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1
Outrunning Constantine’s Shadow
Aristotle Papanikolaou and George E. Demacopoulos
Whatever one may mean by “po liti cal theology,” or even  whether, as Stanley Hauerwas questions,1  there can be such a  thing as 
politi cal theology, it is fair to assert that the discussion on  these themes has 
followed primarily a Protestant- Catholic trajectory. Th e post- Communist 
situation has thrust the Orthodox into  these debates, though  there appears 
 little evidence in the lit er a ture of any mutual infl uence between the 
centuries- long Protestant- Catholic conversation and that emerging within 
the Orthodox world. It was this lack that we hoped to address at the 
Patterson Conference, “Chris tian ity, Democracy, and the Shadow of Con-
stantine,” sponsored by the Orthodox Christian Studies Center at Fordham 
University.
Th e question of the relation of Chris tian ity to democracy is especially 
acute in the post- Communist Orthodox countries. Although Orthodox 
theological engagement with modern liberalism is evident in nineteenth- 
and early twentieth- century Rus sia, it was in relation to the existing im-
perial structures and was interrupted by the Communist Revolution. Th e 
traditional Orthodox countries are now not empires, and even though 
one sees movements  toward totalitarianism within some of  these Ortho-
dox countries,  there is no way for the Orthodox countries to avoid engage-
ment with the challenge of modern po liti cal liberalism. Even in Greece, 
where church- state relations have been a national public issue since 
Greece’s liberation from the Ottomans in the early nineteenth  century, the 
complicated relation to the Eu ro pean Union manifests how an East- West 
divide shapes Ortho dox thinking on the po liti cal.  Th ere is not an Orthodox 
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Church in the world that would disavow democracy, but they do argue 
that the par tic u lar shape of church- state relations is not uniform and must 
take into account a nation’s par tic u lar religious history. Fr. Capodistrias 
Hämmerli supports this claim, drawing on the now landmark case of Lautsi 
v. Italy, and shows how most of the twenty countries participating in Italy’s 
 appeal to the case  were traditional Orthodox countries. Kristina Stoeckl 
further elucidates this East- West rhe toric by analyzing the discourse on 
 human rights in the Rus sian Orthodox Church (ROC). Although the ROC 
supports  human rights, it advances an understanding of  human rights that 
 counters that of the Western liberal tradition. In eff ect, it uses a Western 
notion to claim a diametrical opposition between East and West by arguing 
for a par tic u lar Eastern notion of  human rights and, by extension, of de-
mocracy. In so  doing, it forms alliances with Western conservatives, with 
whom the ROC shares an antiliberal rhe toric. It is unclear to what extent 
the ROC infl uences the Rus sian state or par tic u lar legislation; but Vladimir 
Putin is using Rus sia’s Orthodox history and cultural traditions in order to 
forge a new East- West ideological divide. In this sense, the ROC’s own am-
bivalence  toward modern Western liberalism indirectly contributes to such 
seemingly un- Christian legislation as the laws against “gay propaganda.”
Given this new global real ity, it is timely for a new ecumenical discus-
sion to occur where Protestant and Catholic theologians refl ect on  these 
questions in light of both the Orthodox situation and Orthodox sources; 
and, conversely, where Orthodox theologians refl ect on the unpre ce dented 
global real ity within Orthodoxy in dialogue with the already- existing de-
bate among Protestants and Catholics. Th is theological exchange occurs, 
of course, in light of the larger discussions within po liti cal philosophy about 
the relation of religion to the state, society, and culture.
Mount Athos is to many the heart of the Orthodox world, and Luke 
Bretherton appeals to what some refer to as the holy mountain and the ex-
perience of living between liturgical and “worldly” time as a bridge to the 
consociational model of democracy, which pluralizes po liti cal sovereignty 
across diff er ent overlapping associations. He argues that Orthodox should 
think about politics in terms of consociational democracy, which he con-
nects to Orthodox understandings of the Trinity and eschatology. Th inking 
in consociationalist and eschatological terms would further help the Ortho-
dox resist the temptations of phyletism and ethnonationalism  because it 
would challenge the claims to undivided sovereignty by any worldly po-
liti cal authority or association.
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A seminal moment within the Roman Catholic tradition regarding its 
relation to liberal democracy is Vatican II, and Mary Doak writes on the 
Council’s description of the Church as a “sign and instrument” of divine- 
human communion and ties it to the Orthodox teaching on theosis, argu-
ing that Catholics can learn from the Orthodox how to better show Catholic 
social thought’s rootedness in central Christian teachings. Orthodox teach-
ing on communion can help resist globalization, rampant individualism, 
and social atomism, while helping to promote justice and inclusion. In 
continuity with this theme of divine- human communion, or theosis, Eric 
Gregory identifi es the need for both East and West to better relate the 
world- affi  rming incarnational dimension of po liti cal theology to redemp-
tion history and the awareness of sin. Th e Orthodox are often accused of 
overstressing the former, leading to uncritical alliances with po liti cal in-
stitutions, while po liti cal Augustinians tend to overstress the latter, leading 
to pessimism about earthly politics. Gregory calls on both traditions to 
think about the importance of po liti cal action in time as a way of navigat-
ing the dialectic tensions between po liti cal confi dence and pessimism.
One of the most challenging, if not basic, questions Orthodox theolo-
gians must confront is the compatibility between the Orthodox tradition 
and liberal democracy. Perry Hamalis argues for such a compatibility 
through highlighting the affi  nities between Orthodox thinkers and Th omas 
Hobbes on the dynamics of death. Orthodoxy and the liberal tradition 
founded on Hobbes both see the modern po liti cal order grounded in the 
dynamics of death, and Hamalis argues that such a notion allows for a 
bridge between disparate traditions in ways not pos si ble with the theologi-
cal notion of divine- human communion.
Nathaniel Wood focuses our attention on late nineteenth and early 
twentieth- century Rus sia, where one sees one of the few substantive debates 
on liberal democracy within the Orthodox tradition prior to the post- 
Communist situation. As Wood illustrates, the notion of divine- human 
communion was central to this discussion. He further argues that Rus sian 
theologians, such as Sergius Bulgakov, viewed the secular liberal order 
through the lens of divine- human communion in a way that was critically 
appreciative, as such an order allows for a divinization of the created order 
in freedom, and not through force. Fi nally, Emmanuel Clapsis, like Doak, 
sees the Orthodox understanding of the Church in terms of the Eucharist 
as enabling it to act as an agent for promoting  human solidarity and com-
munion. While the pluralism of liberal democracies has posed a challenge 
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to the ways in which the Church has functioned within traditional Or-
thodox countries, members of Eucharistic communities— Church— should 
engage as connected critics, promoting solidarity and communion within 
the public sphere, while testifying also to the limitations of the age and to 
the world’s eschatological  future.
 Th ese theological discussions on po liti cal theology are ultimately 
haunted by the shadow of the Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Chris-
tian ity (312 CE), which has left its indelible stamp on Christian thinking 
of the po liti cal; his shadow even extends to the pre- Constantinian era, as 
it is impossible for scholars of Chris tian ity to interpret the pre- Constantinian 
Christian response to the question of the po liti cal without being cogni-
zant of what occurred  after Constantine. In the fourth  century, Constan-
tine’s turn to Chris tian ity was si mul ta neously the constitution of a dualism 
in Christian po liti cal theology between Constantinianism and pre- 
Constantinianism that continues to haunt Christian theological refl ec-
tion on the po liti cal.
At the time of Constantine’s conversion, Christians  were not yet the 
majority within the Roman Empire and it was not necessarily inevitable that 
they would succeed in Christianizing the Roman Empire. In hindsight, it 
is clear that the emperor’s conversion facilitated this Christianization and, 
in the pro cess, forged a new relation of the still- evolving institutional 
Church to the imperial state, as well as to the culture and traditions of 
Roman civilization. To say that what emerged was a caesaropapist model 
would be inaccurate and would better describe tsarist Rus sia  after the 
eighteenth- century tsar Peter the  Great. Even  after Constantine, Christians 
maintained a pre- Constantinian critical distance between church and state. 
One way to interpret the well- known model of symphonia, enshrined in 
Justinian’s Sixth Novella, is to see the “established” Church, even with all of 
its growing privileges, as distinct from the state. From the fourth  century 
up  until the fall of Constantinople,  there are numerous examples, including 
writings of patristic thinkers, monastic protestations, and emperor- bishop 
squabbles, that testify to the continuation of a pre- Constantinian Christian 
consciousness as a community distinct from the po liti cal. If “Constan-
tinianism” is meant to characterize an absolute accommodation of 
the Christian Church to the state, then that does not describe the post- 
Constantinian Roman Empire; and, in fact, one would be hard- pressed to 
fi nd a moment in Christian history where this Christian consciousness is ever 
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eviscerated. Inasmuch as Constantine’s shadow looms large over Christian 
po liti cal discourse, so does that of Augustine. As Peter Kaufman demon-
strates, even though Augustine made use of state power against the Dona-
tists, unlike the state, the Church is a community that restores sinners and 
combats pride through its stories and memories.
One might be more sympathetic to the charge of “Constantinianism” 
if it pointed to the kinds of possibilities opened to the Christian Church 
as a result of Constantine’s conversion, and the kinds of exclusions it 
enabled. It would be diffi  cult to dispute that  after Constantine, the Chris-
tian Church suff ered from the temptation of using state power to advance 
what is determined to be Christian objectives, and this temptation plagued 
the Christian Church even during the formation of the modern nation 
state. Th e use of state power ultimately leads to the violent exclusion of not 
simply  those who are not Christian, but  those who might interpret Chris-
tian ity diff erently. Constantine also opened the door for state power to 
infl uence the institutional life of the Christian Church, to the point, as 
Timothy Barnes has proven, of the election of the archbishop of Constan-
tinople being determined by the  will of the emperor, even if the latter did 
not formally meddle in the offi  cial pro cess of electing him. During the  later 
years of the Empire, James C. Skedros describes how “Orthodoxy” transi-
tioned from being a theological concept to one appropriated as “po liti cal 
Orthodoxy” in order to affi  rm a superior po liti cal and cultural identity over 
and against Latin Christians and the Ottomans, in a way that is similar to 
Vladimir Putin’s appropriation of Orthodoxy against the liberal West. 
Constantine did enable new ways of envisioning the relation of Christians 
and the institutional church to the po liti cal, which Christians have not 
been able to resist even up to our current moment.
Th e greatest challenge to this symphonic model was the emergence of 
modern po liti cal liberalism, which has as one of its core princi ples the 
separation of the state from the church. Even though  there always existed 
Augustinian voices attempting to remind Christians that they are a com-
munity distinct from and in critical relation to the po liti cal, the history of 
Christian po liti cal theology in both the East and the West has been one 
form or another of Justinian symphonia in which the Church feels it is 
justifi ed to use the power of the state to advance Christian objectives, and 
where the state makes use of the institutional church and appropriates 
Christian discourse to advance the interests of the state. Modern po liti-
 O u t r u n n i n g  C o n s ta n t i n e ’s  S h a d ow  5
153-66040_ch01_3P.indd   5 9/16/16   11:59 AM
cal liberalism challenged that relationship, but not without re sis tance 
from the Christian churches. Eventually, one sees the growing Christian 
ac cep tance of demo cratic structures, from Walter Rauschenbusch’s So-
cial Gospel to Vatican II’s affi  rmation of democracy. As detailed by  J. 
Bryan Hehir, the Catholic Church has had and continues to have a com-
plicated relationship with democracy, even if it now unequivocally supports 
democracy. Th e complication entails the liberal presuppositions that seem-
ingly structure modern demo cratic institutions, pro cesses, habits, atti-
tudes, and modes of subjectifi cation. It is fair to say that given the Ottoman 
and Communist occupations of traditional Orthodox countries, the Or-
thodox have not had the luxury to confront the challenge posed to Chris-
tian ity by modern liberalism, except for a strain of po liti cal thinking in 
nineteenth- century Rus sia. Up  until the fall of communism, one cannot 
detect a vociferous critique of democracy by Orthodox thinkers. In fact, 
Orthodox Christians in the diaspora seemed to thrive within the Eu ro-
pean, American, and Australian democracies within which they found 
themselves. Even if ambivalent,  there seemed to be an emerging Christian 
consensus around democracy; it appeared as if Constantine’s shadow had 
fi  nally receded.
As the Christian world was making its peace with modern liberal de-
mocracy, and as secular liberal po liti cal phi los o phers from John Rawls to 
Jürgen Habermas  were fi  nally conceptualizing a way for religion to par-
ticipate in the public sphere, Christian theologians started to critically 
examine the relation between Chris tian ity and democracy. Th eologians 
from the movement known as Radical Orthodoxy argued that the presup-
positions of modern liberal po liti cal philosophy are antithetical to  those 
inherent in a Christian participatory ontology. Hauerwas has been one of 
the most vocal critics of the Christian accommodation to liberal po liti cal 
philosophy, arguing, in part, that the Christian endorsement of any par-
tic u lar structuring of the po liti cal is still a form of Constantinianism in-
sofar as such an endorsement tends  toward absolutizing the po liti cal.  Th ere 
are even nontheologians who would indirectly agree with Hauerwas, such 
as Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, and Giorgio Agamben, insofar as they 
interpret the “secular” as simply an extension of Chris tian ity and, thus, of 
some form of Constantinianism, even if Hauerwas would interpret the sec-
ular as a distortion of the Christian Gospel.  Th ere is a strange and ironic 
alliance between certain Christian theologians and nontheologians in 
rejecting the categories of the “secular,” “public square,” and “liberalism.” Th e 
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question of Chris tian ity’s relation to democracy has returned to the center 
of Christian po liti cal theology, and in this discussion, Constantine’s shadow 
once again looms large.
We are living in an age where just as it seemed  there was increasing ac cep-
tance for the role of religion in the public square, Christians started again 
to question their relationship to modern liberal democracy, and non- 
Christian thinkers started to question their relationship to the secular. 
Th e state of the question is a state of confusion, which makes the question 
of religion and politics, of po liti cal theology even more urgent. Although 
the tide of the academic discussion has shifted  toward imagining that 
religion should participate in the public sphere, the liberal left is on the 
defense globally. What remains to be seen, especially in Orthodox countries, 
is  whether what  will emerge  will be a distinctive Christian politics or a re-
surgence of rightist, exclusionary politics.
Th e conference from which this book emerges would not have been 
pos si ble without the generous support of Solon and Marianna Patterson, 
whose generous gift has endowed the Patterson Conference Series on 
Orthodox- Catholic Dialogue. Words simply cannot express our gratitude 
for their unwavering support of the work of the Orthodox Christian Stud-
ies Center at Fordham University. Th e conference was also funded by grants 
received from the Archbishop Demetrios Chair in Orthodox Th eology and 
Culture at Fordham University (which was graciously established by Mary 
and Michael Jaharis through the Jaharis  Family Foundation, Inc.), the Kal-
linikeion Foundation, the  Virginia H. Farah Foundation, members of the 
Orthodox Christian Studies Center Advisory Council, the Interdisciplinary 
Center for Hellenic Studies at Stockton University, and the Michael G. and 
Anastasia Cantonis Chair of Byzantine Studies at Hellenic College and 
Holy Cross. We are also thankful to Gregory Tucker and Nathaniel Wood, 
gradu ate students at Fordham University, for the editorial and administra-
tive work that facilitated the production of this volume. Fi nally, we would 
like to express our thanks to the indefatigable Valerie Longwood, who has 
taken the Orthodox Christian Studies Center to another level.
Note
1. When we mention par tic u lar authors, we are referring to their essays for 
this volume.
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Moral Argument in the  Human 




Over the last de cade and a half the Rus sian Orthodox Church has conducted an intense debate on  human rights, initiated by  today’s 
patriarch and former metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Kirill.1 
In an article published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 26 May 1999, Kirill 
expressed the conviction that  human rights are a natu ral result of the 
Western cultural development that he outlined as follows: Th e Re nais-
sance (i.e., the return of ancient paganism) triggered a chain of subsequent 
cultural changes leading to the Reformation, the Enlightenment, mate-
rialism, and atheism, which fi  nally led to the Universal Declaration of 
 Human Rights, the ultimate codifi cation of anthropocentrism. Since 
the Rus sian Orthodox tradition did not share this history, ran Kirill’s 
argument, it could not share the concept of “ human rights.”2 Shortly 
 after the appearance of this rather pointed article, Kirill apparently felt 
the need to express his position in more detail. Th us, on 16 February 
2000, he published a second article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, which began 
as follows:
A fundamental contradiction of our time and also a major challenge 
to the  human community in the twenty- fi rst  century is the confron-
tation of liberal civilization standards, on the one hand, and the val-
ues of national cultural and religious identity. Th e study of the genesis 
of the contradiction between  these two crucial  factors of modern 
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development and the search for ways to overcome it should take, as 
it seems, an impor tant place in Orthodox theological studies. Since 
this is a prob lem whose solution  will largely determine the  future 
shape of the  human civilization, it is clear that the very formulation 
of the prob lem and attempts to  settle its primary defi nition [ here 
Kirill refers to his previous article] are not only the fruit of a sincere 
interest, but no less of sincere anger. Anger about  those who out of 
ideological convictions reject the very idea of raising  these issues for 
fear of a pos si ble correction or revision of the liberal ideas which  today 
underpin the attempts to shape the  human community into a “melt-
ing pot” of cultures and civilizations. Anger also about  those zealots 
and religious and cultural fundamentalists who have made up their 
mind on  these prob lems long ago and are deeply convinced that the 
only way to move further is to tightly close the door of their  house.3
Kirill concluded that critical and creative engagement with liberal values 
was among the most impor tant tasks of Orthodox theology.4 It is quite 
symbolic that Nezavisimaya Gazeta printed this article alongside a repro-
duction of a nineteenth- century woodcut by the romantic artist Julius 
Schnorr von Carolsfeld entitled Th e Healing of the Two Blind Men. Th e 
symbolism of the image underlined the argument of the article— namely, 
that  there is a confl ict between two sides blinded by their ideological 
fervor.
What Kirill did in this article was to distance himself from both forms 
of “blindness”: He did not think that Rus sia should unconditionally adhere 
to the Western modern and secular trajectory, as liberal secularists would 
argue, nor did he want to fi nd himself on the side of the religious zealots, 
who would not even consider the question of  human rights  because they 
condemn the intellectual universe that has created them in the fi rst place. 
In contrast, Kirill argued for the need to fi nd a third way. But of what 
should this third way consist? In this article, I look at three impor tant 
documents— Th e Basis of the Social Concept of the Rus sian Orthodox Church 
from the Synod of the Rus sian Orthodox Church, the Declaration on 
 Human Rights and Dignity by the Tenth World Council of Rus sian  People, 
and the Rus sian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on  Human Dignity, 
Freedom and Rights—in order to show how the shaping of an ideological 
 middle ground in the Church’s confrontation with  human rights took 
place. A keyword in this pro cess is “morality,” and I  will therefore pay 
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par tic u lar attention to the way in which the moral argument developed in 
the offi  cial discourse of the Moscow Patriarchate in the period from 2000 
to 2008. Before that, however, I  will devote some words to the theoretical 
challenges related to the study of the relationship between religion and 
 human rights.
Religion and  Human Rights
How are we to conceptualize the relationship between religion and  human 
rights in the modern secular world? Louis Henkin has described  human 
rights and religion as two separate ideological worlds with good reasons 
for mutual suspicion. Religions are suspicious of  human rights  because they
are much older than the  human rights idea and have seen no need 
for that idea. Religions laid claim to conceptions of the good, of the 
good society, long ago, without any idea of rights. . . .  Th ey do not 
welcome the ideological in de pen dence of  human rights, its insistence 
on nontheistic support for the idea, its re sis tance to the higher law of 
society and even to divine law. [Religions] have not had confi dence 
in an ideology that does not claim divine origin and inspiration and 
has no essential place for the Deity. Spokesmen for religion have 
declared secular foundations for  human rights to be weak, unstable, 
and doomed to fail and pass away. Some religions resist what they 
see as the concentration on, indeed the apotheosis of, the individual 
and the exaltation of individual autonomy and freedom. Th e empha-
sis of religion, of religions, was not upon the individual but upon the 
community.5
Th e  human rights ideology, in turn, is suspicious about religion  because it
does not see  human rights as integral to a cosmic order. It does not 
derive from any sacred text. Its sources are  human, deriving from con-
temporary  human life in  human society.  Human rights is a po liti cal 
idea and ideology that claims to refl ect a universal con temporary 
moral intuition.  Human institutions have  adopted the idea to serve 
the purpose of the good life within national po liti cal socie ties in an 
international po liti cal system.6
Th e quotations from Henkin are helpful in framing the prob lem of the re-
ligious perspectives on  human rights that I want to address in this article, 
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not least  because Henkin is slightly overstating the contrast between the 
two sides. Henkin rejects  those theories according to which the  human 
rights idea grew from religious inspiration: “Th ough some Christian theo-
logians have argued that Western  human rights theory is grounded in 
religious faith,  human rights morality is, in fact, autonomous.”7 He also 
denies any kind of connection between the concept of “ human dignity” 
as it is used in  human rights covenants and a religious understanding of 
 human dignity. In his view, the
contours of the religious morality developed around this concept [of 
 human dignity] are not congruent with  human dignity as commonly 
conceived in the domain of  human rights . . .  [ because] religions have 
defi ned  human dignity so that it  will coincide with a morality rooted 
in par tic u lar theological foundations and in its historic- sociological 
manifestations over centuries of life in par tic u lar religious socie ties.8
From Henkin’s perspective, no real dialogue or engagement is pos si ble 
 between secular approaches to  human rights and traditional religious 
positions; all that is pos si ble is pragmatic adaptation and division of 
tasks. Religions should recognize that their interests can be advanced by 
the  human rights idea, not least  because, “if only in self- defense . . .  [they 
have] had to develop attitudes  toward modern society and modern po liti-
cal authority.”9  Human rights, on the other hand, are not a substitute for 
religion, but “a supplemental ‘theology’ for pluralistic, urban, secular 
socie ties.”10
Henkin’s sketch of the prob lem of religion and  human rights contains 
four ele ments that are impor tant for my interpretation of the con temporary 
Rus sian Orthodox approach to  human rights: (1) the idea that from a 
 human rights perspective the individual is, fi rst and foremost, endowed 
with rights, whereas from a religious perspective what comes fi rst are the 
duties of  every single person; (2) the idea that from the  human rights per-
spective the individual comes fi rst, whereas from a religious perspective the 
community comes fi rst; (3) the fact that “ human dignity” has become a 
contested term that is used both in  human rights and in religious discourses, 
but is endowed with diff er ent meanings; (4) the argument that religions 
adapt to the modern language of  human rights out of a pragmatic calcula-
tion in order to claim their stake in secular socie ties, as well as the oppo-
site view that their engagement with the modern world is a sign of genuine 
modernization.
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 Th ese four ele ments— rights vs. duties, individual vs. community, 
 human dignity, and pragmatic calculation vs. genuine modernization— 
are leitmotifs for the Rus sian Orthodox discussion of  human rights in this 
article, but I  will show that the ascriptions of the diff er ent positions to  either 
religion or the  human rights regime are not always as clear cut as Henkin 
suggests. I do not subscribe fully to Henkin’s description since he pres ents 
religion and  human rights as two closed and unchangeable systems of rea-
soning. Th is, I think, is wrong. It is wrong from the perspective of reli-
gions,  because religious traditions and theologies evolve with time, even if 
very slowly, and their capacity to confront new topics is not only a  matter 
of self- defense but also of  human creativity and, from the perspective of 
the religious mindset, divine inspiration. It is also wrong from the per-
spective of  human rights,  because the  human rights regime is continuously 
changing;  human rights treaties and legislation have evolved since the Uni-
versal Declaration of  Human Rights was signed in 1948, and religions are 
among  those actors trying to take an active role in infl uencing  human rights 
defi nitions  today.
A theoretical perspective that I fi nd more fruitful for structuring the 
debate on religion and  human rights is the idea of “the sacralization of the 
person” put forward recently by Hans Joas.11 Joas tries to show both that 
 human rights do not belong to an exclusively secularist terrain, and that 
they do not sprout from a purely religious soil. He suggests that the mod-
ern  human rights idea is a genuinely new development, related to religious 
and secular intellectual traditions and practices, but not reducible to  either 
of them alone: He calls this new development “the sacralization of the per-
son.” Joas provides an excellent summary of the fruitless debate between 
secular and religious attempts to legitimize  human rights. Conventional 
lay wisdom (not necessarily shared by academics), he writes, holds that 
 human rights emerged from the spirit of the French Revolution, which is 
in turn considered a po liti cal expression of the anticlerical and antireligious 
Enlightenment: “From this perspective,  human rights are clearly not the 
fruit of any religious tradition, but rather the manifestation of re sis tance 
to a power alliance linking state and (Catholic) church, or to Chris tian ity 
as a  whole.”12 Th e alternative narrative asserts that the notion of inalien-
able  human rights was able to take root  because it could build on an 
understanding of the  human being as cultivated in the Christian tradition. 
Th is perspective became prevalent in the course of the twentieth  century 
when the Catholic Church moved from its initial condemnation of the 
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concept of  human rights to its endorsement.13 Both of  these narratives, 
Joas concludes, are untenable, and he suggests an alternative in which the 
focus of his analy sis is the notion of “sacredness.” He interprets the belief 
in  human rights and universal  human dignity as the result of a specifi c 
pro cess of sacralization of the  human being, “a pro cess in which  every 
single  human being has increasingly, and with ever- increasing motiva-
tional and sensitizing eff ects, been viewed as sacred, and this understanding 
has been institutionalized in law.”14
In the early years of the 1990s, the New School professor Adamantia 
Pollis unequivocally stated:
Individual  human rights cannot be derived from Orthodox theology. 
Th e entire complex of civil and po liti cal rights— freedom of religion, 
freedom of speech and press, freedom of association, and due pro cess 
of law, among  others— cannot be grounded in Orthodoxy, they stem 
from a radically diff er ent worldview.15
Th is statement is correct insofar as it is indeed diffi  cult to “derive” liberal 
individual  human rights from Orthodox theology. However, it would be 
equally diffi  cult to derive  these rights in a straightforward manner from 
any other religious tradition. Th e Christian churches for most of their his-
tory existed untroubled by torture and other abuses, rejected the  human 
rights declarations of the eigh teenth  century, and  were even skeptical about 
the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights of 1948.16 Even  today, most 
Christian churches in the United States are not moved to protest the con-
tinuing practice of the death penalty in many American states. Joas is cor-
rect, therefore, when he points out that it is erroneous to imagine  human 
rights as something that inevitably springs up from the roots of some tra-
ditions and not of  others. Traditions as such “generate nothing”17— what 
 matters is how specifi c actors, belonging to certain traditions, in a specifi c 
moment of time and  under specifi c institutional circumstances, set them-
selves in relation to the innovative idea of universal  human rights or the 
pro cess of the sacralization of the person, as Joas terms it. He writes:
As a novel form of the sacralization of the person, the rise of  human 
rights represents a challenge to Chris tian ity— and to other religious 
and even to secular value traditions and worldviews—in light of 
which their adherents must inevitably reinterpret them.18
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Th is is especially true for the Orthodox churches, which are somewhat 
delayed among Christians in engaging with the idea of  human rights.
In a recent article, Vasilios Makrides mapped the Orthodox theological 
engagement with  human rights on a continuum from “complete rejection” 
to “accommodation.” At the “complete rejection” end of the scale he situ-
ates theologians including Christos Yannaras and Vigen Gurojan, and at 
the “accommodation” end he identifi es writers and churchmen such as An-
astasios Yannoulatos and Konstantinos Delikostantis. In the  middle, he 
situates the Rus sian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on  Human Dig-
nity, Freedom and Rights.19 Th is  middle ground is characterized by what 
Makrides, with reference to Alexander Agadjanian, calls a strategy of 
“acceptance- through- rejection”—an ac cep tance of the  human rights lan-
guage paired with a rejection of the defi nition and aims of modern  human 
rights ideologies.20 My own fi ndings regarding the function of moral 
arguments in the  human rights debate in the Rus sian Orthodox Church 
confi rm the assessment given by Makrides and Agadjanian. However, I 
have also found that the  middle position is not stable: It took shape as a 
theological and moral strategy over a relatively short period of time from 
2000 to 2008, but was then immediately incorporated into the larger and 
purely po liti cal category of “traditional values.” In the remainder of this 
article I  will describe this development and, in the conclusion, off er some 
ideas on why I think that the  middle ground identifi ed by Makrides is 
destined to remain theologically and intellectually barren.
 Human Rights in the Social Concept of the Rus sian Orthodox Church
In 2000, the Synod of the Rus sian Orthodox Church approved a document, 
Th e Basis of the Social Concept of the Rus sian Orthodox Church (Osnovy 
Sotsial’noi kontseptsii Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi; hereafter, Social Con-
cept), which constituted a novelty in the Orthodox world. In this docu-
ment, the Church laid out its position on a number of issues: church- state 
relations, law,  family, society, biotechnology, and globalization. When So-
cial Concept was published in 2000, many commentators interpreted the 
mere fact of its formulation as an impor tant step of Rus sian Orthodoxy 
on its way  toward modernization.21
Social Concept addressed members of the Rus sian Orthodox Church and 
Rus sian society as a  whole. Th ough it also found resonance outside of 
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Rus sia, especially in the Catholic world, its intended audience was domes-
tic. With this document, the Church quite clearly reacted to the social up-
heaval in Rus sian society since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, which 
had brought many freedoms but also many social and economic prob lems 
and, in the eyes of the Church, moral decline. In the document, the Church 
off ered guidelines for Orthodox believers on questions such as abortion, 
contraception, euthanasia, ge ne tic engineering, and environmental protec-
tion. In par tic u lar, the po liti cal agenda of Social Concept constituted a 
novelty: Th e Church defi ned itself as in de pen dent from the Rus sian state and 
government. Drawing a lesson from the history of subordination  under the 
Tsarist state and of suppression by the Soviet state, the Church positioned 
itself as a potential  counter- player to the government and an in de pen dent 
force in civil society.22 Th is commitment to a separation of church and 
state was, as I have shown elsewhere,23 not necessarily liberal in nature, 
but did constitute a break with the long tradition of the symphonic model 
of church- state relations, characteristic of Orthodox Christian politics.
 Human rights are treated in Section IV: Christian Ethics and Secular 
Law of Social Concept, wherein they are associated with the rise of secular-
ism and self- suffi  cient humanism:
As secularism developed, the lofty princi ples of inalienable  human 
rights turned into a notion of the rights of the individual outside his 
relations with God. In this pro cess, the freedom of the personality 
transformed into the protection of self- will (as long as it is not detri-
mental to individuals) and into the demand that the state should 
guarantee a certain material living standard for the individual and 
 family. In the con temporary systematic understanding of civil  human 
rights, man is treated not as the image of God, but as a self- suffi  cient 
and self- suffi  cing subject.24
Social Concept presented  human rights as the product of a Western secular 
 legal positivism, which started to infl uence the Rus sian  legal space  after 
the breakdown of the Soviet Union, but was essentially alien to the na-
tional  legal culture. Th e document clearly remained on a confrontational 
and ideologically closed plane vis- à- vis the concept of  human rights. Th ough 
the document is, over considerable stretches, a text of moderation, the 
section on  human rights departs sharply from this trend. Rather, it repre-
sents the nationalist and anti- Western viewpoint on  human rights that was 
apparently dominant inside the Church at that time.
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Th e Declaration on  Human Rights and Dignity of the Tenth 
World Council of Rus sian  People
In 2006, a second document concerning  human rights emerged from the 
Moscow Patriarchate. To be precise, the Declaration on  Human Rights and 
Dignity by the Tenth World Council of Rus sian  People (Vsemirnij Nardo-
gnij Russkij Sobor’, hereafter often referred to as the Rus sian Declaration of 
 Human Rights to distinguish it from the Universal Declaration of  Human 
Rights) was not strictly speaking a Church document, but the fact that 
it was issued by the World Rus sian  People’s Council, a nongovernmental 
organ ization chaired by the patriarch, with its seat on the premises of the 
Patriarchate, makes it clear enough that the document was produced with 
the full knowledge of the hierarchy of the Church. In retrospect we can 
interpret the Rus sian Declaration as an intermediate step on the path of the 
Rus sian Orthodox Church  toward the formulation of the Basic Teaching. 
In 2006, however, when the Rus sian Declaration of  Human Rights was pub-
lished, its decidedly anti- Western and antiliberal attitude escalated the 
reception of the ideas expressed in Social Concept six years earlier.
Th e Rus sian Declaration established a link between  human rights and 
morality. In the Rus sian original this connection is expressed in the rather 
convoluted phrase “the content of  human rights cannot not be connected 
with morality (ne mozhet ne byt’ svyazano),” simplifi ed in the En glish trans-
lation as “ human rights essentially involve morality.” Th e authors of the 
Rus sian Declaration off ered a theological argument for this link— they drew 
a distinction between  human worth (tsennost’) and  human dignity (dosto-
instvo), claiming that the attainment of the latter depends on morally dig-
nifi ed life- conduct: “Each person as image of God has singular unalienable 
worth, which must be respected by  every one of us, the society and the 
state. It is by  doing good that the  human being gains dignity. Th us we dis-
tinguish between  human worth and dignity. Worth is given, while dignity 
is acquired.”25
Th e distinction between “ human worth” and “ human dignity” was 
theologically untenable, however, and it is no surprise that the Rus sian 
Ortho dox Church’s Basic Teaching on  Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights 
published two years  later corrected this distinction and dropped the term 
“ human worth” altogether. But the very fact that this distinction was made 
in the document of the World Council of Rus sian  People demonstrates that 
the Rus sian Orthodox Church was fi rst and foremost interested in the link 
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between dignity and morality, and not in a theological clarifi cation of 
dignity as such.
Th e 2006 Rus sian Declaration of  Human Rights made reference to a 
“clash of civilizations” as the justifi cation for why the Orthodox world 
must defend its position in the international  human rights debate. Th e 
fi rst sentence of the Rus sian Declaration states: “Aware that the world, 
passing through a crucial point in its history, is facing a threat of con-
fl ict between the civilizations with their diff er ent understanding of the 
 human being and the  human being’s calling, the Tenth World Council 
of Rus sian  People, on behalf of the unique Rus sian civilization, adopts 
this Declaration.”26 A comparison of this passage with the Basic Teach-
ing on  Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights published by the episcopal 
Synod two years  later shows an ideological shift inside the Patriarchate 
between 2006 and 2008. Th e Basic Teaching depicts a very diff er ent 
scenario:
Without seeking a revolutionary reconstruction of the world, and ac-
knowledging the rights of other social groups to participate in social 
transformations on the basis of their own worldview, Orthodox 
Christians reserve the right to participate in building public life in a 
way that does not contradict their faith and moral princi ples. Th e 
Rus sian Orthodox Church is ready to defend the same princi ples in 
dialogue with the world community and in cooperation with  people 
of other traditional confessions and religions.27
Th e approach of  these two documents is completely diff er ent: In the 
Rus sian Declaration, Orthodox tradition is described as a culture endan-
gered by the clash of civilizations; in the Basic Teaching, the Rus sian Ortho-
dox Church recognized that  there is a public debate about values and 
rights in which all social groups and individuals are called to participate, 
and in which they are permitted to defend their respective positions. With 
regard to the signifi cance of the moral argument, in 2006 the Rus sian Or-
thodox Church presented itself as a bulwark of morality against the im-
moral and corrupted West, whereas by 2008, though the same Church still 
perceived itself as a bulwark of morality, it was now willing to enter into a 
dialogue with what it described as a crisis- ridden and morally confused 
West. Th ough this may be a limited change in approach, it nonetheless 
required considerable argumentative and rhetorical eff orts from the hier-
archs of the Moscow Patriarchate, as I  will now show.
20 K r i s t i n a  S t o e c k l
153-66040_ch01_3P.indd   20 9/16/16   11:59 AM
Th e Moral Argument in the Rus sian Orthodox Church’s 
Basic Teaching on  Human Dignity, 
Freedom, and Rights
From 2005 onwards, the Church’s standpoint on  human rights shifted 
from mere rejection to a strategy of acceptance- through- rejection. Th is 
strategy consisted in both the ac cep tance of the  human rights language in 
princi ple and the rejection of concrete  human rights regulations in prac-
tice. A new feature of the discourse was a more intimate knowledge of the 
Western  human rights regime, of its history, and of existing tensions in 
 human rights legislation. Th is approach was inaugurated around 2005 by 
Metropolitan Kirill when he cited for the fi rst time Article 29 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of  Human Rights, a text to which he has subsequently 
returned many times. Article 29 states (in part):
(1) Every one has duties to the community in which alone the  free 
and full development of his personality is pos si ble.
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, every one  shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and re spect for the rights and 
freedoms of  others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a demo cratic society.28
Th e “discovery” of Article 29 had an impor tant eff ect on the  human 
rights debate in the Rus sian Orthodox Church,  because it provided the 
means through which the Church no longer had to place itself in opposi-
tion to a Western individualistic understanding of  human rights, but 
instead might actively pres ent itself as the vanguard of a more original 
understanding of  human rights according to Article 29—an understand-
ing that emphasizes the importance of morality and duties to the commu-
nity. Th is new approach is vis i ble in several of Kirill’s speeches in the years 
leading up to the publication of the Basic Teaching.
At a seminar entitled “Th e Evolution of Moral Princi ples and  Human 
Rights in Multicultural Society” held at Strasbourg on 30 and 31 October 
2006, Kirill said:
I am convinced that the concern for spiritual needs, based moreover 
on traditional morality,  ought to return to the public realm. Th e 
upholding of moral standards must become a social cause. It is the 
mechanism of  human rights that can actively enable this return. I am 
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speaking of a return, for the norm of according  human rights with 
traditional morality can be found in the Universal Declaration of 
 Human Rights of 1948.29
Th e same view was expressed in his speech to UNESCO on 13 March 2007: 
“Th e Orthodox Church invites the world to return to the understanding 
of the role of  human rights in social life that was established in 1948. Moral 
rules can put limits to the realization of  human rights in public life.”30
Th e same point was reiterated by Patriarch Alexei II in a speech to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu rope on 2 October 2007, in 
which he made reference both to the Universal Declaration of  Human 
Rights and to the Eu ro pean Convention on  Human Rights:
 Th ere occurs a break between  human rights and morality, and this 
break threatens the Eu ro pean civilization. We can see it in a new gen-
eration of rights that contradict morality, and in how  human rights 
are used to justify immoral be hav ior. In this connection, I may note 
that morality, with which any  human rights advocacy has to count, 
is mentioned in the Eu ro pean Convention for the Protection of 
 Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. I am convinced that the 
makers of the Eu ro pean Convention on  Human Rights included 
therein morality not as something ambiguous but rather as an inte-
gral ele ment of the  whole  human rights system.31
Th e point was corroborated once more, two years  after the publication of 
the Rus sian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on  Human Dignity, Freedom 
and Rights, by Metropolitan Hilarion Alfayev:
It should be noted that the post- war  human rights instruments did 
refl ect the connection between freedom and moral responsibility. Th e 
Universal Declaration of  Human Rights from 1948 and the Eu ro-
pean Declaration on  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
from 1950 speak about the connection between  human rights and 
morality. It is in  later international acts such as the Charter of 
 Fundamental Rights of the Eu ro pean Union from 2000 that the 
connection between  human rights and morality is not mentioned. 
Freedom is therefore completely divorced from morality.32
Th is series of quotations shows that during the period in which the Basic 
Teaching was being drafted, the leadership of the Rus sian Orthodox 
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Church acquired an increasingly clear understanding of con temporary 
 human rights politics and legislation. Alexei II even spoke about “a new 
generation of rights,” a term that is habitually used in  human rights lit er a-
ture.33 Th e Church’s position was no longer determined by the vague 
inclination  toward rejection that informed debates up  until the mid-
2000s. Th e Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow 
Patriarchate had acquired a precise view on the prob lem and a concrete 
sense of how to approach it. Th ey saw their mission as affi  rming the link 
between  human rights defi nitions and morality.
Th e Rus sian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on  Human Dignity, Free-
dom and Rights, published in 2008, provided the script for this mission. It 
dedicated the entire fi rst chapter to the question of  human dignity as a re-
ligious and moral category. In this chapter, we read that, from the Ortho-
dox Christian perspective,  human dignity is related to the creation of the 
 human being “in God’s image and likeness” (see Genesis 1.27). God’s im-
age in man is described by the document as the source of  human dignity 
that remains “indelible . . .  even  after the fall”— even man’s susceptibility 
to sinfulness cannot erase his God- given dignity. With this sentence, the 
Basic Teaching corrected the distinction made by the authors of the Rus-
sian Declaration of  Human Rights between “worth” as something given and 
“dignity” as something acquired. Furthermore, the concept of  human dig-
nity does not go unqualifi ed in the Basic Teaching: Divine- human like-
ness becomes, for the Church, the source for a precise understanding of 
how  human beings should strive to overcome sin and “restore  human life 
in the fullness of its original perfection.”34 Furthermore,
dignifi ed life is . . .  achieved through God’s grace by eff orts to overcome 
sin and to seek moral purity and virtue. . . .  What is dignifi ed and what 
is not are bound up with the moral or amoral actions of a person 
and with the inner state of his soul. Considering the state of  human 
nature darkened by sin, it is impor tant that  things dignifi ed and 
undignifi ed should be clearly distinguished in the life of a person.35
Th e restoration of  human life to the fullness of divine likeness is called, in 
the Orthodox theological tradition, theosis (deifi cation).
In  these terms, the authors of the Basic Teaching explained what eff ec-
tively constitutes a “good life” according to “God’s design for  human be-
ings and their calling”:36
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Moral norms [are] inherent in humanity just as moral norms set forth 
in the divine revelation reveal God’s design for  human beings and 
their calling.  Th ese norms are guidelines for a good life worthy of 
God- created humanity.37
Knowledge of  these moral norms derives from revelation (scripture and the 
example of Jesus Christ) and from conscience.  Human nature is a prob-
lematic source for morality  because of its potential for sin— “life accord-
ing to the law of the fl esh.”38 For this reason the document puts a special 
emphasis on repentance: “Th e patristic and ascetic thought and the  whole 
liturgical tradition of the Church refer more to  human indignity caused 
by sin than to  human dignity.”39 Chapter I concludes: “According to the 
Orthodox tradition, a  human being preserves his God- given dignity and 
grows in it only if he lives in accordance with moral norms  because  these 
norms express the primordial and therefore au then tic  human nature not 
darkened by sin.”40
Th e Rus sian Orthodox Church thus established a direct link between 
 human dignity and morality, to the point that critics have read the chap-
ter as saying that the Church is making the moral be hav ior of the indi-
vidual a condition for recognizing his or her  human dignity.41 I suggest 
that this is a slightly unfair interpretation of the Basic Teaching. It was true 
of the Rus sian Declaration of  Human Rights by the Tenth World Council 
of Rus sian  People, which drew a distinction between  human worth and 
 human dignity, but the Basic Teaching corrected this view and expressed, 
in princi ple, a commitment to  human dignity as such. However, this com-
mitment remains ambiguous, and it is this ambiguity that I  will now 
address.
My sense is that one partial reason for the continuing dissatisfaction 
among observers with the Church’s equation of “dignifi ed life” and 
“morality” is the use (and translation) of the word “morality.” Th e Rus sian 
version of the Rus sian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on  Human Dignity, 
Freedom and Rights uses the word moral’ three times, but more commonly 
the term used is nravstvennost’ or nravstvennyj (employed over forty times). 
In the En glish translation, both words are rendered as “morality” or “moral,” 
with the exception of the title of the fi rst chapter, for which nravstvennyj is 
translated “ethical.” What are we to make of this diff erence, and why is it 
relevant?
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For ordinary Rus sian speakers, the words moral’ and nravstvennost’ do 
not have the same meaning. Moral’ is understood to mean a “socially 
formed set of norms and princi ples” whereas nravstvennost’ appears to re-
fl ect primarily a type of “inner ethical judgment.”42 I interpret the preva-
lence of the term nravstvennyj in the Basic Teaching as indicative of the 
intention of the authors of the document to defi ne moral be hav ior in a 
comprehensive, individual, and social sense, and not merely as obeying 
rules.
Th at a real tension exists  here is highlighted by the fact that the distinc-
tion between “morality” and “ethics” is a topic addressed by several 
 Orthodox theologians throughout the twentieth  century, notably Chris-
tos Yannaras. Yannaras dedicated an entire book to the diff erence between 
ethics and morality, in which he distinguishes between  free ethical choice 
and moral dictate, and accuses the churches of his time of having become 
moral dictators instead of places for the growth of a  free ethos.43 Another 
Orthodox theologian, Anastasios Yannoulatos, has defi ned the moral 
meaning of the Church’s  human rights discourse in terms of the inner 
makeup and ethical orientation of religious life, rather than in terms of 
public morality.44 He calls the churches to their vocation as “centres of 
moral and spiritual inspiration, nurseries of integrated and sanctifi ed per-
sonalities, workshops of selfl ess love.”45 Th e Rus sian Orthodox Church’s Ba-
sic Teaching on  Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights has been criticized by 
liberal Orthodox commentators precisely on the grounds of this theology, 
which is said to lack emphasis on  free ethical choice. Marina Shishova has 
pointed out that  there is a tension in the Basic Teaching: Does the Church 
engage in  human rights out of commitment to  human dignity as seen from 
the perspective of eternal life, or out of an interest in the community de-
fi ned in terms of the Rus sian state?46
Th e document, not least  because of the semantics of nravstvennost’, re-
mains ambiguous, but in the fi nal analy sis, it seems to me, the balance tips 
from dignity as a religious and ethical category to dignity defi ned in terms 
of compliance with a narrow public morality. I think it is not by chance 
that the Church’s discourse has changed over the last few years since the 
publication of the Basic Teaching, shifting from an emphasis on “morality” 
to “traditional values.” Tradition is invoked by the Church  today as a source 
for rules of social and moral be hav ior and for limitations of individual 
 human rights. When “traditional values” are invoked as the source of public 
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morality, the inner- outer duality of ethical judgment contained in the 
word morality/nravstvennost’ is lost.
Conclusion
Let us now conclude this analy sis of the place of morality in the  human 
rights debate in the Rus sian Orthodox Church prior to 2009. First, we have 
to recognize that this debate was as much a sign of the strength of Rus sian 
Orthodoxy, as it was a sign of self- defense. Why engage at all with the 
 human rights question, if not  because the Church felt aff ected by this new 
real ity and new understanding of the “sacredness” of the person? Second, 
the  human rights debate within the Church was characterized by a shift 
from total rejection to a more complex stance of acceptance- through- 
rejection. Th is stance was chiefl y the fruit of the eff orts of Metropolitan 
Kirill, now patriarch of Moscow, and his collaborators in the Department 
of External Church Relations. Th e outcome of this engagement was the 
Rus sian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on  Human Dignity, Freedom and 
Rights, published in 2008, and a well- defi ned agenda of  human rights and 
morality in the Church’s external relations. But since then, and in par tic-
u lar in Rus sian domestic aff airs, the key term for the Church appears no 
longer to be “ human rights,” nor even “morality,” but “traditional values.” 
My suspicion is that the “tradition” being invoked  here is not the theo-
logical tradition, but a Rus sian cultural tradition.
Why is this invocation of cultural tradition problematic? In reference 
to the Roman Catholic Church, José Casanova once observed that tradi-
tion can never be an argument for uniformity but only for pluralism, 
 because “tradition” has always been the sum total of a multiplicity of 
visions of religious life and teaching, all gathered  under the umbrella of 
the Church.47 In theological terms “tradition” does not appeal to doctrinal 
certainty but rather the opposite— openness. Along  these lines, the Greek 
theologian Pantelis Kalaïtzidis has pointed out that the term “tradition” 
in Orthodox theology should not be understood in a historical sense:
A certain version of theology has turned Tradition into tradition-
alism and taught us to associate the identity of the church mainly—
or even exclusively— with the past, making us accustomed to an 
Orthodoxy that is permanently out of step with its time and history 
in general.48
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Instead, the Eastern Orthodox tradition should be conceived in the light 
of eschatology: “Th e fullness and identity of church is not located in 
the past or the pres ent . . .  but in the  future.”49 And he quotes John 
Meyendorff :
Without eschatology, traditionalism is turned only to the past: it is 
nothing but archaeology, antiquarianism, conservatism, reaction, 
refusal of history, escapism. Au then tic Christian traditionalism 
 remembers and maintains the past not  because it is past, but  because 
it is the only way to meet the  future, to become ready for it.50
If one takes this criticism seriously, then, paradoxically, the Rus sian Ortho-
dox treatment of  human rights falls short of its potential not  because of an 
excess of tradition, but  because of a lack of it— a lack of tradition in an 
eschatological sense.
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Post- Communist Orthodox 
Countries and Secularization
The Lautsi Case and the Fracture of Eu rope
 Father Capodistrias Hämmerli
Introduction
This essay explores how the accession of post- Communist and Ortho-dox countries to the Eu ro pean Union and the Council of Eu rope 
during the last two de cades has impacted the pro cess of secularization in 
Eu rope. Post- Communist Orthodox countries provide an alternative ap-
proach to secularization that has come to play a signifi cant role in  today’s 
po liti cal debates concerning the role and place of religion in modern soci-
ety in Eu rope.
I  shall illustrate my argument with reference to the case of Lautsi v. Italy. 
In 2009, the Eu ro pean Court of  Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that the 
Italian government was in violation of the Eu ro pean Convention on  Human 
Rights by permitting crucifi xes to be displayed in public school classrooms, 
arguing that it broke from the princi ple of the confessional neutrality of the 
state. Twenty of the forty- seven member states that comprise the Council of 
Eu rope intervened in the case, supporting the appeal of the Italian govern-
ment against the ECHR decision. Th e majority of  those twenty states are 
post- Communist countries, and predominantly traditionally Orthodox 
countries. Th ey contested the ECHR’s authority to impose the princi ples of 
laïcité and confessional neutrality on countries, in contradiction to their 
national culture and religious traditions. Th is essay argues that Lautsi v. It-
aly revealed a division between Eastern and Western Eu rope over the role of 
Chris tian ity in Eu rope’s po liti cal and cultural identity.
153-66040_ch01_3P.indd   31 9/16/16   11:59 AM
32 C a p o d i s t r i a s  H ä m m e r l i
Th is paper  will examine some historic and religious specifi cities pertain-
ing to post- Communist and Orthodox countries that explain their diff er-
ent approaches to secularization. Th e historical experience of radical, forced 
secularization  under Communism provides a solid basis for the critical ap-
proach of post- Communist countries to the increasing secularization of 
Eu rope. I  shall also argue that close church- state relationships and a strong 
bond between religious and national identities are some of the character-
istics of Orthodox cultures that are leading several Eastern Eu ro pean coun-
tries to a diff er ent stance on secularization. I  will explore this point further 
with reference to recent po liti cal developments in Rus sia.
Th e Crucifi x Case: Background
Th e local confl ict that was to become known across the  whole of Eu rope 
as “the Crucifi x Case” began in Northern Italy in 2002, in the small town 
of Abano- Terme near Venice. Mrs. Soile Lautsi contested the presence of 
crucifi xes on the classroom walls of the public school attended by her two 
sons, then aged thirteen and eleven. In making her case, she appealed to 
the princi ple of laïcité1 which is recognized by Italian constitutional juris-
prudence.2 Lautsi is a member of the Associazione Nazionale del Libero 
Pensiero “Giordano Bruno” (the Giordano Bruno National Association of 
 Free Th ought), whose main po liti cal endeavor is to obtain a complete sep-
aration between church and state. Th e Associazione Nazionale supported 
Lautsi during the lengthy juridical procedures she underwent. It is on the 
ground of her philosophical convictions, rather than on the ground of any 
substantial moral damage that would have been infl icted upon her sons 
by the public school, that Lautsi began the juridical strug gle that was to 
last almost a de cade. During the several proceedings, she consistently fo-
cused on trying to prove that the princi ple of laïcité was being  violated by 
the presence of religious symbols in public schools.
First Ruling of the Eu ro pean Court of  Human Rights
In 2006,  after the Italian courts had eventually rejected her arguments and 
appeals,3 Lautsi fi led a petition with the Eu ro pean Court of  Human 
Rights.4 On 3 November 2009, the Chamber of the Second Section of the 
ECHR issued its ruling concerning Lautsi v. Italy.5 In its argumentation, 
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the court introduced formally for the fi rst time the princi ple of the confes-
sional neutrality of the state:
Th e State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with 
any kind of power on its part to assess the legitimacy of religious con-
victions or the ways of expressing  those convictions. In the context 
of teaching, neutrality should guarantee pluralism.6
Formally, the court concluded that both the right of Mrs. Lautsi (as  mother) 
and her  children to education (Protocol 1, Article 2 of the Eu ro pean 
Convention on  Human Rights) and to religious freedom (Article 9 of the 
convention) had been  violated.7 A close analy sis of the structure of the argu-
ment of the court shows that pluralism, rather than the right to education 
and to religious freedom per se, is the key princi ple that the court sought 
to uphold. Th e jurisprudence of the court considered pluralism as a fun-
damental aspect of democracy. According to the Chamber of the Second 
Section, since the displaying of crucifi xes in Italian public schools could 
not be interpreted as contributing to educational pluralism, the practice 
should not be accepted.
Th e court argued that, since pluralism is vital to demo cratic socie ties, it 
is necessary to guarantee it through the confessional neutrality of the state, 
in order to prevent an unjust domination of the majority religion over other 
religions and convictions— a situation that would disrupt the equality of 
religions in the state. Th e court’s argument in  favor of neutrality is founded 
on an induction, as is made clear by the ruling itself, already quoted above: 
“In the context of teaching, neutrality should guarantee pluralism.”8
Th e implied consequences of the ruling  were far reaching: Italy should 
remove all crucifi xes from all public schools. Moreover, since the ruling 
on Lautsi v. Italy was a decision of the ECHR, all member states of the 
Council of Eu rope, from Portugal to Rus sia, could be expected to comply 
with the newly enforced  legal princi ple of the confessional neutrality of the 
state. All countries in Eu rope would be obliged to remove religious sym-
bols from public school classrooms.
Th e court, through the fi rst Lautsi v. Italy ruling, was trying to estab-
lish laïcité as a po liti cal norm that would be binding upon all the states 
that signed the Eu ro pean Convention on  Human Rights. However, laïcité 
is not mentioned by, and therefore not guaranteed by, the convention, and 
in fact many countries in Eu rope have juridical systems that do give a 
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par tic u lar privileged place to their own historically and so cio log i cally 
dominant religious tradition.9 Th e implicit idea in the chamber’s ruling is 
that Eu ro pean identity and unity can only rest on secular values, and not 
on Eu rope’s Christian heritage.
Reactions and Po liti cal Implications
Th e ECHR’s ruling provoked strong public reactions in Italy and several 
other Eu ro pean countries. Th e Vatican, together with representatives of 
many major ecclesiastical institutions, condemned the court’s decision. Th e 
Patriarchate of Moscow was a major voice on behalf of the Orthodox 
Church and took an active role in responding publically to the court’s 
decision.10
Th e Italian government contested the decision and lodged an appeal 
with the  Grand Chamber of the ECHR.11 Th e appeal was accepted and 
the proceedings resumed, with unpre ce dented media coverage. Th e Italian 
government’s argument was grounded on premises very diff er ent from  those 
exhibited in the fi rst ruling of the ECHR:
Th e Republic of Italy, though secular (laïque), has freely deci ded to 
preserve a tradition which dates back almost a  century. . . .  [Th is de-
cision] is motivated by the distinctive national characteristic expressed 
by the close relation between state and the  people, and Catholicism, 
at the historical, traditional, cultural, and territorial level, as well as 
by the fact that Catholic values have always been deeply rooted in 
the feelings of the majority of the population.12
Th e strongest argument adduced by Italy was that the government, i.e., the 
state (which holds po liti cal power), must take account of the character of 
the nation. Po liti cal power (kratia) must represent the  people (demos). Th is 
is the very defi nition of demo- cracy. In other words, the Italian government 
claimed that it could not apply the court’s princi ple of confessional neu-
trality of the state in Italy without showing contempt for the majority of 
its own population and for its historical and cultural traditions.
Lautsi v. Italy acquired its real po liti cal signifi cance with the intervention 
of other states. Ten member states of the Council of Eu rope constituted 
themselves offi  cially as third- party interveners, standing against the deci-
sion of the court.13  Th ese countries participated in the proceedings, each 
submitting to the  Grand Chamber a written argument for the display of 
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religious symbols in public schools or public spaces maintained by the 
state. Th ey also took part in a session of the court on 30 June 2010. Eight 
states  were represented by Joseph H. H. Weiler, who delivered a rhetori-
cally brilliant speech arguing that it is Eu rope’s unique characteristic to 
have juridical pluralism, in which each country is permitted to have its 
own church- state model.14 Th is pluralism is secured by the court’s ac cep-
tance of the Margin of Appreciation, which acknowledges that the Eu ro-
pean Convention on  Human Rights  will be interpreted diff erently in 
individual member states. Th e Margin of Appreciation was also at the center 
of the written submissions of the ten countries intervening on behalf of 
the Italian government.15
Th e written statements submitted to the ECHR  Grand Chamber are of 
 great signifi cance. Ten member countries of the Council of Eu rope wrote 
to defend the importance of Chris tian ity in the cultural and po liti cal  future 
of Eu rope. Such a third- party intervention, by states not directly involved 
in the case, contesting a decision of the ECHR, was totally unpre ce dented, 
as Grégor Puppinck noted:
Th is is  really an impor tant pre ce dent in the practice of the Court 
 because, usually, member States abstain from intervening, or inter-
vene only when the case aff ects a national of their State as permitted 
by Article 31(1). Th e Lautsi case is unique and unpre ce dented. Ten 
States are in fact explaining to the Court what is the limit of its juris -
diction; what is the limit of its ability to create new “rights” against the 
 will of the member States. Th is can be viewed as a kind of counter- 
balancing power.16
In addition, ten other governments made public declarations in  favor of 
the Italian government, opposing the ruling of the ECHR. In total, twenty- 
one of the forty- seven member states of the Council of Eu rope contested 
the Second Section Chamber’s initial decision.
Who  Were the Intervening Countries?
It is in ter est ing to analyze which countries constituted the opposition to 
the court’s initial ruling. Two characteristics emerge among  those states that 
determined to intervene. Th e fi rst is po liti cal: Th e strongest re sis tance to 
the court’s secularism came from post- Communist countries; the second 
is religious: Orthodox countries represented the majority of the opposition. 
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Th e other opposing countries  were Roman Catholic. No traditionally 
Protestant country contested the ruling.
Taking into account  these two criteria we can categorize the twenty- 
one countries that opposed the Lautsi v. Italy ruling (which includes Italy) 
into four  classifi cations:
1. Post- Communist and Orthodox, representing approximately 
232 million  people—by far the largest and most signifi cant  group:
a. Th ird- Party Interveners: Armenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Rus sia;
b. Public declarations in opposition to the ruling: Macedonia, 
Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine;17
2. Post- Communist and Roman Catholic, representing approxi-
mately 61 million  people:
a. Th ird- Party Interveners: Lithuania;
b. Public declarations: Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia;
3. Orthodox (and not formerly Communist), representing approxi-
mately 12 million  people: Greece and Cyprus (both third- party 
interveners).
4. Roman Catholic (and not formerly Communist), representing 
approximately 70 million  people:
a. Th ird- Party Interveners: Malta, Monaco, and San Marino;
b. Public declarations: Austria;
Italy also belongs in this category, and accounts for 61 million 
 people.
Albania (approximately 3 million  people) is diffi  cult to classify 
by religion, but should also be counted as a post- Communist 
country.
In order to achieve a more meaningful comparison, I have taken account 
of the population of each country. Th rough the analy sis that follows, my 
aim is to give an impression of the importance of the reaction against the 
court’s ruling, and to demonstrate conclusively that po liti cal history (the 
experience of having been Communist) and religion (being Orthodox) did 
indeed play a major role in the decision to intervene in the  legal proceed-
ings of the ECHR in the case of Lautsi v. Italy.
Th e population of all the member states of the Council of Eu rope com-
bined is approximately 800 million  people. Th e twenty- one countries that 
contested the initial ruling of the court represent approximately 378 million 
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 people or 47  percent of the population of the member states of the Council 
of Eu rope. In other words, the countries that contested the secular ruling of 
the court account for half the population of the constituent states of the 
Council of Eu rope.
Collectively the post- Communist countries that contested Lautsi v. It-
aly (leaving aside their religious affi  liations) stand for approximately 296 
million  people, representing 78  percent of the population of the twenty- 
one countries contesting the court’s fi rst ruling. If we exclude Italy and take 
into account only the countries that defended her, the proportion of the 
contesting populations drawn from post- Communist countries rises to 
92  percent.
Turning now to the religious criterion, it is clear that Orthodox coun-
tries  were dominant in the reaction against the Lautsi v. Italy ruling: Th ey 
represent 64.5  percent of the opposition to the ECHR’s decision, or 77 
 percent, if we exclude Italy.
Half of Eu rope contested the secularist ruling of the ECHR: Th ree- 
quarters of the protesters  were from post- Communist states; two- thirds of 
the protesters  were from Orthodox countries— formerly Communist and 
Orthodox countries represent three- fi fths of all the protesters.  Th ese im-
pressive fi gures prompt us to investigate the reasons for such a confi gura-
tion and the meaning of Communist history and Orthodox religion as 
 factors strengthening re sis tance against the laïcité po liti cal model.
Th e Fracture of Eu rope
Lautsi v. Italy revealed a fault line in Eu rope caused by the question of the 
societal legitimacy of Chris tian ity. It has made manifest the strength of 
the popu lar opposition to the secular po liti cal line that the Eu ro pean Court 
of  Human Rights has been following during the last de cades. Th e Lautsi v. 
Italy case has revealed a  legal and po liti cal confl ict in Eu rope concerning 
the way states should deal with the religious dimension of their own na-
tional identities. Th is fracture divides Western and Eastern Eu rope. Th e 
countries that took the unpre ce dented step to constitute themselves as 
third- party interveners in the case of Lautsi v. Italy are almost all from East-
ern Eu rope.
Th e Chamber of the Second Section certainly did not anticipate such a 
determined reaction to its ruling— had it, the court would have given a 
much more detailed argument and would have addressed the application 
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of the Margin of Appreciation, which  later became the crux of the case. 
Th e importance of Lautsi vs. Italy lies precisely in the fact that it has re-
vealed this diff erence between East and West. During the seventy years of 
the Communist era, Eu rope was divided. During the last two de cades, all 
Eu ro pean post- Communist countries have become members of the Coun-
cil of Eu rope, and many of them have also joined the Eu ro pean Union.18 
Th is long series of adhesions is extremely signifi cant in the history of the 
Council of Eu rope and the Eu ro pean Union. Both institutions had,  until 
then, developed exclusively in Western Eu rope  after the Second World 
War.19 Post- Communist countries, with an Orthodox majority among 
them, represent now more than one- third of the population of the mem-
ber states of the Council of Eu rope.20 Th is means that the Council of 
Eu rope, as well as the Eu ro pean Union, has integrated countries with a very 
diff er ent historical, po liti cal, and religious background. During the 1990s, 
post- Communist countries  were in a period of transition and most of their 
po liti cal elites welcomed Western values and po liti cal models with enthu-
siasm. Th is situation has now partly changed in some countries.21 Th e 
colossal media interest in Lautsi vs. Italy played a role in strengthening 
the perception among post- Communist Christian countries ( whether 
Roman Catholic or Orthodox) that they share a common position against 
a juridically imposed secularization of the state and public sphere. Th e 
ECHR, which may have regarded the employment of the princi ple of 
laïcité as self- evident pro gress, has come to realize through the appeal over 
Lautsi vs. Italy that the new Eastern post- Communist member states  will 
not willingly follow the current secular Western po liti cal trend, but rather 
challenge it.
Th e  Grand Chamber Ruling
Th e  Grand Chamber gave its fi nal judgment on 18 March 2011.22 Th e 
judges declared (by a majority of fi fteen to two) that Italy had not  violated 
the Eu ro pean Convention on  Human Rights by allowing crucifi xes to be 
displayed in public schools. Th is ruling appeared to be a complete reversal of 
the situation established by the Chamber of the Second Section, which made 
the initial ruling unanimously.
At the juridical level, the key ele ment that led the  Grand Chamber to 
revise the fi rst judgment was taking into account the princi ple of the Mar-
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gin of Appreciation.23 Although it is a well- established princi ple in the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR, the Chamber of the Second Section did not 
even mention it in its analy sis, or in its deliberation of the case. Th e princi-
ple of the Margin of Appreciation allows the state a discretionary freedom 
to legislate religious  matters, provided  there is no Eu ro pean consensus on 
the issue at stake. In its fi nal judgment, the  Grand Chamber declared that 
it understood Mrs. Lautsi’s discomfort with crucifi xes, but also underlined 
the subjective nature of this discomfort and concluded that the Italian state 
was not guilty of indoctrination (which is clearly prohibited  under the 
convention).24 Th erefore, exposure to crucifi xes in public schools was not 
interpreted by the court as a violation of the applicant’s rights, or  those of 
her  children.25
Since  there was no doubt that the princi ple of the Margin of Apprecia-
tion exists in the court’s jurisprudence and has played a signifi cant role in 
many similar cases, the key remaining question was: How is it that the 
judges of the Chamber of the Second Section did not take this princi ple 
into account at all (dismissing its importance by ignoring it— not even giving 
arguments against its use in this specifi c case), while the  Grand Chamber 
made it the key ele ment on which to base its revised ruling?
Considering the importance of the po liti cal reactions outlined above, it 
seems diffi  cult to contest the hypothesis that the opposition of twenty- one 
countries, representing almost half of the population of the Council of 
Eu rope’s member states, to the fi rst ruling by the Chamber of the Second 
Section played a decisive role in the fi nal decision of the  Grand Chamber. 
Since, in fact, the court does not have any power to enforce its decision 
within the borders of any individual country, with so many countries con-
testing the legitimacy of the court to impose a secular model over the  whole 
of Eu rope, the court would have lost credibility and moral authority by 
confi rming the fi rst ruling.26
However, the ruling of the  Grand Chamber cannot be considered as a 
straightforward victory for the Italian government and her allies. At the 
level of juridical concepts, the  Grand Chamber has maintained— although 
with some limitations— the princi ple of the confessional neutrality of the 
state.27 Th e ruling of the  Grand Chamber is paradoxical, since the very 
princi ple that was introduced by the Chamber of the Second Section, ac-
cording to which Italy was fi rst condemned, has been confi rmed by the 
 Grand Chamber, and yet the Italian government was no longer considered 
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to have contravened the Eu ro pean Convention on  Human Rights. In other 
words, on the one hand, Italy was granted freedom to act according to her 
own wisdom and to or ga nize the relationship between church and state ac-
cording to local circumstances, but on the other hand, the court established 
the princi ple of confessional neutrality as a norm everywhere in Eu rope.
Th e most obvious explanation for this lack of coherence in the  Grand 
Chamber’s ruling is that the court had to accommodate two contradic-
tory stances: On the one hand,  there was its own preference for po liti cal 
laïcité and a clear separation between state and church; and on the other 
hand,  there was the pressure of the unexpectedly robust support for the 
appeal lodged by the Italian government. Th us, the court did not condemn 
Italy (to satisfy the opponents of the fi rst ruling) but nonetheless upheld 
the secular norm of the confessional neutrality of the state, moving its 
jurisprudence in the direction it wished.
Two Confl icting Interpretations of  Human Rights
Th e debate took place in the context of the ac cep tance of pluralism as a 
legitimate foundation for con temporary democracy, itself viewed as the best 
and most legitimate po liti cal system. During the hearing before the ECHR, 
Prof. Weiler attempted to show that allowing crucifi xes to be displayed in 
Italian public schools, and at the same time permitting France to have a 
po liti cal model grounded on strict laïcité, was a sign of the au then tic plu-
ralism. According to Weiler, the Eu ro pean model of tolerance, allowing 
juridical pluralism, is a most precious part of Eu rope’s heritage.28
Confessional neutrality of the state was necessary, according to the 
Chamber of the Second Section, to protect pluralism. In his defense for 
the Italian government, Grégor Puppinck commented on the use of the 
word “pluralism” in the Second Section ruling: “Th is constituted a mis-
interpretation of the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol 1, which merely 
stands for the princi ple that in a democracy, the educative off erings should 
be pluralistic, not the teaching itself.”29 Puppinck further notes the para-
doxical use of the princi ple of pluralism by the judges of the Second Sec-
tion and the secularists: “Th is ‘pluralism’ ironically results in exclusion of 
the very possibility of plurality by imposing the mono poly of secularism.”30 
Lautsi vs. Italy showcases a confl ict of interpretation between two groups, 
which agree on some basic terminology— human rights, democracy, and 
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pluralism— but give diff er ent meanings to each of  these key terms, accord-
ing to the role and signifi cance religion is accorded in public life.
At the heart of the confl ict is the question: Does the Italian state have 
the right to give visibility to the religious dimension of its national identity 
in its public spaces? In other words, must the state renounce its national 
identity in order to re spect  human rights? Th e straightforward conse-
quence of the fi rst ruling was that the modern state should be removed from 
the continuing infl uence of the nation’s history and from the majority re-
ligious intuition of the  people. Th is is a model in which the state imposes 
a secular norm based on a doctrinal princi ple, rather than one derived 
from the demo cratic  will of the majority of its  people. Secularists believe 
that excluding religion from the public sphere  will prevent further religious 
confl ict; they perceive this prescriptive norm as demo cratic, even when it 
contradicts the intuition of the majority,  because it helps achieve the equality 
of religions  under the law. Th e state has to remain external to any religious 
 matters,  because  were it to adjudicate on religious norms or values, it would 
establish an unjust diff erence between  people belonging to diff er ent con-
fessions or professing no confession at all. Th is was the case made by Mrs. 
Lautsi: Th e fact that one child would see the symbol of their religion in the 
classroom and another one would not constitutes unjust discrimination— a 
violation of the princi ple of equality.
Defenders of the presence of religion in the public sphere perceive this 
type of equality as an excuse for the complete domination of secularism. 
Indeed, removing crucifi xes in Italy means that the dominant religion  will 
be reduced to the same status as other religions— a status of almost nil 
public and po liti cal infl uence. Th e Italian government and its supporters 
 were unable to accept this logic of equality, since they desire religion to 
play a role in public life and to be part of the identity of the state. Th ere-
fore, religious symbols displayed by the state in schools and other public 
spaces are fundamental,  because they show that the government of the state 
is true to the nation’s culture and tradition. From this perspective, demo-
cracy is not a secularist po liti cal ideology, but one that preserves the ety-
mological meaning of “democracy” as a po liti cal system that is rooted in 
the  will of the demos, the  people. Th us the  will of a local or national ma-
jority should prevail over both universal abstract princi ples (in this case, 
the secularist ideals of the ECHR) and excessively individual claims ( those 
of Mrs. Lautsi).
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Imposing a Nationless State?
Another signifi cant dimension of the secularist argument for the confes-
sional neutrality of the state is the unity of Eu rope. Secularists consistently 
argue that Eu ro pean integration requires coherent legislation to regulate 
religion.31 Nationalism is traditional by nature,  because it inherently tends 
 toward the preservation of an identity that is historically constituted: Since 
the history and religious traditions of Eu rope are predominantly Christian, 
patriotism almost always includes a Christian dimension. To be patriotic in 
Eu rope usually entails sympathy for the Christian identity of one’s own nation 
and of the continent— therefore con temporary Western secularism cannot 
count on nationalism as an ally in the construction of a unifi ed Eu rope.
Th e identity and values of a state are refl ected in the symbols it adopts 
publicly, so the idea of symbolic neutrality is impossible.  Were  Eng land, 
Switzerland, or Greece to remove the cross from their national fl ags, it 
would certainly not be perceived as a “neutral” decision. An empty wall in 
a classroom in the countryside in Italy achieves neither neutrality nor 
equality. A state must have a fl ag, a national anthem, a constitution, state- 
funded museums, etc.— these are symbolic of the state— but they cannot 
be religiously neutral since national history is never religiously neutral. Th e 
meaning of state symbols is rooted in national history, and thus  those sym-
bols cannot be neutral.
For this reason, to say that states should be religiously neutral implies 
that they should be detached from the nation they govern. In order to be 
perfectly neutral, a state should become nationless, disconnected from its 
history and culture, supremely indiff erent to the religious feelings of the 
majority of its own  people. It is this that the Italian government could not 
accept in the fi rst Lautsi v. Italy ruling.32 It was agreement with this challenge 
that led to so many vehement reactions, especially from Orthodox countries 
for which it is unthinkable to erase the constitutive role of religious tradi-
tions in the identity of the state.
A nationless state would enforce only individual rights, based on a princi-
ple of  human equality. Philosophically, such equality entails the exclusion 
of national identity, grounded in the  will and sentiment of the majority, 
since demo cratic laws (i.e.,  those that accord with the preference of the ma-
jority) are necessarily less favorable for minorities. One of the key roles of 
 human rights is to counterbalance the power of the demo cratic majority, 
to ensure that minorities  will still preserve their most fundamental rights. 
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But if individual rights are permitted to overrule the  will of the  people, can 
the society still properly be called “demo cratic”? While the Italian govern-
ment and Italian laws do indeed accept the notion of individual rights,  those 
rights need to be balanced by collective societal rights. Many supporters 
of the Italian government in this case insisted on that the Eu ro pean Con-
vention on  Human Rights does not establish the confessional neutrality 
of the state or laïcité as po liti cal  princi ples.
Post- Communist Countries
Radical secularism in Communist countries was grounded in an atheistic 
philosophy that interpreted religion as oppressive and superstitious. Accord-
ing to Marx, religious superstitions had always played a po liti cal role and 
 were the means through which the cap i tal ist oligarchy could dominate the 
 people and hold them in captivity. In the po liti cal philosophies that led to 
Communism in Eastern Eu rope, religion was viewed as a tool of po liti cal 
and economic domination, and the key  factor that hindered the develop-
ment of an equal and just society. Th us, a liberating state had the duty and 
responsibility to  free the minds of its  people from religious superstitions, 
which hitherto  were restricting them to inferior social status and unjust 
living conditions. It became the mission of the Communist state to cleanse 
religion from society. Th e social structures and habits connected with the 
Church, as well as public practices and regulations directly inspired by 
Chris tian ity, had to be suppressed.
In the context of my argument, it is impor tant to emphasize that the 
programmatic eradication of religion from public life involved an attentive-
ness to the symbolic world. In the states that became Communist, religious 
symbols had previously been endorsed and used by the government. Th ere-
fore, the only action that a Communist state could undertake to achieve 
its new po liti cal end was the removal of  those symbols altogether. With 
impor tant nuances in form and intensity, the Communist programs used 
a familiar method to achieve this aim: Church buildings  were  either 
destroyed, reassigned to secular use, or hidden  behind new buildings, and 
streets, squares, even entire cities, which had Christian names  were renamed 
(so, for example, St. Petersburg became Leningrad). But since public spaces 
cannot be deprived of symbols entirely, the Communist governments cre-
ated new statues, names, and slogans to fi ll the void created by the eradi-
cation of Christian symbols and to promote their own philosophy.
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Th is extended period of forced de- Christianization— which entailed 
social and physical persecution, as well as the eradication of religion from 
public life— has left a deep trauma in the consciences of  those who now 
live  under post- Communist regimes in Eastern Eu rope.  Th ere are solid 
reasons to believe that the fi rst Lautsi v. Italy ruling, in which an interna-
tional court attempted to force a state to suppress the traditional presence 
of religious symbols in schools, awoke painful memories for  those who had 
recently experienced just that. It is not surprising, therefore, that the most 
determined supporters of the Italian government’s appeal to the ECHR 
 were formerly Communist countries. Th e key  factor that makes the fi rst 
Lautsi v. Italy ruling similar (although much softer) to Communist policies 
is the fact that the Court claimed that it is the duty of the state to remove 
religious symbols not  because the majority had demo cratically deci ded 
on such a course of action, but for the sake of a po liti cal ideology— secular 
pluralism.
I believe that a thorough refl ection on the role of secularism in the  future 
of Eu rope must take into account the po liti cal history of post- Communist 
countries, for whom their past provides a solid basis for their critical re-
sponse to this trend. And this position must be taken very seriously, since 
more than a third of the current population of the member states of the 
Council of Eu rope is now living in  these countries. It is undeniable that 
the Communist experience  will remain engraved in the conscience of East-
ern Eu rope for a long time to come, and it is thus to be expected that the 
reactions triggered by the fi rst Lautsi v. Italy ruling are only the symptom 
of what  will certainly prove to be a long- lasting disagreement concerning 
the place and role of secularism and Chris tian ity in Eu rope’s destiny.
Orthodox Countries
Since Eastern Eu ro pean Orthodox countries are also post- Communist, it 
is diffi  cult to distinguish and evaluate separately the respective weight of 
po liti cal and religious  factors in their rejection of the Court’s decision. 
However, in the written statements from the traditionally Roman Catholic 
and Orthodox countries acting as third- party interveners, the defense of 
the Christian inheritance of Eu rope appears as a strong motive for their 
reaction.33 As we  shall  later see, religion and politics are deeply intertwined 
in Orthodox countries.
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All the countries that contested the fi rst ruling on Lautsi v. Italy are 
 either Roman Catholic or Orthodox.34 Both insist on the value of a good 
and fruitful relation between the state and the church, the latter having a 
public and active role to play in the life of the nation. Th is common feature 
distinguishes them from postmodern Protestantism, which insists that reli-
gion is a private aff air and therefore that public law should not be molded 
according to specifi cally Christian princi ples. Even so, the fact that the gov-
ernments of traditional Orthodox countries represent two- thirds of the 
opposition to the Second Section Chamber’s decision needs further inves-
tigation. Orthodox countries have several po liti cal, historical, and theo-
logical aspects to their identity that account for their strong stand against 
the Court’s secularism.
Orthodox countries have not passed through the long historical pro cess 
of the privatization of religion that took place in the West, which brought 
to the fore the princi ple of laïcité in the wake of Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution.35 Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece (to name the 
most prominent) became in de pen dent nation states only during the nine-
teenth  century, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In the past their 
territories and impor tant parts of their populations had been part of 
“Romania”— the Christian Roman Empire (which lasted from 382 to 1453) 
centered on Constantinople, the New Rome.36 In the Christian Roman 
Empire, the “Roman” identity was one and the same with the “Christian” 
identity.37 Th is Roman/Christian identity was preserved during the Otto-
man rule through the Rum millet system, which established the Orthodox 
Patriarch of New Rome (which came to be known as Istanbul) as an 
ethnarch for all the Romans (i.e., the Christians) living in the Sultan’s 
empire.38 When the Ottoman Empire dwindled, new nation states on a 
Western model became in de pen dent and once more proclaimed traditional 
Chris tian ity as their national religion, around which much of their respec-
tive national identity came to coalesce. Th e Church played a major role in 
the preservation of a continuous ethnic and religious identity defi ned 
against that of their Muslim rulers during centuries of Ottoman subjuga-
tion. When the Orthodox countries we know  today became in de pen dent 
in the nineteenth  century, the Orthodox Church played an impor tant role 
in their reorganization as newly established states.39 Th is Orthodox national 
history, which antedates the coming of Communism in the twentieth  century, 
plays again— since the fall of the Berlin Wall— a very impor tant role in 
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the formation of the national identity of  those countries. Rus sia was never 
part of the Roman Empire, but the successors of Saints Cyril and Metho-
dius’s missions to Bulgaria from New Rome played a major role in the con-
version of Rus sia to Chris tian ity.  After the fall of Constantinople, Rus sia 
often interpreted herself as the heir to the Christian Roman Empire and the 
guardian of Orthodox Chris tian ity.40
I want to underscore four major diff erences between post- Communist 
Orthodox countries and Western countries, which help explain their strong 
rejection of the secular po liti cal model promoted by the ruling of the 
Chamber of the Second Section.
First, in the West, the public function of Chris tian ity gradually declined 
over a long period, which was still not complete in the 1950s when Chris-
tian demo crats (mostly Roman Catholics) began their proj ect to unite the 
states of Eu rope.41 In contrast to this pro cess, Communist revolutions rep-
resented a sudden and radical breach with the past, without gradual tran-
sition. Immediately, traditional monarchical Christian socie ties had to 
adjust to the new values and po liti cal princi ples of radical international 
socialism. When Communism collapsed, religion won back its social po-
sition in a context in which a clear separation between the state and the 
church, and the confi nement of religion to the private sphere,  were natu-
rally felt to belong to the recent Communist past, which was viewed very 
negatively. Western observers may be misled by the solemn declarations of 
laïcité or separation of state and church in some constitutions of former 
Communist countries. Th e texts of  these laws may very well have been in-
spired by Western standards, but in the minds of the majority of the pop-
ulations, as well as politicians, a clear and well- established separation of 
state and church does not exist, and is not recognized in practice.
Secondly,  after the fall of Communism, religion has found again a pub-
lic voice, as well as social and even po liti cal infl uence.  Th ere is a public 
and social revival of Chris tian ity in both Romania and Rus sia: In  these 
countries, the  whole society has once more become Christian. Th e fact of 
Chris tian ity gaining importance and public infl uence on such a vast scale 
is unheard of for more than two centuries in the West, where  there has 
been only a long decline of Chris tian ity and no sign of a revival.
Th irdly,  there is a strong relationship between Orthodox faith and 
national identity in most (if not all) Orthodox post- Communist countries. 
Th is goes back to the nineteenth  century, when the Ottoman Empire was 
losing its power and the pres ent nation states  were being created. Each new 
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country established— not without religious debates and even schismatic 
situations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople— a national church. It 
is common in Orthodox countries that a citizen of that country would con-
sider themselves an Orthodox Christian, even if they do not believe in 
God, and even if they are not baptized. Orthodoxy and national identity 
are deeply tied together.
Th e fourth point may certainly be the most surprising for someone from 
a Western point of view. In post- Communist countries, the institution of 
the Church is well respected. Anticlerical feelings, which are very common 
in the con temporary West, do not have any equivalent in mainstream pub-
lic opinion in Eastern Eu rope. Orthodox parish priests are almost always 
married and  there is often an organic relationship, especially in rural areas, 
between the laity and the clergy. Without a pope, Orthodoxy is not a 
centralized international institution. Th e authority of its hierarchy, now as 
always, entails the voluntary reception of that authority by the  people. In 
Orthodox countries, it is not uncommon to fi nd nonbelievers who are criti-
cal of aspects of Orthodoxy but who nonetheless re spect the Church as an 
institution.
 Th ese four points, (1) no clear separation of state and church, (2) the 
con temporary revival of Chris tian ity, (3) the strong relationship between 
religious and national identity, and (4) trust and re spect for the Church as 
an institution, lead to an interpretation of democracy and  human rights 
that diff ers from that in the secular West. Th e idea that democracy must 
be grounded in the traditions and  will of a  people understood as a  whole, 
with its religious and cultural traditions, is resilient. Th e demo cratic princi ple 
according to which it is the privilege of the majority to defi ne the national 
identity according to history is still extremely strong in Orthodox coun-
tries, which is why, when  human rights tend to promote a secular po liti cal 
model, they are met with a very negative reaction.
In the West, equality, laïcité, pluralism, and other secular values are 
much more widespread and deeply rooted in popu lar opinion, with the re-
sult that a strong tie between a specifi c religion and the state is perceived 
as unjustly discriminatory against adherents to other religions or non-
believers. Pluralism, as a po liti cal doctrine, dictates that religion has to re-
main a private aff air and that neither government nor the legislature should 
base its decisions on religious princi ples. By contrast, in popu lar opinion 
in Orthodox countries, the idea that pluralism should be imposed po liti-
cally and judicially, with the intention of avoiding discrimination and to 
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build a perfectly egalitarian balance between the diverse religions and 
worldviews, is rejected as a threat to national unity, which is grounded in 
a singular national history  shaped by Orthodox faith.
Rus sia and the Symphonic Po liti cal Model
Th e po liti cal and religious history of each post- Communist Orthodox 
country is very diff er ent. Th e outline given above, which attempts to gather 
together the main features that explain the reaction of Orthodox countries 
during Lautsi v. Italy, only touches the surface of the vari ous national con-
texts, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate in more detail 
the diff erences between the individual countries. However, the exploration 
of at least one of them  will give more weight to the  whole argument.
Rus sia is a very in ter est ing case. Rus sia is not a member of the Eu ro-
pean Union, but she is a member of the Council of Eu rope, and played a 
decisive role in Lautsi v. Italy. Th e demographic, economic, and po liti cal im-
portance of Rus sia, as well as her in de pen dence from the Eu ro pean Union, 
gives her a unique position among post- Communist countries when it comes 
to issues related to Western secular policies and recent innovations in  human 
rights. We must never forget that politics is always a rapport de forces. For 
example, in this regard, a country such as Romania, which depends eco-
nom ically on subventions from the Eu ro pean Union, cannot be expected 
to take a clear public stand against the dominant opinion of the Eu ro pean 
Union.
Th e evolution of Rus sia’s dominant po liti cal philosophy since the fall of 
Communism is extremely in ter est ing. Already in 1990, the Soviet au-
thorities created a law on “Freedom of Conscience and Religious Belief,” 
according to the Western liberal model, “which contains provisions against 
discrimination on religious grounds.”42 Th is was an impor tant turn  toward 
the Western model of freedom of religion. Th e dissolution of the USSR in 
December 1991 left Rus sia without any clear po liti cal trajectory. For a short 
period of time in the early 1990s, Rus sia sought po liti cal inspiration from 
the West, and so laws concerning religion  were enacted during this period 
 under Western infl uence: Freedom of religion was integrated in the new 
Rus sian Constitution of 1993, becoming a cornerstone princi ple of the Rus-
sian juridical system.43 However, enthusiasm for the Western po liti cal 
model did not last long. Sergey Filatov  writes:
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Pro- Western demo cratic and market euphoria, and the expectations 
of the quick and painless achievement of the newly understood 
“bright  future,”  were replaced by disillusionment and apathy. Numer-
ous polls of  those years showed that, prior to 1991, not less than 
two- thirds of the population thought that Rus sia should follow the 
Western example in every thing, patterning Rus sia on its example. By 
1992, the same overwhelming majority believed that Rus sia had its 
own way to follow. Rus sia was, in princi ple, a diff er ent civilization— 
and the West was no model for it.44
Since the mid-1990s, Rus sia has been seeking her own path, and recov-
ering her own history, together with the role of Orthodoxy in her national 
identity. Rus sia resolutely turned to her pre- revolutionary past for inspira-
tion, reviving the traditional Orthodox idea that the state and the church 
should collaborate.45 Th e Moscow Patriarchate took an active role in this 
turn by promoting the idea of a par tic u lar bond between Orthodox reli-
gion and Rus sian identity. Th is resulted in the enforcement of a new series 
of laws, at the regional as well as at the national level, which introduced a 
distinction between diff er ent kinds of religions. Th e new Federal Law of 
1997 demarcates established religions and “groups” which cannot obtain 
 legal recognition.46 Th e special role of Orthodoxy is mentioned in the 
preamble to the law.
On the one hand, it can be stated with Filatov that “the revival of reli-
giosity in post- Soviet Rus sia is a unique phenomenon in the history of 
Christian civilization,”47 and on the other hand, polls show that the pop-
ulation is still largely irreligious. Th e proportion of  those who say they are 
believers in Rus sia is comparable with secular Western countries. Th e main 
diff erence, though, is that this proportion is increasing in Rus sia, whereas 
it is decreasing in Western Eu rope.48  Th ere is no doubt that Rus sia is be-
ing re- Christianized, even if the pro cess has not yet deeply touched the 
population.
Davis states that, at the po liti cal level, post- Soviet Chris tian ity in Rus sia 
may be characterized by two major movements: First, conservative pa-
triots see Rus sian religion as a unique tradition to be defended against 
reforms; and second, demo crats see religion as one ele ment in a plurality 
of institutions contributing to the building of civil society. Both are repre-
sented in the post- Soviet development of Chris tian ity and its repre sen ta-
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tion in the media.49 Th is tension and contradiction between  these groups 
is noted by Marat Shterin:
One basic tension stemmed from the perceived contradiction between 
the 1990 Law’s thrust to treat all religions equally on the one hand, 
and the claims of historic faiths to recognition of their specifi c role 
for par tic u lar national or ethnic groups on the other. Undoubtedly, 
 there was a revival of ethno- religious links  after the de cades of 
forcible disassociation between religion and ethnicity. As part of this 
pro cess, past history became the most prominent reference point in 
what can [be] described as a strug gle for legitimacy.50
Th is restoration of Rus sia’s glorious past involves a specifi c idea about Rus-
sian identity as fundamentally diff er ent from Western Eu rope.51 Patriarch 
Kirill introduced in the late 1990s the phrase “Rus sian civilization,” under-
stood as unique  because it is grounded in the Orthodox faith, that sets 
Rus sia apart from Western Eu rope, which is essentially Protestant and 
Roman Catholic.52
Th is “turning to the past” in an attempt to fi nd a po liti cal path distinct 
from  those of Communism and Western liberal, secular, and individual-
istic democracy has even reached further than Rus sia’s own past. In the 
media, as well as in po liti cal debates, the question as to  whether the Chris-
tian Roman Empire must be used as a source of inspiration for po liti cal 
thinking has become signifi cant. Over the course of more than a millen-
nium, the Roman Empire developed a Christian po liti cal philosophy, which 
may be expressed by the Greek word symphonia, which means “harmony.” 
It refers to a po liti cal philosophy that, according to the word of Christ, dis-
tinguishes the power of the state and the power of the church, and, at the 
same time, strongly affi  rms that the two powers must collaborate for the 
good of the  people, each of them exercising its limited authority. Sympho-
nia is the predominant traditional Orthodox model for Christian po liti cal 
philosophy. In the Bases of the Social Concept of the Rus sian Orthodox 
Church,53 the Synod of the Rus sian Orthodox Church speaks highly of sym-
phonia as a po liti cal model, quoting from the Sixth Novella of Emperor 
Saint Justinian I:
Th e greatest blessings granted to  human beings by God’s ultimate grace 
are priesthood and kingdom, the former (priesthood, church au-
thority) taking care of divine aff airs, while the latter (kingdom, 
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government) guiding and taking care of  human aff airs, and both, 
come from the same source, embellishing  human life. Th erefore, noth-
ing lies so heavy on the hearts of kings as the honour of priests, who 
on their part serve them, praying continuously for them to God. And 
if the priesthood is well ordered in every thing and is pleasing to 
God, then  there  will be full harmony between them in  every  thing 
that serves the good and benefi t of the  human race. Th erefore, we 
exert the greatest pos si ble eff ort to guard the true dogmas of God 
and the honour of the priesthood, hoping to receive through it  great 
blessings from God and to hold fast to the ones which we have.54
Orthodox tradition features several Christian Roman Emperors as mod-
els, having canonized them as saints.55 Holy rulers of the Roman Empire 
are discussed in the media in Rus sia.  Th ere is no agreement about the sym-
phonia model, but the very fact that it is seriously discussed shows how far 
Rus sia is from the model of Western liberal democracy: “Th e pattern of 
religious news coverage in broadcasting as a  whole is therefore based on a 
strong inclination  toward the Rus sian Orthodox Church and the expec-
tation that Church policies  will feature as a regular aspect of most major 
po liti cal, social, and cultural questions.”56
Tsar Nicolas II, murdered by the Communists, was offi  cially canon-
ized in Rus sia in 2000 as a martyr for the faith, reconnecting po liti cal 
thinking to the traditional idea of “Holy Rus sia.” Another prominent 
example of the collaboration of the state and the Church concerns the 
rebuilding of the monumental Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, 
which had been destroyed by Stalin. It was recently reconstructed essen-
tially with state fi nances and was presented as a symbol of a new era in 
national life.57
To conclude this short exposition of some current po liti cal develop-
ments in Rus sia, the main fact that needs to be underscored is that  there 
is a return of Christian tradition as a framework for po liti cal thinking in 
Rus sia.
Conclusions
Th is essay has explored the historical, po liti cal, and religious diff erences 
that set apart post- Communist Orthodox countries from other nations in 
Eu rope. Th e recent experience of radical secularization  under Communism 
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explains why Church and po liti cal authorities in formerly Communist 
states have begun to contest the secular interpretation of  human rights that 
is so widespread in Western Eu rope. Th eir religious tradition is perceived 
by the majority of the local population as a self- evident foundation of na-
tional identity, and so the idea that the state should surrender its national 
identity (by promoting secularism) in order to re spect individual  human 
rights simply does not make sense. Th e creation of Eu ro pean unity around 
secular values (therefore excluding Chris tian ity as of primary signifi cance) 
has been challenged by several post- Communist Roman Catholic and 
Orthodox countries. Th ey reject the idea that laïcité should be imposed on 
all Eu ro pean countries by an international court and they refuse to inter-
pret pluralism as requiring strategies that disregard their own religious cul-
ture and traditional values.
Th e ECHR case of Lautsi v. Italy has brought to the fore the fact that 
Eastern Eu rope is not uncritical of Western Eu ro pean pro gress  toward a 
fully secularized society.  Th ere are strong signs of a revival of Chris tian ity 
in several countries in Eastern Eu rope including Rus sia, which is the most 
power ful actor in Eastern Eu ro pean politics. Rus sia seems willing to aban-
don altogether the idea of Eu ro pean unity in order to pursue the restora-
tion of a glorious Rus sian civilization founded on Orthodoxy, and thus 
markedly diff erentiated from the Western po liti cal construction, which is 
based on individual  human rights, prescriptive pluralism, and equality. 
Such an idea has been fully endorsed and outlined by the pres ent patri-
arch of Moscow. If traditional Chris tian ity continues to reinforce itself in 
Rus sia and other Orthodox and Roman Catholic post- Communist coun-
tries in the  future, and at the same time Western Eu rope continues on its 
trajectory  toward a more thoroughly secularized society, the fracture of 
Europe, brought to light by Lautsi v. Italy,  will no doubt become a more 
forceful real ity in Eu ro pean politics in the years to come.
Notes
1. Laicità in Italian.  Th ere is no exact equivalent for this term in En glish; 
it is perhaps best translated as “secularism.” However, in Italian laicità and 
secolarismo have diff er ent nuances: Laicità refers specifi cally to the po liti cal and 
juridical princi ple of the separation of state and church, and is thus narrower in 
scope than secolarismo, which is a so cio log i cal and ideological term. In other 
words, laicità refers to a standing  legal princi ple by which the state is bound, 
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whereas secolarismo is descriptive of an ideology and only theoretically prescriptive. 
In Eu rope, juridical lit er a ture in En glish uses the French laïcité (equivalent to the 
Italian laicità) to express the po liti cal and  legal norm according to which the 
state should neither interfere in religious aff airs nor be defi ned or infl uenced by 
religion. In this article, I  will use the term laïcité in the En glish  legal sense 
when speaking of the po liti cal norm apart from the social phenomenon of 
secularism. It is in fact the very term laïcité that stands at the center of the 
juridical debate pertaining to Lautsi v. Italy.
2. Th e princi ple of laïcité is not written into the Italian Constitution. 
However, it has received progressive recognition over a lengthy period as part of 
the Italian jurisprudence.
3. For a detailed review of the long and complex proceedings in Italy, see the 
reconstitution in the ruling of the Eu ro pean Court of  Human Rights  Grand 
Chamber, Lautsi v. Italy, 18 March 2011 (http:// hudoc . echr . coe . int / sites / eng 
/ pages / search . aspx, accessed 17 July 2014), §§10–16.
4. Th e Eu ro pean Court of  Human Rights (ECHR) has its seat in Strasbourg 
and protects rights as set out in the Eu ro pean Convention on  Human Rights. 
Th e ECHR is affi  liated to the Council of Eu rope, which is constituted of 
forty- seven member states, representing approximately 800 million  people. Th e 
Council of Eu rope must be distinguished from the Eu ro pean Union, a more 
recent and slightly diff er ent endeavor, which is constituted of only twenty- eight 
member states accounting for approximately 500 million  people, and with its 
seat in Brussels. All member states of the Eu ro pean Union are also members of 
the Council of Eu rope.
5. A Chamber is a body of seven judges that represents the ECHR at a fi rst 
hearing of a case. Th e ECHR is or ga nized into diff er ent Sections, each having 
responsibility for diff er ent kinds of cases. Th e case Lautsi v. Italy was fi rst heard 
by the Chamber of the Second Section. Th e  Grand Chamber, composed of 
seventeen judges, gives fi nal rulings on appeal cases. Th e Chamber and the 
 Grand Chamber are often simply called “the court,” since in both operations 
they represent the ECHR.
6. ECHR (Second Section), Lautsi v. Italy, 2009, §47e.
7. Th e core argumentation of the court can be found in ECHR (Second 
Section), Lautsi v. Italy, 2009, §§48–58.
8. ECHR (Second Section), Lautsi v. Italy, 3 November 2009, §47e.
9. See Eu ro pean Centre for Law and Justice,  Legal Memorandum: ECHR— 
Lautsi v. Italy, April 2010. Th e Appendix to the Memorandum details the 
religious and constitutional specifi cities of all forty- seven member states of the 
Council of Eu rope. Th e full text is available at http:// eclj . org / pdf / ECLJ 
- MEMO - LAUTSI - ITALY - ECHR - PUPPINCK . pdf (accessed 17 July 2014).
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10. See, for example, the declaration of Kirill, patriarch of Moscow, available 
on Interfax: http:// www . interfax - religion . com / ? act = news & div = 6675 (accessed 
17 July 2014).
11. Th e  Grand Chamber is the fi nal court of appeal in the Eu ro pean Court 
of  Human Rights, and its rulings cannot be overturned. See note 5 above for 
more details concerning the organ ization of the ECHR.
12. Repubblica Italiana, Lautsi c. Italie, Saisine de la Grande Chambre, 2010, 
§16 (my translation, from French). Th e full text can be found at http:// eclj . org 
/ pdf / mémoire _ du _ gouvernement _ italien _ pour _ la _ saisine _ de _ la _ grande 
_ chambre . pdf (accessed 17 July 2014).
13. Th e status of “third- party intervener” (amicus curiae) is usually used to 
allow NGOs, which are not directly involved in a case ( either as plaintiff  or as 
accused), to intervene offi  cially in the written and oral proceedings.
14. Professor Weiler, an Orthodox Jew, was formerly the Joseph Straus 
Professor of Law and the Eu ro pean Union Jean Monnet Chaired Professor at 
New York University School of Law. Since 2013 he has been president of the 
Eu ro pean University Institute, Florence, Italy. A video of his defense in the 
Lautsi and  Others v. Italy case can be viewed on YouTube at www . youtube . com 
/ watch ? v = ioyIyxM - gnM (accessed 17 July 2014).
15. “A Summary of the Submissions of the Intervening States,” prepared by 
the Eu ro pean Center for Law and Justice, can be found at http:// eclj . org / pdf 
/ ECLJ - Summary - LAUTSI - 20110315 . pdf (accessed 17 July 2014). Th e full 
written submissions of the states are neither published in print nor available on 
the internet (as far as the author is aware); they are accessible in the archives of 
the ECHR.
16. “ECHR Crucifi x Case: Ten Member States Join Italy in Support of the 
Crucifi x,” Eu ro pean Centre for Law and Justice press release (1 June 2010); 
available at www . eclj . org / Releases / Read . aspx ? GUID = a77d9063–0475–408f 
- 84a6 - 8a608be0077e (accessed 17 July 2014).
17. Armenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Rus sia became third- party interveners 
in the Lautsi and  Others v. Italy proceedings, so their involvement was more 
direct that that of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine, which made 
public declarations but did not take part in the juridical proceedings before 
the ECHR. A distinction between the two subcategories of offi  cial participants 
in the  legal proceedings and unoffi  cial commentators is pres ent in each of the 
following groups also.
18. Th e exception is Belarus, which has not yet been accepted into the 
Council of Eu rope.
19. With the exception of Greece, which was the only Orthodox country in 
Eu rope that did not become Communist.
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20. Th e post- Communist countries that opposed the ruling of the 
 Chamber of the Second Section represent 37  percent of the population of the 
countries that make up the Council of Eu rope (approximately 293 million 
 people).
21. Rus sia is the clearest example (as  will be elucidated below), but  there are 
other countries that have recently taken po liti cal courses alien to Western 
secular politics— for example Hungary, which has just established a new 
constitution that gives an impor tant place to traditional Christian princi ples.
22. Eu ro pean Court of  Human Rights ( Grand Chamber), Aff aire Lautsi 
et autres c. Italie, with an offi  cial translation in En glish as Lautsi and  Others v. 
Italy, 18 March 2011, available at http:// hudoc . echr . coe . int / sites / eng / pages 
/ search . aspx#{“dmdocnumber”:[“883170”], “itemid”:[“001–104042”]} (accessed 
17 July 2014).
23. See § 61 and § 68–70 of the ruling of the  Grand Chamber.
24. ECHR, Lautsi and  Others v. Italy, § 78.
25. ECHR, Lautsi and  Others v. Italy, § 57–81.
26. In fact, it has been argued with good reason that the very fact that 
twenty- one countries contested the fi rst ruling had already diminished the 
authority of the ECHR.
27. ECHR, Lautsi and  Others v. Italy, § 60: Th e court mentions the Folgerø 
Case, which is interpreted as imposing a “duty of neutrality and impartiality” 
on contracting states.
28. See Weiler’s intervention, acting in the name of eight countries. Video 
available at: www . youtube . com / watch ? v = ioyIyxM - gnM (accessed 17 July 2014). 
Th e written text of the intervention can be accessed at: http:// www . ilsussidiario 
. net / News / Politics - Society / 2010 / 7 / 1 / EXCLUSIVE - Oral - Submission - by 
- Professor - Joseph - Weiler - before - the - Grand - Chamber - of - the - European - Court - of 
- Human - Rights / 96909/ (accessed 17 July 2014).
29. G. Puppinck, “Th e Case of Lautsi v. Italy: A Synthesis,” 873.
30. G. Puppinck, “Th e Case of Lautsi v. Italy: A Synthesis,” 884.
31. See A. J. Menéndez, “A Christian or a Laïc Eu rope? Christian Values and 
Eu ro pean Identity,” in Ratio Juris. 18, no. 2 (June 2005): 179–205. (“Laïc” 
should read “Laïque,” since “Eu rope” requires the feminine adjectival form in 
French.) Secularists no longer consider the possibility of building Eu ro pean 
unity on Christian values, an idea that was still widespread in the 1950s.
32. Th is is clear in the argument of the Italian Republic found in Lautsi 
c. Italie, Saisine de la Grande Chambre.
33. See “ECHR Crucifi x Case” (note 19 above).
34. With the exception of Albania, which became Communist at a time 
when Islam, Catholicism, and Orthodoxy  were all well- established religions.
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35. Th is pro cess of privatization achieved momentum in the eigh teenth 
 century in Western Eu rope. It progressed very unevenly in diff er ent national 
contexts. Yet,  there is now a clear movement  toward secularization, which came 
to full fruition only in the late twentieth  century, especially through the 
Eu ro pean Union and also, to a lesser extent, the infl uence of the ECHR.
36. Also known in Western scholarship by the pagan name of “Byzantium.” 
Th is ancient name also gave itself to the expression “the Byzantine Empire,” 
coined in the sixteenth  century in French by Hieronymus Wolff . Both in Latin 
and Greek, the name of the Christian Empire was  either “the Roman Empire” 
or “Romania.” “Eastern Roman Empire” is also a modern historiographical 
term, used to distinguish the eastern Christian territories from the  later western 
kingdoms.
37. Indeed, the word “Romans” was used to refer to “Christians,” while 
“Greeks” was used to refer to the few remaining “pagans.”
38. Th is Ottoman system gave the patriarch the highest po liti cal authority 
and responsibility over the Romans (i.e.,  those belonging to the Orthodox 
Church).
39. In Greece, the church also played a major role in the Roman Revolution 
of 1821 (the “Greek War of In de pen dence”), which  later was interpreted— 
under the infl uence of  Great Britain and France, which took an active and 
decisive role in the revolution—as a Greek revolution against their Ottoman 
rulers.
40. Th is feeling was very strong in the nineteenth  century, especially in the 
Slavophile movement (Khomiakov, Dostoevsky,  etc.), which thought that 
Rus sia had a role to play as the redeemer of Eu rope, perceived as Western and 
profoundly alien. Th e feeling that the Rus sian Empire was the legitimate heir to 
the Christian Roman Empire led Moscow to proclaim herself as the “Th ird 
Rome” (a title still used  today by traditional Orthodox).
41.  Th ere  were, of course, violent and radical episodes. Th e most impor tant 
was the French Revolution, which not only murdered, exiled, or imprisoned 
anti- Republican priests and annihilated  whole populations in the monarchist 
and pro– Roman Catholic region of Vendée, but also abolished the Judeo- 
Christian week of seven days and changed the calendar in order to lay the 
foundation for a new society,  free of the Judeo- Christian tradition.
42. H. Davis, “Mediating Religion in Post- Soviet Rus sia: Orthodoxy and 
National Identity in Broadcasting,” in Orthodoxy in Rus sia: Post- Atheist Faith, 
ed. S. Filatov, Studies in World Chris tian ity 14 (Proj ect Muse, 2008): 65–86, 
 here 71.
43. Davis, “Mediating Religion,” 71: “Th e law was liberal and popu lar and 
the freedoms  were endorsed in the 1993 Rus sian Constitution. Its guarantees of 
freedom of worship for all faiths, including foreign religious associations, 
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encouraged a boom in religious activity ranging form evangelism, pilgrimage, 
religious education, new religious movements and the resurgence of indigenous 
religious practices.”
44. Sergey Filatov, “Orthodoxy in Rus sia: Post- Atheist Faith,” in Orthodoxy 
in Rus sia: Post- Atheist Faith: 187–202,  here 188.
45. Th is collaboration of the state and the church has progressively 
become more impor tant since the fi rst election of Vladimir Putin as presi-
dent in 2000.
46. See Davis, “Mediating Religion,” 72. Many, if not most,  legal systems in 
Western Eu rope have similar distinctions even  today. Th e striking aspect of this 
new law is that it moves away from equality between religions  toward a system 
that grants privileges to only some religions on the basis of history, demo-
graphic importance,  etc. Th is reversal in the prevailing trend is highly signifi -
cant in refl ection on the fate of secularism in Eu rope.
47. Filatov, “Orthodoxy in Rus sia,” 188.
48. World Values Survey research in Rus sia, based on surveys at vari ous 
intervals in the 1990s and 2000s, shows that:(1) a minority in Rus sia practice 
religion on a regular basis; (2) the proportion of Rus sians who believe in God 
and identify with Orthodoxy is growing. Th e data can be found on the offi  cial 
website at: http:// www . worldvaluessurvey . org (accessed 17 July 2014).
49. Davis, “Mediating Religion,” 71–72.
50. Marat Shterin. “Church- State Relationships and Religious Legislation in 
the 1990s,” in Religious Transition in Rus sia, ed. M. Kotitanta (Helsinki, 
Kikimora Publications for Alexsanteri Institute), 218–50,  here 231. Citation 
according to Davis, “Mediating Religion,” 71.
51. Filatov, “Orthodoxy in Rus sia,” 190: “Th e continuous strengthening of 
the Orthodox Church in Rus sia is fi rst of all its strengthening as an ideological, 
cultural and po liti cal force expressing society’s mood of restoration.”
52. Filatov, “Orthodoxy in Rus sia,” 191: “Th e term ‘Rus sian civilization,’ 
introduced into ecclesiastical vocabulary in the late 1990s by Metropolitan 
Cyrill (Gundyaev), has acquired a sacral, quasireligious meaning in church 
circles.”
53. Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, 
Bases of the Social Concept of the Rus sian Orthodox Church, 2000. Th e full text of 
the document is available in En glish at http:// orthodoxeurope . org / page / 3 / 14 
. aspx (accessed 17 July 2014).
54. Th e Sixth Novella of Saint Justinian is quoted  here as found in the 
En glish translation in the Bases of the Social Concept of the Church (see note 53 
above). Th e Synod of the Rus sian Orthodox Church endorses this Novella as a 
traditional reference, but noting that this ideal was never realized in its purity 
in the Christian Roman Empire. Th e  whole pre sen ta tion on the diff er ent 
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po liti cal models and their respective merits can be found in the Bases of the 
Social Concept of the Church § III.4.
55. Im por tant examples of canonized Roman Emperors are Saint 
 Constantine I the  Great (272–337), Saint Th eodosius I the  Great (347–395), 
Saint Justinian I (482–565), and Saint Basil II (958–1025).
56. Davis, “Mediating Religion,” 78.
57. See Davis “Mediating Religion,” 76–78.
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Power to the  People
Orthodoxy, Consociational Democracy, 
and the Move beyond Phyletism
Luke Bretherton
Introduction
I had the privilege a few summers ago of  going on retreat to Vatopedi Monastery on Mount Athos, the ancient spiritual center of Orthodoxy.1 
Up some stairs from where the church and refectory  were located, in a 
passageway the monks constantly traversed,  were two clocks. One was 
marked “worldly”/cosmic time, keeping Greenwich Mean Time— a chron-
ological order universalized as a result of contingent historical procedures 
developed mainly to serve the interests of industrial and imperial expan-
sion and effi  ciency.2 Th e other clock marked the time that determines the 
practices and life of the monastery and that was changed regularly accord-
ing to a combination of the rhythms of nature (notably, the movement of 
the sun) and the liturgical calendar. Th is monastic, liturgical time is referred 
to on Athos as “Byzantine” time— revealing both its local and traditional 
character. To catch the ferry or arrange to meet someone, one has to oper-
ate on worldly time; to eat or worship (two dimensions of the same event 
at the monastery), one has to know the time set within your monastery, 
which, as St. Benedict tells us, is a school for the Lord’s ser vice. Such was 
my schooling that, for all the contingency and abstraction of worldly time, 
it still felt more “real” than the local time, despite the materiality, sociality, 
and concreteness of the latter.
As well as the prob lem of how to live faithfully at the intersection of two 
time zones— one eschatological and the other earthly— Vatopedi illustrates 
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the prob lem of how to live in overlapping and intersecting po liti cal spaces. 
Mount Athos is an anomaly that incorporates and disrupts key aspects 
of po liti cal order as it emerged in Eu rope since the tenth  century. Each 
monastery is a self- governing polity, and governance of the mountain as a 
 whole is overseen by a council of representatives of the twenty monasteries 
whose jurisdiction overlaps and must be negotiated with both its titular 
ecclesiastical ruler, the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, and the 
modern sovereign power responsible for Mount Athos within the post- 
Westphalian international order, the Greek nation state. In its national 
administrative structures, Greece locates responsibility for Mount Athos 
within the Foreign Ministry. Th e three diff er ent forms of monastic life 
practiced on the island (in the monasteries, the scetes, and the cells) add 
further diff erentiation and variation. Most of the monasteries are “Greek”— 
although they welcome monks and guests of all nationalities— but  there 
are also the “foreign” monasteries of Rus sia, Serbia, and Bulgaria, at which, 
nevertheless, “Greek” monks may also reside (even if this is far less com-
mon  today). Mount Athos can thus be said to represent an ongoing form 
of what John Milbank calls “complex space”: Th at is, in contrast to the 
bounded nation state with a single law and indivisible source of rule, which 
at the same time is unbounded in the exercise of its sovereign  will within 
its own borders, complex space entails overlapping jurisdictions in which 
the sovereign authorities of the pope, parliaments, kings, dukes, doges, and 
vari ous forms of self- governing corporation are interwoven with each other 
and span disjunctive spaces.
In this essay I  will refl ect on the twin problematics Mount Athos pres-
ents us with— that is, how to live faithfully at the intersection of two time 
zones and how to live in overlapping and intersecting po liti cal spaces—in 
the context of thinking about the relationship between Chris tian ity and 
democracy.3  Th ese refl ections  will serve as a prelude to some constructive 
suggestions for ways in which Orthodoxy might faithfully conceptualize 
its relationship to demo cratic politics in liberal states characterized by re-
ligious and moral plurality. But fi rst let me say a word about democracy.
Defi ning Democracy
Democracy means collective self- rule by the  people for the  people, rather 
than rule by the one, the few, or the mob. Th is defi nition raises the ques-
tion of who and what constitutes the  people and thence what is the nature 
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and form of this self- rule. Many accounts of democracy conceive of self- 
rule as an extension of individual autonomy. Pop u lar sovereignty is derived 
from the sovereignty of the individual and is considered indivisible and 
singular. Legitimacy is premised on each individual having an equal say in 
the decisions that aff ect every one. Th is “say” can be or ga nized in a variety 
of ways; hence,  there are debates about diff er ent ways of organ izing collec-
tive self- rule. Th e adjectives “representative,” “deliberative,” and “direct” 
placed before the term “democracy” denote diff er ent forms of organ izing 
collective self- rule and constituting individuals into a  people. However, by 
conceiving of collective self- rule as an extension of individual autonomy, 
what is lost from view is the intrinsic relationship between collective self- 
rule and the forms of association in which the art of ruling and being ruled 
is learnt and performed. And thence the ways in which the  people as a 
 whole is constituted through diff er ent forms of association coming into re-
lationship with each other and the negotiation of their diff er ent interests 
and visions of the good in the formation of a common life— this common 
life being what constitutes the  people qua  people.
We can begin to see that  there is a paradox in the conceptualization of 
democracy in modern po liti cal thought: Demo cratic citizenship is seen as 
an expression of individual autonomy but its per for mance and defense are 
in  great mea sure dependent on participation in a group. Without being em-
bedded in some form of association, the individual citizen is naked before 
the power of  either the market or the state and lacks a, if not the, vital 
means for his or her own self- cultivation. Th e relationship between Chris-
tian ity and democracy encapsulates the triadic tension between market, 
state, and community within which the individual is located. State and 
market pro cesses are seen to limit, challenge, and provide alternatives to 
 those derived from religious obligations and identities, yet in an increas-
ingly deinstitutionalized and atomized society religions provide one of the 
few corporate forms of life available for mobilizing and sustaining the abil-
ity of individuals to act together in defense of their common interests and 
in pursuit of their common objects of love.
An alternative approach to the relationship of demo cratic thought to 
individual autonomy— one that helps us address the paradox just outlined—
begins with the relationships between individuals. If democracy is the rule 
of the  people by the  people, then at its most basic level it demands relation-
ships between  people. Without some kind of meaningful relationships be-
tween  people  there are just individuals, and an atomized and disaggregated 
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crowd,  whether at a local, national, or transnational level. If one is to begin 
with relationships, then one has to take seriously the arenas or forms of 
social life through which individuals develop and sustain relationships 
over time and in which they learn the arts of ruling and being ruled. Th is 
starting point for thinking about democracy is not in opposition to indi-
vidual liberty but in recognition that individual liberty depends on and is 
mediated by multiple forms of association.4 Much po liti cal theory has 
moved beyond the sterile dichotomies between “liberals” and “communi-
tarians” to take seriously the symbiosis between individual freedom and 
communal formation in demo cratic politics.
Th e dark side of thinking about democracy by beginning with relation-
ships, the side that rightly worries liberals, is the way in which such a be-
ginning can lead to an emphasis on the collective taking pre ce dence over 
and oppressing the individual. At a minimal level, the emphasis on rela-
tionships, and the necessary particularity of such a beginning point, is felt 
by some to threaten universalistic and egalitarian conceptions of citizen-
ship.5 Beyond this normative concern, and as Tocqueville and Montesquieu 
observed,  there can be despotism of the  people as well as that of a despot. 
Beyond even the prob lem of demo cratic despotism are  those forms of 
po liti cal order that inherently subordinate the individual to a collective 
vision of peoplehood, as is the case with nationalist, fascist, state socialist, 
and state communist regimes. Polities characterized by one or another of 
 these regimes may include demo cratic ele ments, but the constitution of the 
demos as a po liti cal community is substituted for some other, supposedly 
prepo liti cal species of peoplehood such as the ethnos or Volk. However, 
beginning with relationships between individuals can challenge collectiv-
ist, homogenous, and monistic conceptions of peoplehood and popu lar 
sovereignty. In  these accounts a diff er ent set of adjectives come to the fore 
as ways of describing the organ ization of rule by the  people for the  people. 
Th e adjectives used foreground how relationships between individuals take 
multiple forms and the complex rather than  simple nature of social and 
po liti cal space.
Sovereignty, Chris tian ity, and Consociational Democracy
One conception that begins with relationships and allows us to make sense 
of the kind of complex space Vatopedi represents can be called “conso-
ciationalist.” Consociation is a term derived from the work of the early 
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seventeenth- century Dutch Protestant po liti cal thinker Johannes Althu-
sius.6 While literally meaning “the art of living together,” the broader 
meaning of consociationalism denotes the mutual fellowship between dis-
tinct institutions or groups that are federated for a common purpose. In 
contrast to the likes of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel, Althusius allows for 
the pluralization of po liti cal order so as to accommodate and coordinate 
the diversity of associational life,  whether economic, familial, or religious. 
In his account, to be a po liti cal animal is not to be a citizen of a unitary, 
hierarchically determined po liti cal society. Nor is it to participate in a pol-
ity in which all authority is derived from a single point of sovereignty 
( whether of the general  will or the Leviathan). Rather, it is to be a partici-
pant in a plurality of interdependent, self- organized associations that to-
gether constitute a consociational polity. Mount Athos is a clear example 
of such a polity. Th e singularity of each is constitutive of the common-
wealth of all. In such a compound commonwealth, federalism is societal 
and po liti cal rather than simply administrative. In contrast to constitutional 
federalism as a way in which to limit sovereignty, as exemplifi ed in the dom-
inant interpretations of the US Constitution, which leaves undisturbed the 
indivisibility of po liti cal sovereignty, consociationalism envisages a full- orbed 
confederalism whereby sovereignty is distributed across distinct corporate 
entities. For Althusius, sovereignty is an assemblage that emerges through 
a pro cess of mutual communication between consociations and their recip-
rocal pursuit of common ends. Unity is premised on the quality of coopera-
tion and relationship building and is not secured through  either legislative 
procedure, the singular nature of sovereign authority, or the formation of 
a unitary public sphere premised on a homogeneous rational discourse.
Th e consociational approach is not as alien as may fi rst appear. Th e the-
ories of Hobbes, Carl Schmitt, and Giorgio Agamben are one  thing; his-
torical practice is quite another. As Mount Athos illustrates, the medieval 
Gothic order did not wholly dis appear with the advent of the “Westpha-
lian” order of nation states. Rather, it was displaced and redescribed so that 
forms of po liti cal community became relocated and renamed as “economic” 
or “social.” For example, the joint stock trading com pany— the early modern 
archetype of the con temporary cap i tal ist fi rm— was an explic itly po liti cal 
community based on the concept of the corpus politicum et corporatum or 
communitas perpetua that went back to Roman law. Th e paradigmatic 
example of the early modern mercantile republic was the East India Trad-
ing Com pany, which, as a colonial proprietor,
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did what early modern governments did: erect and administer law; 
collect taxes; provide protection; infl ict punishment; . . .  regulate eco-
nomic, religious, and civic life; conduct diplomacy and wage war; 
make claims to jurisdiction over land and sea; and cultivate authority 
over and obedience from  those  people subject to its command.7
Th is could be a description of Halliburton in Iraq, mining and oil compa-
nies in the Congo, or even any number of com pany towns in the US. Yet 
the nature of such companies as po liti cal and sovereign institutions is 
either viewed as  anomalous or it is denied. Such entities are labeled as 
economic, not po liti cal. However, contrary to how it is presented in po-
liti cal and economic theory,  legal and po liti cal pluralism is the norm 
rather than the exception in con temporary socie ties. As the po liti cal 
theorist James Tully argues, most nations are in fact “federations of 
more or less self- governing and overlapping po liti cal associations with 
somewhat dissimilar  legal and po liti cal ways.”8 Sovereignty is an assem-
blage that opens up diff er ent conditions and possibilities for agency de-
pending on where one is located.
In the realm of theory, it is as variations on a consociational conception 
of sovereignty that we can make sense of a theologically and philosophi-
cally diverse yet interlinked tradition of po liti cal refl ection. If Althusius 
is its progenitor, a key mediator is the German  legal historian Otto von 
Gierke and  those he infl uenced, notably the En glish Pluralists (John Neville 
Figgis, and the early work of G. D. H. Cole and Harold Laski).9 While 
 there  were substantive diff erences between them, the En glish Pluralists 
advocated a decentralized economy based on the noncapitalistic princi ples 
of cooperation and mutuality and proposed a radically confederalist and 
po liti cally pluralist conception of the state.10 Sovereignty was not some-
thing that could be appropriated by a single agency or institution. Rather 
it emanated from the complex and divided governing powers that compose 
the body politic.
A further strand of consociationalist thought can be identifi ed in the 
sphere sovereignty of the Dutch Neo- Calvinists Abraham Kuyper and Her-
man Dooyeweerd.11 For vari ous complex reasons, Kuyper does not explic-
itly name Althusius as an antecedent. However, he was clearly aware of his 
Dutch Calvinist forebear, and the conceptual debt is striking.12 Kuyper and 
Dooyeweerd envisaged the in de pen dence of distinct spheres— notably, 
 family, education, and work—as expressions of the sovereign  will of God. 
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Each sphere was said to have a relative autonomy and specifi c character 
that needed to be respected by other authorities. Derivatively, specifi c con-
sociations (such as a university or school) within each sphere had their 
own integrity and autonomy that was not to be usurped by a higher au-
thority. Government had a role in ordering and protecting the general good 
but it did not have the authority to interfere with or determine the charac-
ter or telos of each sphere. In turn, the state was bounded by the sover-
eignty of other spheres.
It was in the Netherlands that notions of sphere sovereignty overlapped 
with and found a parallel expression in the emergence of Catholic Chris-
tian Demo cratic thinking. Central to this current  were the phi los o pher 
Jacques Maritain and the development, from Rerum Novarum (1891) 
onwards, of Catholic Social Teaching (CST). Bryan Hehir gives a full out-
line of CST and its development in this volume, but the consociational 
aspects of CST are worth sketching in further detail. Maritain argues for 
a genuine plurality and a consociationalist conception of civil society as a 
way of limiting the power of the state and the market. Maritain describes 
the plurality of civil society as “an organic heterogeneity” and envisages it 
as being constituted by multiple yet overlapping “po liti cal fraternities” that 
are in de pen dent of the state.13 Maritain distinguishes his account of a con-
sociationalist po liti cal society and economic life both from fascist and 
communist ones that collapse market, state, and civil society into a single 
entity and from collectivist and individualistic conceptions of economic 
relations.14 Crucially, civil society constitutes a sphere of social or “frater-
nal” relations that has its own integrity and telos but that nevertheless serves 
the defensive function of preventing  either the market or the state from 
establishing a mono poly of power and thereby  either instrumentalizing so-
cial relations for the sake of the po liti cal order or commodifying social 
relations for the sake of the economy. Within this sphere  there can exist 
multiple and overlapping and, on the basis of subsidiarity, semiautonomous 
forms of institutional life and association— forms that are not reducible to 
 either a private or voluntary association. Indeed, in contrast to his overall 
theological framework, Maritain’s account of a consociationalist body 
politic overturns the kind of divisions between public and private at work in, 
for example, the thought of John Rawls and late- modern liberalism more 
generally. Th e consociational approach exemplifi ed in Maritain’s work was 
a rival to and eventually displaced the “throne and altar” authoritarianism 
that informed a fi gure such as Carl Schmitt. In a very diff er ent context we 
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could speculate about a parallel development in Rus sian po liti cal thought 
that drew on Orthodox theology. I am thinking  here of the work of 
Vladimir Soloviev and Nicholas Berdyaev.
Animating the Christian consociationalist tradition, of which the Plu-
ralists and Neo- Calvinists and Catholic Social Teaching are a part, is the 
sense that we participate in a cosmic order that can disclose to us some 
mea sure of meaning and purpose. It is this cosmic social imagination that 
distinguishes the Christian consociationalism of Figgis, Kuyper, and Mar-
itain, amongst  others, from their secularist confrères, notably Emile Dur-
kheim and the po liti cal theorist Paul Hirst.15 It is my contention that one 
way Orthodoxy might think about its relationship to democracy is via some 
account of consociational democracy—an account that takes the church 
qua church seriously. A consociational conception of democracy prioritizes 
the relationship between distinct but reciprocally related consociations (or 
communities or forms of life together) as the best way to generate the col-
lective self- rule of a  people conceptualized as a non- natu ral po liti cal 
community.16
Such a conception chimes with a central aspect of modern Orthodox 
theology: An emphasis on the centrality of the Trinity. With a renewed 
emphasis on the Trinity in con temporary Western theology, good order 
comes to be seen not as the result of the exercise of sovereign  will. Instead, 
good order is constituted through participation in right relationships as 
encountered and empowered through participation in the perichoretic com-
munion of  Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In place of images of po liti cal 
rulers (emperors, kings, or lords),  music, drama, and dance become more 
common analogies for the nature of God. In such accounts God is no dis-
tant sovereign but both loving Creator and intimately and vulnerably in-
volved in creation through the ongoing work of the Son and the Spirit. In 
the light of this kind of God, monarchical, absolute, and indivisible claims 
to po liti cal sovereignty that override the freedom and dignity of the one, the 
few, or the many are revealed as in opposition to the divine nature and 
the true order of being, which is one of harmonious diff erence in relation. 
Likewise,  humans are not monadic individuals but persons in relation with 
a status above and beyond any immanent social, economic, or po liti cal 
claims upon them. But before simplistically (and naïvely) turning the 
Trinity into a social program, an eschatological note of caution must be 
sounded. And for this I turn to a theologian not often cited in con temporary 
Orthodox theology: Augustine of Hippo.
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Augustine’s eschatology can be read as a response to both Constantin-
ian triumphalism (marked by an expectation of pro gress  until the Church 
would overcome the world and universally display heaven’s glory in history) 
and Donatist separatism from the world (wherein history is orientated 
 toward regress or a movement away from God).17 In place of both  these 
polarities, Augustine reestablishes a Pauline eschatological perspective 
through his conception of the two cities.18 For Augustine, the city of God 
is an alternative, yet coterminal society to the earthly city.  Th ese two cities 
are two po liti cal entities coexistent in time and space and thus part of this 
noneternal age or saeculum. Within this framework  human history is secu-
lar (rather than neutral): Th at is, it neither promises nor sets at risk the King-
dom of God. Th e Kingdom of God is established, if not fully manifest, and 
the “end” of history is already achieved and fulfi lled in Christ. On this 
account, po liti cal authority is not neutral (it is  either directed  toward or 
away from God) and the saeculum (the time between Christ’s ascension 
and his return) is open, ambivalent, and undetermined.19 Th us the Church 
can reside in this age in its structures and patterns of life as relativized by 
what is to come, and therefore see them as contingent and provisional.
R. A. Markus argues that Augustine’s eschatology warrants positing 
an autonomous secular sphere that is neither wholly demonic, sinful, or 
profane, nor wholly sacred,  either for the pagan or the Christian.20 How-
ever, this seems an overstatement that does not keep in play the dynamic 
relationship between the earthly city and the city of God within the saeculum. 
Markus is right insofar as the saeculum is an ambiguous time, a fi eld of 
wheat and tares, neither wholly profane nor sacred. However, it is not 
autonomous— Christ’s sovereignty holds sway over all that happens in this 
age. Th e saeculum constitutes a single real ity or realm, ruled by Christ, 
and this real ity is the mutual ground on which the city of God and the 
earthly city coexist. Eric Gregory helpfully summarizes this conception of 
the secular as follows:
Th e drama of the secular lies precisely in the  human capacity for good 
or evil, rather than in some autonomous tertium quid that is delivered 
from moral or religious signifi cance. Th e “secular” refers simply to that 
mixed time when no single religious vision can presume to command 
comprehensive, confessional, and vis i ble authority. Secularity . . .  is 
interdefi ned by its relation to eschatology. Th is defi nition does not 
deny the Christian claim that the state remains  under the Lordship 
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of Christ, providentially secured in its identity “in Christ.” But it 
does claim that the secular is the “not yet” dimension of an eschato-
logical point of view.21
Citizenship is the currency that the city of God and the earthly city share 
within the mutual ground of the saeculum. Citizens of both cities seek 
peace; however, in the earthly city peace is achieved through the imposi-
tion of one’s own  will by the exercise of force. For Augustine, the only true 
society and true peace exists in the city of God. With Aristotle, Augustine 
can say that  humans are naturally social animals who fi nd fulfi llment in a 
polity of some kind. But against Aristotle and much other po liti cal thought, 
he argues that the po liti cal socie ties we see around us, and thus the 
form citizenship takes in them, are neither natu ral nor fulfi lling,  because 
they are fallen and oriented away from the true end of  human being— 
communion with God— and  toward their own prideful, self- destructive 
ends. So Christians would be fools to try and unfold a “Trinitarian” blue-
print for society. Rather, for Augustine, politics in the saeculum is about 
enabling a limited peace that is on the one hand shorn of messianic pre-
tensions and on the other not given over to demonic despair. A demo cratic 
and consociational po liti cal space is, I contend, a necessary condition for 
keeping in check messianic forms of po liti cal program ( whether by the 
church or any other “party”) and dystopian underinvestments in the good 
of po liti cal order.
Building on Augustine, we should be deeply suspicious of any proj ect 
of salvation or  human fulfi llment through politics, and alert to the temp-
tation of rendering the prevailing hegemony as “natu ral” or ontologically 
foundational.22 All po liti cal and economic formations and structures of 
governance are provisional and tend  toward oppression, while at the same 
time,  whether it be a democracy or a monarchy, any po liti cal formation 
may display just judgments and enable the limited good of an earthly peace 
through the pursuit of common objects of love. Moreover, “the better the 
objects of this agreement, the better the  people; and the worse the objects, 
the worse the  people.”23 Th us, while existing on a spectrum,  there is a 
diff erence between the Roman Empire and a band of brigands.24 No 
politi cal formation is neutral, but one can be better or worse, rather than 
simply good or bad. As Markus puts it: “Being imperfectly just is not the 
same  thing as being unjust.”25
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A consociational conception of democracy makes pos si ble the affi  rma-
tion of: (1) an eschatological vision of the saeculum (not collapsing pursuit 
of the Kingdom of God into pursuit of penultimate goods in common); 
(2) the Church as a distinct community of belief and practice; (3) the possi-
bility of a common life between diff er ent communities within a specifi c 
earthly polity; and (4) the need for a genuinely pluralistic or complex space 
in order to hold in check the formation of anti- Christic and idolatrous 
monopolies of power. How so?
First, nonviolent, participatory, and grassroots demo cratic politics is a 
vital means through which to ensure that the state and market recognize 
that  humans have ends and vocations beyond po liti cal and economic 
life, and that the role of the market and the state is to serve  humans, not 
vice versa. It thereby helps prevent democracy from becoming a “thinly 
disguised totalitarianism.”26
Second, a consociational, pluralistic body politic provides a context in 
which the Church learns to listen to  others and put  people before program. 
For the Church, listening is the constitutive po liti cal act. Th rough listening 
and responding to the Word of God, the Church is assembled as a pub-
lic body— the ekklesia— out of the world. Th is initiatory act of listening 
forms the body of Christ. In being called out, this body is then enabled to 
participate in God’s hearing of the world, and so it can both discern the 
truth of the world and know itself truthfully. Listening to  others through 
involvement in demo cratic politics both presumes a common life (no lis-
tening takes place in contexts of vio lence or social atomization) and is an 
act that intends and embodies such a life. Th us listening not only consti-
tutes the Church but is itself a primary form of faithful witness within 
po liti cal life as it embodies and points to the real ity that in Christ all  things 
 were made and all  things are reconciled and therefore a common realm of 
meaning and action is now pos si ble. Involvement in a consociational and 
participatory demo cratic politics is one way of listening to the world and 
thereby becoming the  people of God and being a faithful witness.
Th ird, as well as being a way of bearing witness, of listening to and en-
countering the other in po liti cal and economic life, demo cratic politics is 
a vital way in which the Church learns to tell the truth about itself as such 
practices foster the humility and penitence necessary to hear God and 
neighbor. Listening is a therapy for the self- love or pride that is the attempt 
to secure oneself outside of relationship with God and pursue illusions of 
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self- suffi  ciency in relation to both God and neighbor. By contrast, listen-
ing inoculates the Church against developing false securities,  because in 
listening one has to deal with the world as it is. In listening, one must take 
seriously who is before one and attend to the situation rather than prede-
termine what to do in accord with some prior agenda, ideology, or strategy 
of control. When I listen to someone I encounter them neither as a statistic 
nor a ste reo type but as a  human being, as one who bears the image of God 
with all the density and complexity being  human entails. In sum, listening 
is vital to deepening one’s moral conversion in relation to God and  others, 
and thus one’s ability to reason rightly about what is the just and truthful 
judgment to be made with  these  people, at this time, in this place. In order 
to know what is true, we must fi rst listen. In certain confi gurations, demo-
cratic politics is one such way of listening well.
Ecclesiology and National Identity
A consociational account of democracy contests perhaps the most funda-
mental theological challenge modern demo cratic thought poses: the 
immanent attempt to ground a moral po liti cal life. Th is constitutes the re-
fusal of eschatology or rather the historicization of eschatology and thence 
the absolutization and divinization of the fi nite. If this time is all  there is, 
then politics has no limits as it has to bear the full weight of  human meaning 
and possibilities. Th e prob lem is not totalitarianism but the totalization of 
politics as such, which leads  either to an overinvestment in po liti cal proj-
ects as programs of salvation or an underinvestment that despairs of any 
meaningful po liti cal activity being pos si ble. In contrast, when politics is 
understood to be an activity in the saeculum— that time between Christ’s 
ascension and his return—it is freed to bring about a limited but never-
theless meaningful peaceableness. Vatopedi Monastery, with its daily and 
yearly round of worship, embodies the  great gift of Chris tian ity to poli-
tics, which is time, and in par tic u lar the relativization of historical time.27
Christians have time to hope and live in a time when change is pos si ble 
and in which past and pres ent are connected in the communion of saints.28 
At the same time, as Stanley Hauerwas has forcefully argued, Christians do 
not have to establish regimes to control the time so as to determine the 
outcome of history; rather, they can live out of control  because the fulfi ll-
ment of history is already inaugurated in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
A Christian vision of time as history, as open to redemption and as ful-
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fi lled in the eschaton, undergirds a theological apol o getic for demo cratic 
politics understood as a fi nite and contingent activity that has limits but 
also signifi cance beyond the immediate needs and vicissitudes of the mo-
ment. Th e kind of Augustinian eschatology sketched above disqualifi es any 
absolute claims of a po liti cal sovereign to shape  human life and reasserts 
the need for the pluralization of po liti cal space as refl ective of the complex 
nature of this time between Christ’s ascension and parousia. Th e complexi-
fi cation of po liti cal space is theologically necessary so as to hold open the 
existence of times and spaces that are not subject to po liti cal control. On 
this account, the status of the Church as a res publica is based on its voca-
tion to bear witness within the po liti cal order to an order and rule that is 
over and beyond this or that spatiotemporal order.
On this account, any idea that  there can be a Christian society or na-
tion needs to be treated with suspicion, like any proj ect of salvation or 
 human fulfi llment through politics.  Here the witness of Mount Athos 
points both to a profound prob lem within Orthodoxy and, paradoxically, 
to what faithful witness might entail in relation to this prob lem.  Here I am 
talking about phyletism— that is, the move beyond ecclesial autocephaly to 
national churches whereby national and religious identity become synon-
ymous, such that to be Greek is to be Orthodox and, conversely, for a 
Greek to attend a Rus sian or Romanian Orthodox church is to participate 
in a foreign or alien entity. Phyletism was condemned as a heresy at the 
Synod of Constantinople in 1872. Yet it was the failure to address it through 
the proper upholding of an eschatological tension and something like a 
consociational vision of po liti cal authority that prepared the way for the 
emergence of ethnoreligious nationalism throughout much of the Ortho-
dox world in the twentieth  century. Having spent time in Rus sia, Armenia, 
Romania, and Kosovo, I’ve encountered the phenomenon of ethnoreli-
gious nationalism fi rst hand. We see the ongoing legacy of ethnoreligious 
nationalism on Mount Athos where, since 1989, certain monasteries have 
been converted into nationalist enclaves. At the same time, I’ve met the 
antidote. Men like Fr. Sava and the other monks of Decani Monastery in 
Kosovo who protected Albanians from racist Serbs and then, in turn, pro-
tected fearful Serbs from vengeful Albanian militias. And some monaster-
ies on Mount Athos are polyglot entrepôts drawing together the faithful 
from all over the Orthodox world in common worship— albeit only of men. 
What  these faithful monasteries witness to in a fragile and often broken 
way is that,  after Christ, the Church should be the paradigmatic  people: 
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Th at is, it is to be that body— the  people of God— which is to be the 
training ground for that time when creation is fulfi lled and when  people 
from  every nation  shall be reconciled in Christ. Th at it is so often not should 
be a source of lament and a goad to pursue deeper faithfulness.
Notes
1. I am grateful to  Father Demetrios Bathrellos for comments on an earlier 
draft, and in par tic u lar for helping me unravel some of the complexity of 
Mount Athos.
2. Th e  actual word used was kosmic. I have translated this as “worldly” in 
keeping with certain New Testament usages. Th e term “world” (kosmos) in the 
New Testament can denote  either the unifi ed order of created  things, under-
stood as a neutral description (John 17:5, 24; Rom. 1:20; 1 Cor. 4:9), or the 
worldly system that is hostile to God’s good order (John 15:18–19; 17:14–16; 
1 Cor. 1:20, 5.10). In New Testament Greek a number of variations on  these two 
basic connotations can be discerned. For example, Paul Ellingworth identifi es 
six variations: (1) the universe; (2) the earth; (3)  human beings and angels; 
(4) humanity as a  whole; (5) humanity as or ga nized in opposition to God; and 
(6) par tic u lar groups of  human beings. See Paul Ellingworth, “Translating 
Kosmos ‘World’ in Paul,” Th e Bible Translator 53, no. 4 (2002): 414–24. See 
also David J. Clark, “Th e Word Kosmos ‘World’ in John 17,” Th e Bible Transla-
tor 50, no. 4 (1999): 401–6.
3. It should be noted that in refl ecting on Mount Athos I am not thereby 
holding it up as necessarily the normative form of Christian life.  Th ere are 
many aspects of Athonite monasticism as an ongoing, all- encompassing form of 
life that are theologically problematic: most notably, the exclusion of  women. 
Rather, like any other “real existing” embodiment of Chris tian ity, its very 
existence deserves and may provoke theological refl ection.
4. Th e term “association” is used  here in a generic way and encompasses 
both voluntary and nonvoluntary (rather than involuntary) forms of associa-
tion. For a discussion of the distinction between voluntary, nonvoluntary, and 
involuntary, see Mark Warren, Democracy and Association (Prince ton: Prince ton 
University Press, 2001), 96–103.  Th ere are, of course, extensive debates about: 
(1) how to distinguish vari ous forms of associative relationship such as contrac-
tual, covenantal, and corporate; (2) the corporate personality of groups as  these 
relate to the state; and (3) what happens to diff er ent forms of social relations 
within pro cesses of modernization stemming from Tönnies’s distinction 
between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society/association).  Th ese 
so cio log i cal distinctions echo a distinction in Roman law between societas 
(partnership/voluntary association) and universitas (a corporation with a 
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common identity and that is capable of common action) brought to promi-
nence in po liti cal theory by Michael Oakeshott. Im por tant as  these debates and 
distinctions are, for the purposes of this essay, a generic use of the term 
association suffi  ces.
5. For a discussion of such concerns, see Michael Walzer, Politics and Passion: 
 Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2005).
6. Althusius, Politica I.1. It is probable that Althusius derived his use of the 
term from Cicero (De Re Publica 1.25–27), although in Cicero’s usage its 
meaning is restricted to the  legal bond for the or ga nized conduct of public life 
rather than an all- encompassing term for social and po liti cal relations. See 
Th omas Hueglin, Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World: Althusius on 
Community and Federalism (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 
1999), 79.
7. Philip Stern, Th e Com pany- State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early 
Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 4–6.
8. James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 164.
9. Otto von Gierke, Community in Historical Perspective, ed. Antony Black, 
trans. Mary Fischer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and for 
the En glish Pluralists, see Paul Hirst, ed., Th e Pluralist Th eory of the State: 
Selected Writings of G.D.H. Cole, J.N. Figgis, and H. J. Laski (London: 
 Routledge, 1993).
10. For an account of the conceptual diff erences between the En glish 
Pluralists, see Cécile Laborde, Pluralist Th ought and the State in Britain and 
France, 1900–25 (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 2000), 45–100; and Marc 
Stears, “Guild Socialism,” in Modern Pluralism: Anglo- American Debates Since 
1880, ed., Mark Bevir (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 40–59. 
Stears uses the term “guild socialist” rather than “En glish Pluralist” but this 
alternative designation more directly relates to the work of Cole and Laski 
rather than Figgis. For the diff erences between the En glish Pluralists and 
American traditions of po liti cal pluralism, notably that of Robert Dahl, see 
Avigail Eisenberg, Reconstructing Po liti cal Pluralism (New York: SUNY Press, 
1995). Eisenberg confl ates forms of American po liti cal pluralism with an 
aligned but distinct tradition of consociational thought to which the En glish 
Pluralists are more directly related.
11. See Jonathan Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd: Christian Phi los o pher of State 
and Civil Society (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011).
12. See James Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian Demo crat 
( Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2013), 133–35.
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the New Christendom, trans., Joseph Evans (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1968), 163, 171.
14. Jacques Maritain, Integral Humanism, 169–71, 186–95. A parallel 
distinction is made by Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno (1931), §§ 94–96, as a way 
of distinguishing a Christian corporatist vision of politics from fascist ones. On 
the Christian account, corporatist and personalist forms of civic association and 
economic organ ization are precisely a means of preventing the subsuming of all 
social relations to the po liti cal order.
15. See, for example, Paul Hirst, Associative Democracy: New Forms of 
Economic and Social Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).
16. It could be suggested that a consociational vision of democracy has, 
within the context of Orthodoxy, unfortunate echoes of the millet system used 
in the Ottoman Empire. However, against such a connection, consociational 
democracy is precisely an anti- imperial mea sure as it normatively refuses any 
single hegemonic group or discourse as able to determine the public sphere 
and is precisely a means to ensure a meaningful plurality of associations is 
maintained so as to prevent any single group from monopolizing control of 
po liti cal authority.
17. Th is is to summarize what I take to be Oliver O’Donovan’s reading of 
Augustine in Th e Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Po liti cal 
Th eology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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22. From the writing of Genesis as an alternative creation mythos to the 
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of Chris tian ity to deconstruct and off er an alternative to any instance of 
 cosmopolis: that is, the writing of the po liti cal order into the cosmic order so 
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 immutable character and posited as inevitable and “natu ral.”
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24. Augustine, City of God IV.4.
25. Markus, Chris tian ity and the Secular, 44. It is impor tant to note that 
defi ning Augustine’s conception of justice in the earthly city as “imperfectly 
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just” is itself problematic. Augustine argues in City of God XIX.23–27 that 
true justice does not exist without true piety. Th e implication of this is that 
knowledge of justice is not pos si ble outside of knowledge and worship of God 
through and in Christ. Th us the order found in Rome, or any other instance of 
the earthly city, is not just. However, this does not mean its order is wholly 
evil—it is an earthly peace. But this earthly peace should not be viewed as on a 
continuum with the just order of the city of God. For a detailed examination of 
Augustine’s conception of the relationship between justice and the “justice” of 
the order found in the earthly city, see Robert Dodaro, Christ and the Just 
Society in the Th ought of Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 27–114.
26. Centesimus annus §46.
27. Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western 
Po liti cal Th ought (Prince ton: Prince ton University Press, 2004), 111–15.
28. Stanley Hauerwas, “Demo cratic Time: Lessons Learned from Yoder and 
Wolin,” in Th e State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge of 
God (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 147–64.
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Power, Protest, and Perichoresis
On Being Church in a Troubled World
Mary Doak
We have entered the twenty- fi rst  century with global systems of communication and trade binding the world’s population to-
gether more thoroughly than perhaps at any other time in history. Unfor-
tunately, this globalization is also presenting unpre ce dented challenges to 
 human survival and fl ourishing. Our increasingly global economy holds 
out the hope that all might participate in the benefi ts of economic develop-
ment; yet thus far this economic system is evidently more inclined to in-
crease in equality, resulting in a small group of super- rich and massive 
populations of deeply impoverished  people. And many of  these poor  today 
fi nd that the local resources that at one time provided at least subsistence 
levels of food and shelter for their families and communities have now been 
appropriated for the global economy. Perhaps even more alarmingly, our 
economic system is dependent on practices of production and consump-
tion that are unsustainable in their current form, and that are eff ecting a 
global change in climate, threatening the conditions of life on this planet. 
Together, climate change and a globalized economy are increasing rates of 
 human migration, destabilizing established communities through large- 
scale shifts in populations.
Given  these urgent prob lems, the task of developing an appropriately 
Christian theology of democracy may not seem compelling.  After all,  these 
global prob lems exceed the control of the nation state and  will not be solved 
by tinkering with forms of national government. Besides, democracy of-
ten appears to be broadly accepted as the most legitimate form of govern-
ment  today, even to the point that dictators at times feel compelled to hold 
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elections that mimic the procedures of democracy.  Isn’t providing a theol-
ogy of democracy at best a case of theology showing up— yet again— a  little 
breathless and a  little late to provide a Christian defense of what every one has 
already accepted anyway?1 At worst, as some argue, eff orts to provide a 
theological defense of po liti cal democracy risk prolonging the failed proj-
ect of liberal Chris tian ity, continuing the misguided eff ort to baptize the 
ethos of secular society at the cost of a distinctively Christian perspective.2 
Rather than further defending what the world (especially the secular world) 
has already embraced, some argue that theological energies should be fo-
cused on the distinctively Christian perspectives and practices that off er 
hope for a real alternative to the suff ering and oppression of this world.
Before deciding too quickly that attitudes  toward democracy are irrel-
evant to the grave prob lems the  human community  faces  today, it might 
be worth noting that current pro cesses of globalization involve a system of 
power analogous to the imperialism that Chris tian ity has too often em-
braced in the past: Th e world is being united in an economic system that 
is directed by, and for the benefi t of, a very small group of  human beings. 
Further, the ethos of our current form of globalization and the eff ects of 
total global climate change are thoroughly undemo cratic: What aff ects all 
is most defi nitely not being deci ded by all! In fact, demo cratic practices of 
working together for the common good are seriously undermined by the 
magnitude of global systems that far exceed local control, while at the same 
time electronic media foster interactions that are defi nitely atomizing (and 
often narcissistic). Text ing, Facebook, and what ever other electronic net-
work is briefl y the rage, take time and attention away from face- to- face en-
counters with the real, embodied, and diverse  people with whom we share 
the structures and conditions of our lives. To overcome the imperialist 
globalization that imposes uniformity and undermines collective agency, 
humanity  today needs renewed commitment to diverse, participatory 
communities and to practices of inclusive decision- making that value the 
distinctness of each person. To the extent that democracy involves  people 
coming together to order their common life, we need more, not less, 
democracy!3
Empire, it is now clear, has not dis appeared but rather has mutated into 
new yet no less virulent forms. Faithful Christian re sis tance thus requires 
that we continue to reexamine critically “the shadow of Constantine” and 
the often unacknowledged dream of harnessing imperial power to create a 
world order that serves the interests of elite Western Christians.4 To be sure, 
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democracy is no guarantee of justice, and tyrants can be elected. Yet as 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith have argued (conclusively, 
in my judgment), the best guarantee that policies  will serve the general wel-
fare is a structure that ensures that the broadest pos si ble number of  people 
are involved in determining who  will govern.5 Further, and no less signifi -
cant from a theological perspective, inclusive communities that foster rec-
ognition of  human dignity and a person’s right to contribute to society are 
valuable ends- in- themselves. Demo cratic forms of community are not only 
the means through which  people can join together to combat poverty, in-
equality, and environmental destruction, then; participatory, demo cratic 
communities are also in themselves a countercultural alternative to atomi-
zation, uniformity, and the global disregard by the power ful of the value 
of ordinary  people.
Chris tian ity, with its concept of the person fulfi lled in community, has 
the resources to contribute to movements in opposition to imperialist 
globalization and social atomization. As many have argued, Christian es-
chatological hope for ultimate harmony calls us to develop increasingly 
demo cratic structures that foster (however imperfectly) participatory com-
munities in civil and po liti cal society.6 However, as I  will further argue, this 
Christian ideal of reconciled, harmonious communities must be understood 
in a way that does not preclude responsible engagement with the realities 
of power, confl ict, coercion, and domination. Th e same theological resources 
that challenge Christians to seek more inclusive forms of community can too 
easily prevent eff ective Christian opposition to injustice, especially if the 
hope for ultimate reconciliation is understood as an immediate possibility 
that delegitimizes Christian engagement with confl ict. In brief, we need 
a theology of democracy that  will enable Christians to resist the ongoing 
temptation to be “court chaplain to the pride of nations,”7 without becom-
ing so afraid of power that Christians refuse the opportunities— and the 
responsibilities—to oppose the destruction of  human beings, their com-
munities, and their environment.8
My discussion  here proceeds in three steps. First, I begin with a brief 
assessment of the growing theological consensus that the mission of the 
Church is to witness to, and to work  toward, the goal of divine- human 
communion. I argue that the Church’s mission as thus understood calls 
Christians to oppose the antidemo cratic forces of imperialist globalization 
and societal atomization that divide and oppress rather than unite human-
ity. More explicit engagement with this widespread and ecumenical under-
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standing of the Church’s unifying mission would enable po liti cal and 
liberationist theologies to defend inclusive, participatory po liti cal structures 
with the resources of Trinitarian theology, con temporary ecclesiology, and 
the sacramental practices of the Church.
I then turn to the main focus of this essay, which relates power, confl ict, 
and even coercion, to the ecclesial goal of ultimate harmony. As Marcella 
Maria Althaus- Reid has aptly noted, theologies that emphasize inclusion 
risk reinforcing current power structures by neglecting the role of confl ict 
and confrontation in the pursuit of liberation.9 While Christians cannot 
and should not give up the eschatological hope that exclusion and mar-
ginalization  will be overcome in God’s reign, a po liti cal or liberationist 
theology that seeks a more humane and liberating society  will need to pay 
par tic u lar attention to theologizing the relation of power and confl ict to 
this hope for ultimate unity. A clearer articulation of how confl ict can serve 
the goal of harmony might overcome the re sis tance to liberation theolo-
gies of some of the privileged, though well- meaning, theologians and 
church authorities who currently reject as divisive liberationist (and espe-
cially feminist) theologies.
Fi nally, I  will conclude with a brief refl ection on the importance of form-
ing Christians to deploy power responsibly and gracefully in this world.
Communion and Democracy
As a Catholic theologian committed to a strongly ecclesial, nonindividu-
alistic form of Chris tian ity, my approach to po liti cal theology is based on 
the mission of the Church as proclaimed by the Second Vatican Council: 
Th e Church is to be the sign and instrument (that is, a sacrament) of  union 
with God and unity among humanity.10 Th is is stated early in Lumen 
Gentium and provides the theological basis for that document’s account of 
the nature and internal structures of the Church. More impor tant for our 
purposes, this sacramental understanding of the Church is also proclaimed 
in Gaudium et Spes as the basis for the Church’s mission to the world and 
the princi ple of Christian activity in all spheres of culture and society.11 
We should note that the Church, as described in  these ecclesial documents, 
is called to be both sign and instrument: Th e Church is to witness to divine- 
human communion in its ecclesial life; at the same time, the Church is to 
work extra- ecclesially, to serve as “an instrument” cooperating with God’s 
intention of increasing harmony throughout the world.
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Th is emphasis on the Church’s mission to foster divine- human com-
munion in the world is by no means unique to Catholic Chris tian ity. 
Divine- human communion, or theosis, has been and continues to be central 
to Orthodox theology, and indeed Orthodox thought has been identifi ed 
as the source for the renewed emphasis on communion at the Second 
Vatican Council.12 Further, the mission of the Church to be a sign and in-
strument of the  union of all in God has been recently affi  rmed in the 
World Council of Churches’ document Th e Church:  Towards a Common 
Vision,13 and is presupposed (for example) in the other wise quite diff er ent 
theologies of John Milbank and Miroslav Volf.14 Indeed, the centrality of 
the goal of divine- human communion to the mission of the Church has 
become the prevailing consensus in con temporary Christian ecclesiology 
in recent de cades.
Orienting the mission of the Church as witness to and in ser vice of com-
munion helpfully integrates a commitment to this world with a hope that 
transcends history: Th e Church is called to further the unity of all in God 
that can be experienced in part now but  will only be given in full beyond 
history. Th is is therefore an eschatological perspective as well as a thor-
oughly sacramental (indeed, Eucharistic) approach to the mission of the 
Church, acknowledging that the telos of harmony within the divine life 
gives value and orientation to, but cannot be identifi ed with, historical 
projects. God’s grace is at work in this world, but the fi nal perfection of 
our life within the Triune God cannot be achieved in this world, as Reinhold 
Niebuhr consistently— and rightly— maintained.15
Th e theological signifi cance of divine- human communion has been 
further clarifi ed by the explosion of Trinitarian theology in Western Chris-
tian ity in the late twentieth  century. Th is renewed attention to the doctrine 
of the Trinity emphasizes that  humans are made in the image of a God 
who is not an identity in stasis, but rather distinct persons in a perichoretic 
communion of self- giving love that is fundamentally other- directed, bringing 
new beings into existence and into the life of the Triune God. Humanity 
is thus made for, and only fulfi lled in, inclusive communities of love in 
which distinctness is valued and diversity enriches the  whole. As so many 
have argued, a Trinitarian perspective reminds us that each  human person 
contributes uniquely to the  human (and ultimately divine) community 
while, at the same time, fi nding his/her fulfi llment in participating in that 
common life.16
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Chris tian ity thus has obvious implications for eff orts to resist a global-
ization that appropriates the benefi ts of the global economy (and wrecks 
the planet) for a small percentage of the  human population, while treating 
the majority as disposable.17 Where once hierarchy was defended by invok-
ing a monarchical view of the one God over the universe and one absolute 
ruler over society, it is now more commonly— and appropriately— argued 
that Chris tian ity calls for  human communities that seek to model the 
divine community of nonhierarchical, other- directed, loving harmony that 
is the source and the goal of  human life.18 Instead of legitimizing an im-
perialism (including the imperialism of global capitalism) that imposes 
uniformity for the benefi t of a power ful elite, a consistent Trinitarian 
Chris tian ity supports inclusive, diverse communities modeled on the mu-
tual self- giving of the Trinity, communities in which  people work together 
for the common good and are mutually enriched through each other’s 
unique contributions.
Th is recovery of an emphasis on divine- human communion provides 
the basis for a po liti cal theology thoroughly rooted in the central beliefs 
and practices of Chris tian ity: Belief in a Triune God, salvation through 
Jesus Christ, and the eschatological goal that is proleptically experienced 
in the Eucharist all inform the Christian view of the person as oriented to 
communities of mutuality.19 Christians are thus equipped to engage issues 
of public life— and democracy— with the substance of Chris tian ity, in-
formed by essential Christian beliefs about what it means to live as  people 
called to communion with God and with all  else that God has created. 
Rather than being para lyzed by, for example, the false dilemma of  either 
productive engagement with a secular public life or the formation of com-
munities for a distinctly Christian witness, Christians must recognize that 
their mission, as Christians, is to image the Trinity in openness to  others 
for the greater good of all.
Although it is beyond the scope of this essay to explore the  matter in 
detail, it is worth noting  here that Western Christians have much to learn 
from Orthodox Chris tian ity about how to return the doctrine of theosis, 
or divine- human communion, to its proper place as central to the Christian 
account of creation, sin, and the redemption of humanity. It might then 
become clearer, for example, that Catholic social thought is not in fact an 
arbitrary list of rules derived from moral princi ples several steps removed 
from essential Christian doctrines. Instead, this body of thought strives 
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to articulate what it means to live in society as persons oriented  toward 
community and harmony with one another and with God.20 When one 
considers how seldom Western Christians (including American Catholics) 
recognize the centrality of divine- human communion to Christian faith, 
or off er a faith- inspired re sis tance to the rampant individualism of US 
culture, the importance of current theological work— including theologi-
cal dialogue with Orthodox Chris tian ity—on the Trinitarian, ecclesio-
logical, and sociopo liti cal implications of communion becomes especially 
evident.
Th e Ambiguity of Power
To further the proj ect of developing a more adequate Christian po liti cal 
theology based on divine- human communion, I would like to explore  here 
one par tic u lar challenge that should interrupt any too easy focus on har-
monious community: the stubborn per sis tence and even prevalence of 
 human confl ict in this world. John Milbank is right to insist that Chris-
tians understand harmony, not confl ict, to be the ultimate real ity, but this 
does not absolve Christians from acknowledging the role of confl ict in 
 human relations this side of the eschaton.21 I fear that, without suffi  cient 
attention to power dynamics and to the real ity of  human confl ict and co-
ercion, a theological emphasis on harmony may undermine Christian eff orts 
to achieve more justly structured and diverse communities.  After all, creat-
ing a more inclusive and participatory common life is never a  simple, co-
operative pro cess in this world ( whether in  matters of statecraft or even on 
parish councils!). Rather, eff orts to achieve the common good usually re-
quire that we strug gle with and against  those who oppose that good—or 
who have a very diff er ent idea of the common good— and such strug gle 
involves the deployment of power. As Robin Lovin has recently stated, 
“Hope cannot overcome oppression without acquiring some countervailing 
power.”22 If a commitment to harmony inclines Christians to avoid con-
fl ict and eschew power, are we likely to proff er any signifi cant re sis tance 
to the life- destroying oppression all around us?
Perhaps the diffi  culty  will become clearer if we briefl y return to the doc-
trine of the Trinity, particularly as the source of the Christian ideal of 
harmony. As argued above, the Trinity is the divine perichoretic com-
munion of self- giving love and, as the source and goal of  human life, the 
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Trinity is the model of mutual love that properly inspires our work for 
harmonious and diverse communities. But a Christian praxis intent on 
modeling the divine harmony would seem to leave  little room for agonis-
tic engagement;  after all,  there are no power strug gles among the persons 
of the Trinity.
Must Christians then affi  rm that the use of coercive power, even to pro-
tect the vulnerable, is a cooperation with the logic of sin?23 Should hope in 
God’s reconciling grace lead Christians to refuse all confl ictual politics, and 
respond to vio lence by simply refusing to recognize its existence, by persisting 
in a commitment to “act as if . . .  sin is not  there”?24
To be sure, vio lence is not the ultimate power, and a practice of break-
ing the cycle of sin with a forgiveness that refuses to retaliate is indispens-
able. Nevertheless, we must ask: If Christians refuse in princi ple to interrupt 
the vio lence and domination in  human life and social structures, whose 
interests are served? Does such intentional blindness truly lead to the har-
mony Christians claim to seek, or is it more likely to support the false 
harmony of an oppressive status quo, which often asks only that we pretend 
that this deployment of violent power is not happening?
It may be that  women are particularly attuned to the potential for ten-
sion between protesting injustice and seeking reconciliation through self- 
sacrifi cial love. Th e ideal of loving harmony is frequently invoked to argue 
that  women should give up “selfi sh” demands for their rights and refrain 
from disruptive confl ict and opposition, even when the intent of the 
confl ict is to attain a more just world. Feminist po liti cal theories have for this 
reason not only emphasized relationality, but also dissensus, confl ict, and 
self- assertion as essential to the achievement of more just communities.25 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, such feminist theories have been criticized by the 
Vatican for presuming that confl ictual power dynamics exist between the 
sexes and even within intimate  family relation.26 I submit that this ecclesial 
critique lends further support to suspicions that the ideal of communion 
may be wielded to delegitimize strug gles for justice and thus to support 
oppressive power structures.
To be sure, the points of coherence between the Christian ideal of divine- 
human communion and feminist theories of relationality (especially with 
a feminist focus on affi  rming diff erence in relation) give reason to hope in 
the ultimate coherence of a thoroughly feminist and communion- centered 
po liti cal theology. Yet an adequate feminist po liti cal theology cannot be 
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achieved without further theological attention to the appropriate role for 
dissensus and confl ict even (especially!) within a Christian praxis of model-
ing and working for more harmonious communities.
Some developments within communion ecclesiologies in the Catholic 
tradition provide further evidence that an emphasis on divine- human com-
munion can be invoked in support of unjust power structures. Gerard 
Mannion has rightly described as “authoritarian” the communion ecclesi-
ology that defends a hierarchical harmony in which the laity is united in 
unquestioning obedience to the magisterium, as implied in the “Petrine” 
and “Marian” structures advocated by communion ecclesiologies infl u-
enced by Hans Urs von Balthasar.27 When the communion of the Church 
is understood as comprising a harmonious  union between the initiatory 
leadership invested in the offi  cial (Petrine) hierarchy and the loving recep-
tion of this leadership by an obedient Marian laity,  there is  little room for 
the laity to engage in valid criticism of the hierarchy (even when the hier-
archical abuse of power includes covering up the rape of  children). Instead, 
and notwithstanding protestations that the Marian princi ple is of greater 
value, this model of communion suggests that when the laity question or 
challenge their leaders, they have failed to be appropriately receptive and 
are damaging the communion of the Church.28 Imagine the implications 
if that approach  were to be followed in public life!
Th is interpretation of communion becomes even more troubling when the 
Petrine- Marian division of roles is applied to the relations within the Trin-
ity. Instead of presuming that Trinitarian nonsubordinationism entails a 
mutual equality- in- diff erence as the Trinitarian ideal of community, 
 David Schindler, for example, builds on von Balthasar’s work to defend 
a thoroughly gendered concept of initiation and reception proposed as a 
description of the inner relations of the Trinity as well as a theological 
rationale for the diff er ent roles of the clergy and laity, and of men and 
 women, in church and in society.29 For Schindler, obedient reception of 
hierarchical authority is not merely an ecclesiological princi ple but one that 
is inscribed within the Trinity and so is both fundamental to  human rela-
tions (especially between men and  women) and the basis for all harmony 
in society. As noted above, many communion theologies (rightly, in my 
judgment) refute this explic itly authoritarian concept of social harmony; 
nevertheless, Schindler’s position reminds us of the importance of attending 
to how concepts and images of communion actually function po liti cally 
in the world. Communion no doubt requires leadership and authority, but 
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if  there is no room to challenge abuses of power in the hope of a more perfect 
 union, we are in deep trou ble! Indeed, it would seem that we have come 
full circle  here, having returned to the previously rejected idea that po liti cal 
domination refl ects the dominion of God.30
In brief, a focus on communion with and within the Trinity should 
interrupt injustice and contribute to the development of diverse, participa-
tory communities. Yet at times the goal of harmonious communion in the 
image of, and ultimately within, the divine is invoked instead to encour-
age ac cep tance of unjust structures and power in the name of harmony, 
 whether by explic itly enjoining obedience to authority or simply by failing 
to make room for confl ict within a Christian witness to unity. Given this 
very real danger of supporting an unjust status quo (from which educated 
theologians and church leaders often benefi t), Christian po liti cal theolo-
gies cannot prescind from the task of determining the proper role of power 
and the place of confl ict in the ser vice of greater communion.
In considering this question of the use of power and confl ict in an un-
just, fallen world, it is impor tant to avoid confl ating power, which is the 
capacity to eff ect something, with vio lence (a physical attack on person or 
property) or coercion (the attempt to compel). As Reinhold Niebuhr knew 
well, power in itself is not evil since power can be positive or negative, de-
fensive or off ensive.31 Indeed, power in feminist theories is usually a good 
that  women desire, in opposition to the evils of vio lence and domination 
that have denied  women their proper power.32 Th e primary theological dif-
fi culty  here is not, then, power per se, but rather the appropriate response 
to the real ity of confl ict and the use of coercion in Christian witness to the 
goal of harmonious community.
I intend to set aside  here the more narrow (and diffi  cult) question of 
the use of vio lence by Christians. Not all coercive power involves physical 
attacks or threats of such attacks, and I am convinced that that we must 
fi rst come to terms with confl ict and coercion in themselves, before deal-
ing with the more thorny issue of the Christian use of vio lence. Even non-
violent coercive power can make Christians uneasy and, in fact, can be 
horrifyingly destructive (especially when it involves psychological coercion). 
Nevertheless, coercive power can also be deeply inspiring, as when the 
Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. famously refused vio lence and instead de-
ployed not only rhetorical power and the power of suff ering witness, but 
also the coercive power of boycotts and strikes that remained nonviolent in 
the face of terrifi cally violent opposition.33
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One the one hand, we must ask  whether a responsible commitment to 
the goal of a just and harmonious community is pos si ble without engag-
ing in po liti cal coercion and navigating what is rather redundantly called 
“power” politics (since all politics is concerned with power).34 On the other 
hand, coercive power to attain the goal of one party against the goals of 
 others, at least on the po liti cal level, seems antithetical to the ideal of rec-
onciliation. Th e question still haunts: Are we perhaps denying our true 
vocation as Christians when we participate in the confl ict due to sin, rather 
than exemplifying the eschatological harmony pos si ble in part now? How-
ever much the world follows its own dictates,  shouldn’t the Church do 
other wise?35
While I cannot fully answer  these complex questions in the space of this 
essay, I would like to suggest that a sound basis for integrating the ambi-
guity of power into our understanding of divine- human communion can 
be found in Paul Tillich’s classic work on love, power, and justice.36  Th ere 
is much still to be gained from Tillich’s insightful account of the relation 
between love and justice— and of the role of power in each— particularly 
as his perspective is predicated on the goal of divine- human communion. 
As Tillich argues, the goal of love is  union: Love seeks to unite what is in 
fact (but should not be) separated, while justice preserves what love intends 
to unite. Justice and love are thus integrally related, though not identical: 
Without the preserving work of justice, the unity that love seeks cannot 
be achieved. Tillich further contends that, in extending forgiveness, love 
fulfi lls the demands of justice, while ultimate justice  will be found in the 
reunion of all in the reign of God.37
Tillich thus provides a theological basis for explaining that a harmony 
without justice is a perversion of— and not a witness to!— the communion 
we seek,  because without the preservation of what is to be united,  there is 
only a false peace that obliterates, rather than reconciles with, the other. A 
love without justice, as Tillich further warns, destroys the one who loves 
as well as the one who accepts such love.38 Unfortunately, the destruction 
of the other is one of humanity’s deepest temptations, since in fi nite exis-
tence we continually face the threat that the other  will not make room for 
us, and, in turn, we fear making room for that other.  Th ose who bene-
fi t from the status quo— including Christians— may thus be especially 
tempted by appeals to a false harmony that, without justice, destroys the 
other as well as the harmony Christians claim to serve. Insofar as Chris-
tian ity calls us to live (in church and in society) in hope for true unity, the 
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Church’s mission requires that Christians seek a justice that permits gen-
uine diversity and allows for the harmony in which all fi nd they are more 
fully themselves  because of their relationships with all  others.
If love thus requires justice, then love must be consistent with the exer-
cise of power, insofar as justice requires that we deploy power, even coercive 
power, against the destructive power of injustice. In classic Tillichian 
language, power is integral to all that is  because power is ultimately 
the power of being (particularly its ability to overcome nonbeing). It is a 
 mistake then, as Tillich noted, to identify love with the refusal of power, 
on the one hand, and power with the denial of love, on the other hand.39 To 
the contrary, he argues, love inherently acts with power to destroy what-
ever is against love, which is anything that would deny justice and thus 
annihilate what should instead be gathered into unity. Nevertheless, as 
Tillich further insists, love extends forgiveness, seeking always to preserve 
rather than to destroy the person who is acting against love.40
In Tillich’s ontological analy sis, power—as the power of being—is in-
herently good and comes ultimately from God, who is the creative source 
of all being and to whom power is properly attributed. Although love, 
power, and justice are ambiguous, separated, and at times in confl ict in 
this world, they are, as Tillich maintains, united in the divine ground of 
being.41
Tillich’s analy sis thus reminds us that the divine, reconciling love is pres-
ent in the world not only as a force of forgiveness but also as a power that 
destroys the injustice that opposes love and impedes the ultimate harmony 
of all. Perhaps, then, more theological attention should be given to the cano-
nical stories of divine judgment that disturb any simplistic account of 
God’s love manifest directly in peace and harmony. Is not the story in 
Genesis 3 of the exile from the garden, now guarded with a fl aming sword, 
a description of God acting with power to prevent  human sin from becom-
ing everlasting? Certainly the Jewish canon has insisted on remembering 
a history in which God repeatedly threatens destruction when injustice 
becomes ensconced in the life of the  people. And, of course,  there is no 
denying the role of coercive power in the New Testament imagination 
of Jesus’s return as judge to establish the full reign of God:  Th ere is much 
coercion and even vio lence in the Book of Revelation. Indeed, even while 
we rightly insist that the divine love suff ers— and Christian love must also 
suff er— with all  under our current conditions of unjust separation, it should 
also be remembered that Jesus is described as confronting unjust authority 
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and acting with power to restore to the community what society had ab-
jected in the name of harmony.42 Had Jesus not been a real threat to the 
authorities of his day, it is hard to imagine why they would have bothered 
to crucify him.
A Trinitarian, communion- centered po liti cal theology might do well to 
remain rooted in the canonical stories of God’s power (and of  humans 
called to use power) to right injustice, even while this theology focuses on 
the ultimate reconciliation of all in God. As John de Gruchy has similarly 
argued, a Trinitarian theology of God as a perichoretic communion of love 
must be complemented by the prophetic tradition of protest against injus-
tice in hopes of a more perfect harmony.43
Resisting any account of divine- human communion that stifl es the de-
mands of justice or denies the exercise of power necessary to achieve this 
justice  will, I believe, be further aided by keeping in mind two key points. 
First, divine- human communion must be understood as an eschatological 
goal that is only partially achievable in this life, so that Christians grapple 
honestly with the fact that what is ultimately integrated in the divine re-
mains separated and ambiguous in the world. An adequate po liti cal theology 
 will not proceed as though ultimate harmony is irrelevant to this world, 
but neither  will such a theology presume that this harmony is completely 
available  here. Th e second point to keep in mind is that the Trinity is, and 
invites us to, a unity- in- diversity. Focusing on the fact that the goal is not 
a uniformity that obliterates otherness, but rather a unity enriched by di-
versity, Christians may yet be inspired to greater consistency in their rejec-
tions of false harmony and their oppositions to the injustices that are 
diminishing the  human community— and thus all of us— today.
A Christian Ascetics for the Use of Power
In closing, I would like to mention briefl y the importance of Christian for-
mation for a discipleship that seeks harmony with justice.  After all, a Chris-
tian witness to reconciliation that accepts responsibility for the use of coercive 
power in a fallen world requires growth in wisdom, prudence, and mature 
judgment, along with a willingness to risk oneself in love. However much 
 people may yearn for a clear list of “dos” and “ don’ts” to follow,  there is no 
 simple prescription for an adequate public praxis. But, then, most of us 
have learned that love seldom is  simple. We  don’t always know what is the 
best  thing to do and, in any case, our motives are often not as selfl ess and 
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loving as we believe them to be. Th e use of coercive power in the ser vice of 
love is especially fraught  because we are all (including Christians) inclined 
to hide our self- serving intentions even from ourselves, and this is true 
 whether our interests are served by using or by refusing power. Consider-
able spiritual wisdom is needed to negotiate the complexities of one’s own 
self- deception as well as the deceptions of the world.
Th e recent work of Aristotle Papanikolaou is especially helpful  here in 
pointing to the need for disciplinary practices as formation of the capacity 
to love, particularly as Christians strug gle to learn to love the stranger— 
and the  enemy— inevitably encountered in public life.44 Indeed, it is rather 
surprising how  little attention has been given to the need for such lay 
formation in the Catholic Church, even though the diffi  culty of resisting the 
individualism of our culture and the global economic injustice from which 
we in the United States often benefi t is quite apparent.45 Papanikolaou’s 
insightful analy sis reminds us that truth telling and forgiveness (both high-
lighted in sacramental confession) are essential to communion. Indeed, as 
he argues, “ Free speech as truthful expression . . .  can lead to relationships 
of diff erence that involve re spect, mutuality, and friendship not previously 
imaginable.”46 At the same time, without the willingness to risk the con-
fl ict that so often results from telling an unpleasant truth, relationships (in 
society and in personal life) become distorted. Similarly, the ongoing need 
for forgiveness for ourselves, as well as for  others, is essential given  human 
failures, limitations, and the real ity of continued confl ict even in the strug gle 
for deeper communion.47
Given this signifi cance of practices of truth telling and forgiveness 
for the development of loving relationships, including the development 
of deeper and more honest bonds in public life, Christian communities 
would do well to expand  these practices beyond the confi nes of sacra-
mental confession. Our churches might then better prepare us for the 
continual giving and receiving of forgiveness and for publicly speaking 
and hearing the truth as we seek an ever- greater harmony with God and 
each other.
Consideration should also be given to fostering occasions of attentive 
engagement with one another in Christian communities and families. If 
Christians are to grow in our commitment to inclusive, participatory com-
munities, they need to have deep experiences of the unique contribution 
of each to the  whole. Th is may be as  simple as returning to such enduring 
church practices as potlucks and coff ee hours (with electronic devices 
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turned off !) where Christians grow in relationships and learn to appreciate 
one another.
Th e broader Christian community might also want to consider the 
Quakers’ discipline of consensus seeking, rooted in a belief in that of God 
in every one. While I  wouldn’t recommend this pro cess as an effi  cient 
decision- making practice for large groups, it deserves attention as a spiritual 
practice that springs from and reinforces a deep commitment to the idea 
that each person  matters and has a unique perspective to contribute to the 
good of the  whole.48 Such a practice might increase awareness of the ways 
this world’s po liti cal pro cesses lead to the silencing or dismissal of many 
voices. Th is discipline of ecclesial consensus seeking might also strengthen 
re sis tance to the domineering po liti cal discourse so inconsistent with 
the ideal of an inclusive divine- human communion in which all are 
valued in their uniqueness.
Conclusion
Our highly interactive yet deeply divided— even atomized— world desper-
ately needs  people to come together to resist the increasing in equality and 
environmental abuse threatening the planet  today. Even while democracy 
is widely touted, at least as a form of secular government, a very undemo-
cratic economic imperialism dominates our planet and imposes conditions 
of suff ering and dehumanization on many for the benefi t of a privileged 
few. It is generally acknowledged (at least theologically) that  these destruc-
tive conditions are contrary to Christian beliefs about the good of  human 
beings and indeed of creation, yet the Church as a  whole has not yet off ered 
the sustained and power ful witness of re sis tance that Christian faith calls 
for. Recovering the centrality of the eschatological goal of divine- human 
communion may prove to be an invaluable resource for forming Chris-
tians to resist the new forces of imperialism, provided that we have the 
wisdom to imagine power in the ser vice of justice and love, and the disci-
pline to accept and use such power appropriately.
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Strange Fruit
Augustine, Liberalism, and the Good Samaritan
Eric Gregory
A notable feature of con temporary Anglo- American theology is the welcome revival of engagement with Orthodoxy. But it is a less 
prominent feature of the resurgent interest in “po liti cal theology.” Th is 
neglect is unfortunate.  Th ere are historical and historiographical reasons for 
a preoccupation with the Latin West, especially given the vexed relation 
of Augustinianism to demo cratic constitutional traditions mediated by 
followers of Augustine and his critics. When Orthodoxy does appear, famil-
iar charges of caesaropapism or otherworldliness are seldom far  behind. 
Augustinians sometimes sponsor such readings, painting Constantinianism 
with a Eusebian face in order to relieve themselves of theocratic misun-
derstanding or to contrast their concern for the dynamism of history 
with the ahistorical speculations of Greek metaphysics. Like many in the 
Ortho dox tradition, modern Augustinians have worked hard to reject the 
caricature of “the individual striving for a mystical, nonhistorical, world- 
denying  union with God.”1 Both traditions remain subject to similar chal-
lenges in a secular age.
For example, the sometimes- cramped alternatives in po liti cal theory 
marginalize their shared concern with relating the incarnational and es-
chatological dimensions of the church’s witness to a cosmic redemption of 
history. Such redemption must take account of the dramatic ruptures that 
follow any Christian understanding of sin and the conditions of politics. 
But, as one recent Orthodox theologian has argued, a redemptive vision 
“cannot be dissociated from the dialectic between the pres ent and  future, 
between affi  rmation and denial of the world, between participation in poli-
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tics (the life of the city) and the transcendence of politics.”2 Th at basic, 
shared concern is what I want to pursue in order to think about the theo-
logical signifi cance of demo cratic po liti cal action in time, though not in 
any explicit comparative fashion.
In the background, recall familiar tensions between supposedly world- 
affi  rming incarnational Constantinians and world- denying cruciform 
sectarians.  Th ese tensions, which frame much of con temporary po liti cal 
theology, map onto what Luke Bretherton helpfully describes as “Constan-
tinian triumphalism” and “Donatist separatism.”3 Often constructed as 
ideal types for broader polemical purposes,  these temptations nonetheless 
give rise to temporal forgetfulness in thinking about po liti cal life. Liberal 
realists tend to emphasize eschatological deferral in ways that separate civic 
life from ethical and spiritual value. Antiliberals tend to emphasize an apoc-
alyptic ecclesiology that imagines the Church as the only site of formation 
in virtue and participation in eternity. To speak theologically, both neglect 
the porous fl uidity of one world and one history groaning  toward fulfi ll-
ment in Christ. Th is fulfi llment imagines an immanent teleology that 
draws together creation and redemption without confl ating the two.
Th e topic of this essay is not Augustine as such. Our topic is time, or 
less ambitiously, an invitation to think about time, a venerable Augustin-
ian and Platonic theme. It is one that has received less theological atten-
tion than we might expect, particularly given the “strange fruit” of the 
spatial separation of church and state that Augustine’s modern interpret-
ers have supposedly found in his pregnant biblical imagery of “two loves” 
and “two cities” in this time between the times. Oliver O’Donovan has 
complicated this post- Hobbesian separation of religion and politics by 
rediscovering a vision of “politics not as a self- enclosed fi eld of  human en-
deavour but as the theatre of the divine self- disclosure.”4 On  these terms, 
the emergence of democracy can be linked to divine purposes in history. 
O’Donovan’s own juridical conception of government does constrain our 
expectations of po liti cal institutions. Such institutions are taken to be in-
direct witnesses to divine providence in  humble recognition of their dis-
tinctive temporal purposes. Th e state, on O’Donovan’s view, is not an end 
in itself. It exists in the ser vice of the historical mission of the Church. None-
theless, for O’Donovan, the state “remains  under the direction of the First 
Person of the Trinity; it is not fi lled with the Holy Spirit at Pentecost.”5 
Th e state,  under the authority of God, has its historical role in preserving 
the common good and securing conditions for the preaching of the gospel. 
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Its po liti cal prominence— and its representative claim on our identity— 
fades in the face of the gathered Christian community. And yet, even 
O’Donovan’s distinction and emphasis on the ambiguities of history open 
“an account of secular authority which presumes neither that the Christ- 
event never occurred nor that the sovereignty of Christ is now transparent 
and uncontested.”6
Analogizing po liti cal history and salvation history off ers a more direct 
theological route for evaluating demo cratic action than more familiar terms 
like realism and idealism or optimism and pessimism.  Th ese latter catego-
ries can be helpful for heuristic purposes. But they are not native to Chris-
tian theology and risk abstraction. No politics can save us, Augustinians 
consistently remind us, but can politics teach us anything about the nature 
of salvation in time?  Will meaning in history always only be a retrospec-
tive? Is politics always only remedial beating back of sinful desire? I am 
 here provoked by what my colleague Jeff rey Stout has called a pressing 
question for modern Christian theology: “Is it not pos si ble to discern the 
workings of the Holy Spirit, and thus some refl ection of God’s redemptive 
activity, in modern demo cratic aspirations?”7 If all historical events are 
marked by God’s entry into time, might po liti cal history also bear witness 
not only to the fi rst person of the Trinity but also to Christ and the Spirit 
that testifi es to Christ? To put it more concretely, by way of example, might 
we imagine the civil rights movement or the strug gle against apartheid as 
Christian events for both church and society, a partial embodiment of that 
kingdom from “ every nation, tribe,  people, and language” (Revelation 7:9)? 
Would this reading of history refl ect a dangerous desire to baptize the 
secular, a promiscuous sacramentalism confusing God’s providence with 
salvation? How can we distinguish pneumatological enthusiasm from 
au then tic Christian faith in the wondrous yet fugitive mixing of time with 
eternity? My remarks have three parts, tracking roughly from Augustine’s 
piety to its modern appropriations and moral sentiment in a demo cratic 
culture anxious about politics itself.
Piety and Augustinian Politics
James O’Donnell tells us that “Augustine was lucky that he never had to 
read anything like Augustine.”8 We should re spect the distance of this 
Berber from the margins of empire, famous for his own diffi  culties with 
time. I want to think about what his strangeness might mean for us, 
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 whether you adore or despise Augustine, in part  because he gave Chris-
tian ity a voice that echoes with us  today. Augustine’s enchantment not only 
declared  things in this world to be sacred. He experienced the world as 
sacred, participating in the goodness of his crucifi ed deity. For Augustine, 
unlike fallen angels,  those pure intellects without bodies that fall com-
pletely, we embodied and historical creatures ascend and descend with 
restless desire for  wholeness that he thought was part of  human nature. 
Such  wholeness  will always be incomplete, groaning in the “not yet” of 
history. Yet  there is no neutrality. All of life, and so all of time and all of 
politics, are bound up with our fellowship in God.
Augustine was neither a demo crat nor what we might call an ardent po-
liti cal activist. Demo cratic participation, for the most part, is a distinctively 
modern phenomenon made pos si ble by cultural developments unknown 
to the ancients. Indeed, Augustine is not the fi rst name on a list for  those 
known for demo cratic virtues of self- restraint, re spect for diversity, concern 
for social justice, and openness to deliberation. He was a culture warrior, 
preoccupied with psychic distortions wrought by what he took to be 
counterfeit mythologies of glory and false claims to achieved justice. His 
polemics left him vulnerable to caricature and his own rhetorical excess. 
For Augustine, however, it was pagan culture that did not have the re-
sources to adequately name its own self- deception, its desire to revel only 
in its own glory, to worship itself.
His City of God responds to the anx i eties of pagans and Christians made 
distraught by the fall of Rome.  Th ere are few analogies in modern history 
to this distress and moral panic. I tell my students to picture 9/11 multi-
plied by ten thousand. Augustine’s  great work is his refl ection on this 
shattered world. As with 9/11, many sought scapegoats to blame. Pagans 
blamed the Christians for worshipping the wrong gods (namely, the one 
God that they  were too uptight about) and failing to keep up the proper 
civic practices  because of their meek religion of the Sermon on the Mount. 
In response, Augustine claimed that the pagans had turned imperial am-
bition into a religion. Christians could make the same  mistake  after Rome’s 
apparent conversion to God’s purposes. Th is  mistake refl ects the  great 
temptation of politics identifi ed by Augustine as idolatry. It is a profound 
biblical theme, taken up by Israel’s prophets, and powerfully echoed in 
demo cratic culture by Abraham Lincoln’s second inaugural address. Yet, 
despite his suspicion of Rome’s pretension, Augustine could still see that 
its imperfect peace revealed a natu ral law in the order of nature. Robbers 
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themselves maintain “some shadow of peace.”9 And, by God’s providence, 
“even the heavenly city . . .  while in its state of pilgrimage, avails itself of 
the peace of earth.”10 History has its ironies, as Reinhold Niebuhr tells 
us. But it is not tragic. Temporal peace is known both by comparison and 
contrast with this eternal peace.
In diagnosing this exilic yearning, Augustine is thought to “secularize” 
politics, stretching history with eschatological tension, hoping for a far- off  
country and the resurrection of the dead.  Here we fi nd something like an 
apophatic po liti cal theology, veiled in the ambiguity of pilgrimage and sin- 
stained temporality. Politics, like our experience of grace, operates more 
in the modality of healing than elevation. It tempers imperfection rather 
than tutors perfection. Th is is the realist’s per sis tent wisdom. But po liti cal 
activity also speaks to some end, albeit chastened by the  future rather than 
the pres ent dimensions of salvation.
A common distinction among Augustinians fi nds a sociality that is natu-
ral and a politics that is sinful. In fact, this is sometimes thought to distin-
guish Augustinians from other Christian po liti cal traditions, notably heirs 
of Th omas Aquinas. For Augustinians, politics is that part of providential 
history divided by time  after Babel. According to Romans 13, and given 
our misdirected loves, the purpose of politics is to restrain the wicked with 
a mea sure of “earthly” justice and peace for the time being. Redemption 
waits for the fullness of time. It is historical, but it is not dependent upon 
the pro cess of time.
So Augustinians wait for the kingdom. Th ey do not build the kingdom. 
Augustine, however, did not sit quietly with a clenched fi st watching 
his clock with despair. Th is reputation risks banality. His unmasking of Rome’s 
idolatry suggests a power ful historical consciousness that  human forms 
change. Nothing is permanent. He was a busy leader, judging and govern-
ing a community through po liti cal controversy and economic hard times. 
In fact, we fi nd him writing letters to public offi  cials encouraging them to 
use their offi  ces, with humility and lamenting necessity, for the promo-
tion of Christian reconciliation. Th is suggests that not all earthly politics 
is prodigal. To be sure, Augustine’s premodern experience with law and 
economics placed severe constraints on his po liti cal imagination, confi rm-
ing the darker moments of his theology. It would be left to  later Christian 
thought to develop notions of structural reform that might make pos si ble 
goods we other wise could not enjoy. Such reformers would seek to modify 
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our po liti cal situation, even if we cannot radically change the structures of 
 human desire. I happen to think Augustine could distinguish the failing 
empire from the republic, Th eodosius from Nero, and Regulus from other 
pagans. He knew the slave trade and torture  were wicked practices. In a 
diff er ent age, he might have launched eff orts to abolish them. He did not.
Modern Appropriations
 Later reformers did take inspiration from Augustine, mining the anthro-
pology and eschatology of Book 19 of the City of God for demo cratic pur-
poses of a low- fl ying variety. Th ey took their counsel from Augustine’s 
vision of the limits of politics and the fragile possibilities of just action. In 
the twentieth  century, fi gures like Reinhold Niebuhr and Robert Markus 
found Augustinian resources that might aid demo crats facing the crises of 
totalitarianism and fascism. But demands for a truly just politics  were chan-
neled by a release valve that  either funded compensation in another world 
or took comfort in the value of an ethical personality protected from the 
fl ux of this world.  Th ese versions of Augustinian politics typically equated 
a moralized politics with sentimentalism. In par tic u lar, invocations of love 
in conceptions of po liti cal life  were met with suspicion. While Niebuhr’s 
Augustinianism, which can degenerate into vulgar pragmatism, has re-
turned to public discussions via President Barack Obama and his defenders, 
 things have changed in the acad emy.
Diff er ent va ri e ties of Augustinian liberalism remain, including a repub-
licanism committed to princi ple exemplifi ed in a fi gure like Martin 
Luther King Jr. By my lights, he is Amer i ca’s greatest (and most radical) 
Augustinian, tapping into Augustine’s notions of both love and sin. His 
analy sis of Amer i ca’s loves was able to historicize rather than simply psy-
chologize injustice, off ering a vision of a “beloved community” that joined 
the structural and the personal by diagnosing failures of  will as much as 
fl aws of  will. Many of  today’s Augustinians, however, adopt Augustine’s 
critique of empire in order to expose demo cratic action as a repressed work 
of vio lence. For some, demo cratic action is itself idolatrous.
Augustine’s language of using the world and enjoying God can drain 
activity in time from theological signifi cance, dreaming only of reconcili-
ation beyond history. Politics is just one example of misplaced faith. But 
supposed Neoplatonic oppositional contrasts betray Augustine’s eff ort to 
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refuse a tournament of competitive loves between God and the world, 
especially one predicated on strong distinctions between “natu ral” and 
“super natu ral.” A competition between time and eternity, between the in-
ner and the outer, is what his Christology actually rejects.  Here, I think, is 
a power ful resource for what Pantelis Kalaïtzidis calls “the hidden Chris-
tological dimension of social and po liti cal action on behalf of our neighbor.”11 
Po liti cal action, which promotes just relations among persons, becomes 
a means by which one loves God and neighbor.
Such hiddenness, however, risks virtual denial by many po liti cal Au-
gustinians. Th ey are confi dent in their rejection of any po liti cal confi dence. 
Augustine admittedly confessed a hope familiar to both Eastern and Western 
traditions: We only fi nd happiness and redemption in the afterlife. His 
restless heart yearned for something more than the fairer distribution of 
scarce resources, the hope of modern demo cratic politics. He longed for a 
shared redemption of the world and its common objects of love. Such 
freedom could only be found  after death. Th is Augustine, it might be 
thought, could sing the blues only as a lament for the mediocrity of the 
fallen  human condition in exile. Unlike Billie Holiday’s singing of the song 
“Strange Fruit” in which the “strange fruit” is “hanging from the poplar 
trees”12— which like Augustine’s critique of Rome, unmasked the inno-
cence of American democracy— Augustine’s meditations on eating for-
bidden fruit and a Christ nailed to a tree tend not to inspire protest or 
reform, let alone revolutionary ambition in a world incapable of moral 
redress. Th ey provide occasions for mourning, possibly the consolation of 
spontaneous compassion as symbolic gesture.
For critics of dour Augustinianism, this is the world of merciful slave 
 owners, compassionate doomsayers, or perhaps, bourgeois consumers of 
fair- trade goods who write checks to Oxfam from time to time.  Th ose more 
hopeful about demo cratic action worry about this Augustinian legacy, one 
that can make Christians comfortable with injustice or lethargic in despair-
ing fatalism. Highlighting the limits of politics can promote a charity 
complicit with injustice, a benevolence that supports domination and ex-
ploitation just as much as innocent hopes in the prospects of liberalism.
Humanitarians and Good Samaritans
Th is theme, launched by many Enlightenment fi gures disappointed with 
Christian politics of charity, has been powerfully examined in recent criti-
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cal discussions of the rise of humanitarianism and the ideology of “humani-
tarian space.”13 While scholars raise questions about the exclusionary 
politics of humanitarian practices (now predicated on the “empire” of neo-
liberalism), many of my Prince ton students, disillusioned by modern poli-
tics and hungering for moral clarity, see such direct action as the last best 
hope to make bearable an unbearable world. Hearing their voices has led 
me to that curious and fraught last fi gure in my title. Th e story of the Good 
Samaritan is often heralded as a defi ning moment in the universalism of 
Christian charity, an exemplar of humanitarian concern for the suff ering 
of strangers. Augustine’s infl uential reading of the parable helped to de-
velop its reception in this egalitarian direction.
But much of modern politics (and theology) subsumes benevolence 
 under the rubric of justice, or considers it only a second- best response to 
injustice. Justice is seen as the primary virtue of politics lest we fall prey to 
libertarian or conservative attacks on the welfare state.  After Kant and 
Nietz sche, moreover, charity is seen by many as a semblance of po liti cal 
virtue that obscures the demands of justice. It is hard to read about the 
sociology of compassion without tripping over references to “the  will to 
power,” “class control,” and “disciplining technologies.” If you google “hu-
manitarianism,” for example, you immediately fi nd titles like Th e Dark 
Sides of Virtue or Humanitarianism in Question.14 Tracing links between 
humanitarianism and colonialism has been a major preoccupation of his-
torians, yielding a consensus that movements like the abolition of slavery 
 were motivated by far more than the morality of compassion.15 Charles Tay-
lor has argued that the moral demandingness of modern politics can itself 
be traced to secular transformations of the parable. In his long story about 
our new moral order and the pressures of time, Taylor expresses a Webe-
rian lament about the nature and character of  these demands that form 
their own guilty po liti cal subjects and missionary agendas. He argues that 
modern ethics and politics have distorted the message of the Good Samari-
tan by reducing its prescriptions to a rigorous code in an immanent frame. 
For him, the parable must be understood as an event, a fl eshly act of love 
in time that participates in the life of God.
Augustinians have their own resources to support each of  these suspi-
cions. Christian charity, funded by Augustine’s emphasis on love as the 
form of worshipping God, has fostered compelling commitments to the 
equal dignity of persons and the creation of demo cratic institutions that 
manifest this commitment in ways that do not rely solely on a good  will. 
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It also has a shadow side, rendering victims of injustice merely as objects 
of suff ering. Far from an expression of cosmopolitan solidarity, humani-
tarianism can become the mask worn by the power ful, the supposed virtue 
confessed by the paternalist and the realist.16
So humanitarianism is as contested as democracy and Augustinianism. 
Some humanitarians link their actions to broader po liti cal commitments 
to development;  others resist such linkage in the name of charity and the 
distinct identity of victims.  Th ese debates, however, reveal more than they 
sometimes admit in their discussions of moral obligation and the legacy 
of Christian charity. Th ey raise fundamental questions about how to inter-
pret the character of life in our world as such (including judgments about 
history). For example, anthropologist Peter Redfi eld’s work in comparing 
Albert Schweitzer’s medical mission, the Red Cross, and Médecins Sans 
Frontières highlights the subtle yet profound religious diff erence in mod-
ern humanitarianism that fi nds “moral certainty in alleviating anguish and 
protecting life” and a “distinctly material proj ect of salvation.”17 Redfi eld 
prefers to characterize this proj ect as a reoccupation of the religious rather 
than its transposition, though  others argue that humanitarian practices are 
best understood as a secular theodicy, accenting terms of “spiritual awak-
ening” and “vocation” now in the face of constant emergency.18
Conclusion
Henry Kissinger once quipped that the secret of success in life is low ex-
pectations, something psychologists have labeled “defensive pessimism,” a 
strategy of damage control to manage anxiety and despair.  Th ings can al-
ways get worse, but they are always better than we deserve. In politics, as 
in the rest of life,  there are no good choices, only lesser evils, full of sacri-
fi ce: not just in places like Syria and Af ghan i stan, but everywhere, anytime. 
Such bleakness is taken to be Augustine’s tonic for a world that hopes too 
much from politics.
Peter Kaufman recently has reminded us of the po liti cal implications 
of how bad Augustine thought the bad news of Genesis and the tumult of 
North Africa  really was. For all the apparent success we might have in 
struggling against the darkness, po liti cal action “amounts to  little more 
than damage control in dystopia.”19 Th e City of God, Kaufman tells us, is 
Augustine’s “disorienting device for  those who [grow] too comfortable with 
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time.”20 Augustine was “convinced that Chris tian ity could not redeem ter-
restrial cities. Life in time was a Gulag or—in current coin— a Gitmo, a 
detention camp.”21 Time is anything but comfortable.
All politics involves loss, even the most liberal thinkers admit to us, 
 either  because the goods of life are themselves in confl ict, or as Augustine 
might have it,  because the most fundamental  battles are prob lems internal 
to the  will. Augustine’s moderation does off er a cautious wisdom about 
politics, perhaps not too dissimilar from Rawlsian meditations on realistic 
utopia. But Augustine’s meta phors for politics are pastoral and medicinal, 
rather than technocratic or economic, requiring delicate and discerning 
practical skills, calling into question the confi dent psychologies that sup-
port many of  today’s moral and po liti cal theories, including both humani-
tarians and their critics. Kaufman’s challenge to Augustinian liberals is 
formidable, posing the most diffi  cult questions for  those trying to imag-
ine a diff er ent Augustine for our time. Diff erences may arise not simply 
from interpreting the historical Augustine, but from assessing the needs 
of our age. We might need to transcend some Augustinian lessons we have 
learned too well, including the fear of demanding too much from our poli-
tics and ourselves. Augustine’s allegorical, even parabolic, reading of his-
tory resists closure and resignation. Even- tempered aspirations should not 
be trapped in a God- forsaken time that is only a race to death, loitering on 
the stage of a Samuel Beckett play.
Never demoralized, Augustine sought to provide for a confused, disil-
lusioned, and anxious culture something to live for, rather than simply 
stand against.  Th ere is no certain knowledge, and constant recognition of 
limits, but can the exercise of po liti cal virtues— responsive to true  human 
goods—be a part of the life of piety, even proleptically referred to  those 
virtues perfected in heaven? Augustine’s vision of participation in excel-
lence complicates his received dualisms  because being for the good involves 
being for par tic u lar goods, even if our virtues are fragmented, frail, and 
partial, always resisting our integrative eff orts. Given a God who suff ers 
time with us, the perfecting of virtue requires such time. On my reading, 
Augustine’s heavenly city cannot erase time’s virtues. Th ey are consum-
mated, but not consumed.
Salvation may not be internal to history, but it is also not thoroughly 
external: “Time stands as both the wound of existence and as the salve nec-
essary for healing this wound.”22 I have not off ered a theology of history, 
 A u g u s t i n e ,  L i b e r a l i s m ,  a n d  t h e  G o o d  S a m a r i ta n  107
153-66040_ch01_3P.indd   107 9/16/16   11:59 AM
let alone prophecy, but I think more refl ection in this direction might re-
lieve pos si ble tensions between anti- Pelagian doubts about politics and their 
hyper- Augustinian refusal. It might also allow for a deeper recognition of 
the plurality of moral excellences nurtured in the graced time that is po-
liti cal history.
Th eological interpretation of po liti cal history, in a world with real 
detention camps, is always in danger of self- deception and excess. Augus-
tinians, at their best, remain critics of empires and nationalisms (especially 
ones that lay claim to demo cratic virtue). But I have suggested a po liti cal 
Augustinianism that wants to be more than a counsel against idolatry risks 
saying something about the mysterious and hidden ways of God, even in 
po liti cal action. Some still need to be reminded of Augustinian limits and 
the enigmas of temporal life. But in a world that has largely abandoned 
any hopes for redemption (in this life or the next), articulating the possi-
bility of redemptive agency in the world strikes me as urgent. Such a po-
liti cal theology might off er more than critique, even for  those who long 
for another city  after time.
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An Orthodox Encounter 
with Liberal Democracy
Emmanuel Clapsis
The majority of the Orthodox churches, living in liberal demo cratic socie ties, are  free to worship God and live the fullness of the Ortho-
dox tradition in its diverse ethnic and cultural expressions. However, the 
freedom that liberal demo cratic socie ties ascribe to their citizens generates 
an unpre ce dented pluralism of voluntary communities and lifestyles, which 
has challenged the central role that the Orthodox Church played in moral 
formation in traditional socie ties. Th e attitudes and sensibilities that the 
Orthodox churches are called to develop within the contextual realities of 
liberal democracies are highly contested issues among Orthodox theolo-
gians  today. Some face the new contextual realities with an alarmist attitude, 
fearing the capitulation of the Orthodox Church to liberal sensibilities. 
Th ey adopt an adversarial, activist posture against the modernizing liberal 
socie ties, proposing defensive demarcations of radical separation between 
Orthodoxy and other Christian churches, other religions, and liberal de-
mocracy in general. Th ey seek to construct the identity of the Orthodox 
Church in opposition to all who are not Orthodox, espousing a stringent, 
hierarchical, authoritarian, and exclusivist vision of what the Orthodox 
Church should be, in order to maintain the purity of Orthodoxy.  Others 
perceive the changing social realities of liberal socie ties as opportunities 
to reconfi gure and communicate the Orthodox faith and tradition without 
compromising the Church’s particularity. Still  others, for the sake of rele-
vance and ecumenical collaboration, may have unconsciously surrendered 
the particularity of the Orthodox tradition, reducing the Church to a cul-
tural agency that legitimates for its members the prevailing social realities. 
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Generally, this debate expresses the fear and the anxiety of some about the 
pos si ble loss of the unique Orthodox identity and its capitulation to the 
pluralistic culture of liberal democracy as well as the strong belief of  others 
that the Orthodox ethos can be embodied in and through diff er ent socio-
cultural delineations, aspirations, and achievements. Formally, it can be 
argued that the Orthodox churches, despite the objections of the tradition-
alists, through their active participation in the ecumenical movement and 
interfaith collaboration have signaled the abandonment of attitudes of 
stringent and defensive demarcation, rejecting sectarianism and focusing 
their attention on the task of witnessing God’s love for all.1
In this essay, I  will focus on the challenges that liberal democracy poses 
to the traditional understanding of the Church’s mission and witness in 
the world and how it has already aff ected the life of the Church and its 
structures of authority. Furthermore, I  will explore the role of the Ortho-
dox Church in public life once it has critically accepted the intrinsic plu-
ralism that liberal democracy generates. Perhaps this paper is an exercise 
in theological and moral imagination refl ecting not where the Orthodox 
churches actually stand in relation to liberal democracy, but how they 
should understand their place guided by the fullness of the Orthodox faith, 
its eschatological orientation, and the Eucharistic experience that decisively 
shapes the mind of Orthodoxy.
Freedom in Liberal Socie ties
In liberal socie ties, personal freedom has priority over social unity, regard-
less of  whether this unity is imposed by tradition or modernizing institu-
tions and ideologies. Th e individual is  free to act in ways that are impossible 
in traditional socie ties. He can collaborate with  others to form freely 
chosen communities, without the constraints of ethnic, religious, or class 
identity, or choose life- goals that go beyond the bound aries of traditional 
expectations and norms. In that context, he can fashion and practice di-
verse patterns of life that express individual creativity and aspiration. He 
may choose from a range of possibilities that may have been denied to him 
by a traditionally prescribed social order. Freedom in liberal socie ties is in-
terpreted purely and exclusively as absence of constraint on the possibili-
ties of seeking self- fulfi llment and self- discovery. It might lead some to a 
rejection of all traditions, while  others might be led to a  free appreciation 
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of tradition as a resource for the development of communal life based on 
mutual re spect and affi  nity.
Citizens in liberal demo cratic socie ties are  free to pursue their self- 
interests, and choose to relate to other persons only for the purpose of grati-
fying their own desires. Th e notion of self in such an attitude can be expanded 
to include a par tic u lar group of  people, which acts like a selfi sh person in 
relation to other groups, defi ning and claiming the common good at the 
expense of  others. In such relationships the  others are reduced to objects 
of use, often expressed by economic exploitation and commodifi cation, in 
acts of psychological and emotional manipulation, or in their reduction to 
objects of sexual gratifi cation.  Th ese dominative and exploitative relation-
ships tell the negative story of liberal socie ties, in which individual freedom 
becomes a license to exploit  others. Freedom, however, provides another 
possibility to the citizens of a liberal democracy that leads to the recogni-
tion of discovering the importance of relationships as indispensable ele-
ments of  human identity. It leads them to the recognition that it is only in 
life- sustaining and transforming relationships of love that  human fulfi ll-
ment can be experienced. Such relationships are not relations of domina-
tion and consumption, but relations formed primarily for the sake of a 
shared life.  Th ere is a sharp contrast between  these two pos si ble ways of 
exercising freedom: Th e one views the individual self as seeking its own 
goals, so that relationships have a purely instrumental character, and the 
other considers the self as willing to allow its own goals to be transformed 
through a commitment to a relationship distinct from  those individual 
goals.
Is it pos si ble to give a critical but positive interpretation of this shift of 
focus from the community to  human autonomy, while si mul ta neously ad-
hering to the importance of relations that lead to communion? Th e philo-
sophical and so cio log i cal insights of Charles Taylor can be illuminating in 
developing a positive, but critical appreciation of the turn to the self in a 
culture that emphasizes relationships as constitutive of a healthy commu-
nity. He argues that the culture of subjectivity is neither to be rejected nor 
to be uncritically endorsed as it is.2 Th e way to address the culture of subjec-
tivity is to enter sympathetically into the culture’s animating ideal and to try 
to show what it  really requires. Th is can be done by demarcating the higher 
and nobler ideals of subjectivism from its malignant practices and using 
 these positive and motivating ideas to critique its negative expressions. 
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Such a posture presupposes an engagement in the work of persuasion, be-
ing in conversation with the prevailing cultural realities. He believes that 
 people are not so locked in by the vari ous social developments that condition 
them that they cannot change their ways, regardless of strong arguments 
concerning atomism and instrumental reasoning.3
Taylor acknowledges that in liberal demo cratic socie ties, subjectivity has 
become a unique source of signifi cance, meaning, and authority. “Good 
life”  human fl ourishing is identifi ed with living one’s life in full awareness 
of one’s state of being; in enriching one’s experiences and fi nding ways of 
 handling negative emotions; and in becoming sensitive enough to fi nd out 
where and how the quality of one’s life— alone or in relation— may be im-
proved. Th e goal is not to follow established paths, but to forge one’s own 
inner- directed, subjective life; not to become what  others want one to be, 
but to “become who I truly am.” Th us the key value for the mode of sub-
jective life is an au then tic connection with the inner depth of one’s unique 
life- in- relation.  People have the potential to choose what they wish to be 
and with whom they want to associate.
Taylor proposes that in the cultural confl icts over subjectivity, instead 
of taking a position  either for or against we need to persuade  people that 
self- fulfi llment, so far from excluding unconditional relationships and 
moral demands beyond the self, actually requires  these in some form. It is 
in the nature of their increased freedom that  people through their choices 
can sink morally lower, as well as rising higher. In liberal demo cratic socie-
ties, the higher forms of self- responsible moral initiatives and dedication 
 will coexist with debased practices. Taylor argues that
the best can never be defi nitively guaranteed, nor are the decline and 
triviality inevitable. Th e nature of the  free society is that it  will al-
ways be the locus of a strug gle between higher and lower forms of 
freedom. Neither side can abolish the other, but the line can be 
moved, never defi nitively but, at least for some  people for some time, 
one way, or another.4
Taylor advocates that, through winning hearts and minds, social action 
and po liti cal change, the better forms of collective life, can gain ground, 
at least for a while. Th is perspective, in his view, breaks quite defi nitively 
with the prevailing cultural pessimism. Taylor considers that cultural pes-
simism is not only mistaken; it is also counterproductive.
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Some Orthodox theologians,  because of the corrosive eff ects that the 
primacy of freedom has upon all forms of communal life, consider liberal 
democracy to be incompatible with the basic ethos of Orthodoxy, without 
meaning that that they do not recognize the contribution of liberal democ-
racy in affi  rming the dignity and the freedom of all  human beings against 
oppressive and alienating social structures.5 Orthodox tradition is incom-
patible with the negative aspect of liberalism that threatens all forms of 
communal life, but it provides invaluable resources in forming moral hab-
its that enable freedom to be expressed in ways oriented to community 
rather than domination or gratifi cation.6 In Orthodox theology, commit-
ment to community is not about the stifl ing of individual freedom but the 
fulfi llment of the self in interpersonal relationships.
Th e communal pattern of life that the Church espouses through the 
anthropological implications of the Trinitarian faith and the experience of 
the Eucharistic life is a distinct contribution of the Church to the world, a 
prophetic real ity that challenges or inspires the world to be in the pro cess 
of social transformation and openness to God and  others.7 Freedom by its 
very defi nition may lead  either to a transcendence of the limitations and 
the necessities of nature as well as of history or to an unconditional sub-
jection to them. Th e task of the Church is not to be the advocate of the 
eradication by secular force of  those practices of freedom that lead to  human 
alienation and abuse, but to be an au then tic communion of  people who 
actively participate in the ongoing dialogue in the civil society that aims 
to strengthen  human solidarity, justice, and peace as well as openness to a 
 future that transcends the oppressive realities of the pres ent.8 In the public 
space of civil society, the Orthodox Church may discover that other Chris-
tian churches, religious communities, and secular movements may operate 
with similar anthropological understandings through their commitment to 
society, or even humanity, at large. Such commitments in advancing  human 
solidarity, compassion,  human dignity, and rights enhance  human welfare 
and generate a high degree of cooperation in pursuit of common goals. 
Such commitments and relationships,  either explic itly or implicitly, are open 
to the love of God in their recognition that the fulfi llment of  human life 
lies beyond the self as self- referential goal.
Th e Church is called to communicate its theology of personhood that, 
in my judgment, can redress the harm caused by distorted theologies of 
self- abnegation and invite the citizens of liberal socie ties to allow personal 
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relationships to fl ourish through commitment.9 Th e Kingdom of God, as 
it has been disclosed by Christ and continuously lived in the Church, es-
pecially in the cele bration of the Eucharist, must be communicated within 
liberal socie ties as the life of communion and communication that espouses 
relationships of re spect and love marked by justice and peace.10 Th e com-
ing of God’s Kingdom is embodied in the active involvement of Christ in 
the life of the world, in collaboration with God’s Spirit, disclosing the love 
of God for all creation. God’s goal of bringing life to the world through 
the advent of His Kingdom defi nes his mission; for the realization of this 
mission, Christ is subject to death, without abandoning or modifying 
His proclamation of the Kingdom, or avoiding confrontation with the 
power ful.
Th e Church, in the context of liberal socie ties, should contribute its own 
theological insights and witness on the nature of  human freedom as the 
fundamental potential for community and creativity, rather than as a 
destructive self- assertion. Th e Christian faith’s own understanding of free-
dom, as a response to God’s gift of life and love, can serve and nourish all 
expressions of freedom in liberal socie ties that are oriented to mutual re-
spect and just relationships. For Orthodoxy, the fullest expression of this 
 free self- disposition is in the realization of personal existence through re-
lationships of mutual commitment, relations with God as the source of 
 human life and with other persons as the essential context for personal ful-
fi llment. Freedom is understood as the possibility of fulfi llment through 
relationship, rather than, as in the secular liberal conception, the absence 
of any warrantable and justifi ed claims on the individual autonomy.
How does the primacy of the self over the community aff ect the inner 
life and structures of the Orthodox Church? Focusing now on how liberal 
society has aff ected the ethos of the Orthodox  people in the United States, 
I want to argue that the Orthodox churches in this country have already 
opted to develop their identity by using their religious and cultural tradi-
tion as a resource rather than a constraint.11 Th e profi le of the Orthodox 
communities in this country has changed dramatically  because of the 
social upward mobility of Orthodox  people, their pro gress in education, and 
above all their daily encounters and interactions with  people of diff er ent 
religions, races, cultures, and ethnicities. Most especially for Orthodox 
young  people, neither ethnicity nor diff erences in religion or cultural back-
ground can be an obstacle to uniting their lives with  those of their loved 
ones. Second- and third- generation Orthodox prefer the language of their 
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birth country over that of their parents’ home country, and they speak 
En glish better than Greek, Arabic, Rus sian, or Slavonic. Th ey view their 
Orthodox identity in a very diff er ent way than  either their parents or their 
peers did only two or three de cades ago. Th ey are decoupling the Ortho-
dox faith from its cultural embodiments, and they are in the pro cess of 
recasting it into what is seen by them as a “pure” religion, based on iso-
lated religious markers and American sensibilities. Th e principal authority 
in crafting their identity is the sovereign self. Th ey are distrusting or have 
already moved away from the organ izations, institutions, and  causes that 
used to anchor their religious and cultural identity and be hav ior. Each per-
son performs the  labor of fashioning his or her own self, pulling together 
ele ments from the vari ous aspects of Orthodoxy, ethnic heritage, existen-
tial quests, and pres ent cultural sensibilities, rather than stepping into an 
“inescapable framework” of identity. Community is a felt need, even a real 
hunger for some, but it is, in my judgment, subordinate to individualism.
Th e individualization of the Orthodox faith and its decoupling from 
its traditional ethnic, cultural embodiments lead to the development of 
multiple orthodoxies within the Orthodox Church. Th e pluralization of 
Orthodoxy is a threat to the Church’s unity, since the institutional aspects 
of Church life have limited capacity to persuade  those who have embraced 
or crafted an individualized version of Orthodoxy about the need to cor-
rect, enhance, or recraft their par tic u lar orthodoxy. Perhaps the Orthodox 
churches in liberal demo cratic socie ties must learn not only to accept the 
prevailing pluralism of the public realm that freedom generates, but also 
to live with an internally diff erentiated Orthodoxy— multiple orthodoxies— 
that maintain their unity in the Apostolic faith, the Eucharist, Scripture, 
and diakonia. Ac cep tance of the pluralistic nature of liberal demo cratic 
socie ties inescapably invites the Orthodox churches to come to terms with 
the nature and the limits of pluralism that tradition- as- resource generates 
within the life of the Church, most especially on issues of ethics and 
morality.
Th e Orthodox Church must recognize that while, in traditional, cultur-
ally and religiously homogeneous countries, it was inevitable that the per-
sonal search for  human fulfi llment led most of the  people to the Church, in 
liberal socie ties  people have a range of options for exploration of personal 
meaning. In traditional settings, the Church relied primarily on the pro-
cess of socialization for the purpose of communicating and passing on the 
practice of faith, neglecting the question of personal religious conversion. 
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Once it is recognized that the pro cess of socialization in the pres ent con-
textual real ity no longer necessarily leads to a faith commitment and that 
the range of options for  human fulfi llment is multiplied, the social expres-
sions of the Orthodox faith need to be recast with the aim of communi-
cating, through dialogue and persuasion, a personal faith that fulfi lls the 
perennial  human existential quest for meaning.
Th e Orthodox Church in the Public Sphere
In refl ecting on the presence and participation of the Orthodox churches 
in the public life of liberal socie ties, it is impor tant to avoid all forms of 
reductionism that limit their role  either to serving the poor or operating 
only in the subjective and private realms of life. Generally, the role of 
religion in the public life is much more than “faith- based boostering” of 
eff orts to contribute to material betterment of individual lives and mending 
society’s safety net. Th is kind of understanding misrepresents the capacity 
of the religious communities to carry the burden of social welfare for dis-
advantaged  people, families, and communities. And furthermore, it misrec-
ognizes the identity and priorities of the religious communities in the 
public realm, such as increasing moral and spiritual capacities, inspiring citi-
zens to serve neighbors, building relationships across barriers of race and 
income, and providing a vision of what kind of community  people are 
called to be.12
For the same reasons, we must argue against “dogmatic secularism” that 
devalues the eff ects of faith practices on the vibrancy of civil society and 
demo cratic life by considering them to be simply subjective and private phe-
nomena with no public signifi cance. Dogmatic secularism dismisses the 
beliefs and values of a signifi cant number of  people who have chosen to 
shape their identity through the values and virtues embedded in the nar-
ratives of their religious communities. Th is prevents liberal socie ties from 
responding adequately to the global surge of growing religious pluralism. 
Most importantly, it deprives them of opportunities to give renewed 
strength and vibrancy to the moral values, princi ples, and virtues needed 
for demo cratic participation and civility.13 Dogmatic secularism, however, 
should not be confused with a functional secular ethos that allows all citizens 
of liberal socie ties (secular, religious, agnostics, indiff erent, or unbelievers) 
to withhold the full range and depth of their convictions in order to main-
tain mutual re spect, cooperation, and civility in public settings. Dogmatic 
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secularism wrongly equates a public ethos of tolerance and civility with 
the absence of religious commitments.
Th e Orthodox Church, based on her distinctive ethos, understands her 
public role in liberal socie ties as an agent of reconciliation that promotes 
 human solidarity (communion), justice, and peace through the totality of 
her life and in collaboration with other Christian churches, religious com-
munities, secular movements, and  people of good  will. Such collaboration, 
as we have already noted, is feared by some on the grounds that it might 
gradually render the distinctive stance of the faith secondary and ines-
sential or conceive the ethical princi ples and values of Orthodoxy apart or 
in de pen dently from their theological basis.  Others refute such arguments, 
advocating that not to be involved in such movements means that the 
Church would pay less attention to the ideals of  human rights and dignity 
and focus on its own internal life. In essence, it is feared that  these options 
may lead  either to a dissolution of the Church’s identity or a withdrawal 
from the moral challenges and potentials of the secular world.
Th e justifi cation of the Church’s participation in the public life of lib-
eral society should not be guided by secular ideals and princi ples but 
based on the fullness of the Orthodox tradition and life. It must not be a 
 matter of po liti cal expediency, but it should refl ect the  will and the love of 
God for the world. What God has granted to the world most especially 
through his incarnate Word and the sending of the Holy Spirit is what the 
Church off ers to the world. Th e primary task of the Church is to be an 
icon of God’s Kingdom, the new creation, in which all in their particular-
ity are united with God. Th is is experientially lived in the cele bration of 
the Eucharist that constitutes the Church. In the cele bration of the 
 Eucharist, the Church becomes the living presence of Christ by the grace 
of the Holy Spirit. An indispensable aspect of the Church’s being in the 
world is to witness the coming real ity of God’s Kingdom beyond herself 
and to live in solidarity with all  those who strive to realize, however im-
perfectly, the princi ples and the values of God’s Kingdom in vari ous ways 
and historical contexts.
Orthodox theology in its ecumenical dialogue has been criticized on the 
grounds that its Eucharistic ecclesiology is susceptible to the danger of lead-
ing to ecclesiolatry, limiting God’s presence and operation only within the 
canonical bound aries of the Church and more specifi cally among the 
baptized faithful. In response to such criticism, Orthodox theologians 
have developed the notion of “liturgy  after Liturgy,”14 wishing to maintain 
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the normative role that the liturgy plays in constituting the Church and 
at the same time to acknowledge that the experiential relationships of love 
that they have in the Eucharist with God, humanity, and creation must 
guide the life and the witness of the Church. Th e danger of escaping from 
the challenges and confl icts of history to an eschatology that justifi es 
ethical indiff erence— although it need not be thus—is a real challenge that 
Orthodoxy continues to grapple with.
Th e recognition that the cele bration of the Eucharist demands an ethi-
cal response from the  human side does not mean that God’s presence in 
the world through his Church somehow depends on fallible  human re-
sponses and actions. Th e Eucharistic ethos excludes all forms of messianic 
ethics that imply that  human eff orts and actions can establish and advance 
the Kingdom of God in history.  Human eff orts in de pen dent of God’s Spirit 
and apart from Christ cannot bring humanity and the world into God’s 
Kingdom. Yet the Kingdom, by virtue of Christ’s resurrection and the 
sending of the Holy Spirit, is already an active presence in history without 
being contained or absorbed by it.
Th e Church lives in and communicates to the world the eschatological 
gift of hope that God has bestowed to his beloved creation. Th is hope goes 
beyond history and cannot be satisfi ed or exhausted by anything in  human 
history. What ever the outcome of  human history or the fate of par tic u-
lar historical communities, God’s eschatological gift of hope cannot be 
destroyed.  Human history cannot fulfi ll that hope, nor can it abolish it. 
Phenomenologically, it is in the nature of hope to be able to see the  future, 
despite the possibility of horrors, disappointments, and failures, as an open 
possibility: a  future in which  human beings can persevere in their histori-
cal existence and pass on their hope to succeeding generations. A belief in 
the openness of the  future to  human striving implies a confi dence that the 
 future  will, in some way, be hospitable to  human aspirations. It expresses 
 human confi dence that  human achievements  will have some lasting value 
despite the risk of being corrupted and perishing  because of their histori-
cal contingencies. At the same time, a detachment from  these achievements, 
a sense that they are not the ultimate manifestations of what  humans 
beings are capable of being, is essential to the  human sense of in de pen dence 
from history. Th is is the sense that  human beings can transcend past fail-
ures and begin anew, that their essence has not been exhaustively poured 
out in one fragile historical proj ect. Such a vision is at home in the Orthodox 
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conception of  human existence in the sense that the  future is in God’s 
hands and that  human worth  will not be mea sured by the success of  human 
proj ects but by the virtues that informed and motivated their eff orts. In 
theological terms, the sense of the openness of the  future has its ultimate 
source and meaning in the Kingdom of God, and the in de pen dence of 
 human personal worth from historical vicissitude is given an eternal foun-
dation in the proclamation of the resurrection of Christ from the dead. 
All that is good in  human eff orts prepared in some way for the Kingdom 
of God, yet  human destiny is never determined by the success or failure of 
 human eff orts. Nevertheless, Christians are called to solidarity in history, 
to achieve a bond with their fellow  human beings that is forged and 
strengthened within history. It is in the historical circumstances of their 
lives that they come to know God through his image in their neighbor 
and use their freedom to help make God’s Kingdom vis i ble in sign and 
anticipation.
In the history of the Christian tradition, we can identify three insepa-
rable and equally impor tant modes of unity with God that have  shaped 
the identity of the Church and need to guide her life and mission: unity 
through the word of God as it is found in Scripture; unity through the 
cele bration of the Eucharist; and unity in serving the poor, the needy, and 
the oppressed. While the word of God transforms the  human sense of real ity 
and the Eucharist unites all with God in the risen Christ through the 
power of the Holy Spirit, serving the poor is a sign of recognizing in them 
the suff ering God, who awaits healing and comfort by our love and com-
passion. In the active love of the victims of history and empathy for the 
most vulnerable ones, the Church becomes a sign of witness of the in- 
breaking of God’s Kingdom. Aspects of God’s Kingdom can be found in 
the world and in all  human beings through the prayers, the mission and 
the witness of the Church and the unceasing operation of God’s Spirit who 
moves all in mysterious and still incomprehensible ways into unity in truth.
Th e recognition that the new creation is already an active real ity in the 
world as a gift of God implies that Christians exercising discernment must 
identify and affi  rm what is of God that refl ects in imperfect and multiple 
ways signs of his presence. Each of the noble quests and strug gles for greater 
justice, peace, and advocacy of freedom, dignity, and  human rights for all 
despite their inherent weakness and corruptibility is not alien in all re spects 
to God’s purpose and love. Th e Church discerns in them the  human quest 
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for God’s Kingdom, which is the fruit of God’s Spirit. Th us, in the func-
tional secular public space of liberal society, all life- sustaining and life- 
transforming princi ples and values such as  human dignity and rights 
along with freedom can constitute the common realm in which followers 
of diff er ent religious creeds and ideologies along with secular  people can 
meet and dialogue, contributing dialogically to the common good.15 Dia-
logue creates the necessary space in which citizens and communities can 
meet one another and deliberate about how the common good might be 
embodied in policies that regulate their po liti cal life. Dialogue in such a 
pluralistic setting aspires as much as pos si ble to resolve confl icts discur-
sively, not manipulatively, coercively, or violently. It transcends not only 
the skeptical view that  there is no point in continuing to discuss the issues 
that divide us but also the realist position that assumes that confl icts and 
diff erences among  people and communities can only be resolved through 
the use of power or coercion. Dialogue is neither futile nor conclusive, but 
it helps to sustain the unity of confl icting communities in the conversa-
tion pro cess. If the interlocutors in a conversation do not achieve agree-
ment, they may at least mediate their confl icts temporarily and consider 
the confl ict from the perspective of what they already share. Provided that 
all are  free to participate in the pro cess of deliberation, dialogue advances 
the common good of society.16
Th e Orthodox Church can play a role in liberal socie ties that always 
retains—in fi delity to God’s Kingdom— a critical distance from any par-
tic u lar po liti cal form, and yet never remains aloof from all  those whose 
experience of evil inspires them to strug gle for justice. Th e eschatological 
orientation of the Orthodox faith does not allow the Church to be an apologist 
of any national and racial ideology, po liti cal system, economic theory, and 
praxis since all of them are eff ected by the pervasive corrupting presence 
of evil and their anthropocentric operating conception of real ity. What 
then is the function of the Church in the public realm if it cannot fully 
endorse any po liti cal and economic system and praxis, nor fully reject 
them, once it discerns traces of God’s Spirit in them? Th e notion of being 
“connected critics,” in the phrase of Michael Walzer, illuminates our vi-
sion of how the Church should operate in a demo cratic society.17 Chris-
tians should be committed to the fundamental ideas of democracy and yet 
be able to see the shortcomings of any par tic u lar demo cratic regime and 
society. As connected critics, they deeply care about the values inherent in 
any par tic u lar po liti cal proj ect, and their critique serves to call a commu-
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nity back to its better nature. “ Because  people of faith share the funda-
mental values of demo cratic socie ties, they remain connected to public life 
even as they engage in criticism;  because their commitment to democracy 
remains penultimate, however, they can appeal to transcendent ideals to 
critique current practice and to elevate their understanding of demo cratic 
values themselves.”18
Th e Orthodox Church moving into the public realm as a theological 
agency must operate in a space where the common good is built on affi  r-
mations of shared po liti cal values rather than of the sacred texts and teach-
ings of any par tic u lar religious tradition. In such a context, the Church 
must use her language of faith with an emphasis on its hermeneutical po-
tential to illuminate and interpret shared meanings, rather than to wit-
ness to her sovereign truth. An insistence on par tic u lar religious doctrine 
may be heard simply as an appeal to a par tic u lar group identity rather than 
as an invitation to refl ect on our common situation. Th e Church should 
instead evoke the shareable  human experience that allows the citizens of 
demo cratic socie ties to refl ect on their common  human situation. In this 
context, the promotion of  human rights plays a key role in the Church’s 
relationship to the con temporary world and thereby in the pro cess of shap-
ing a renewed sociocultural identity. Th is form of identity does not have 
demarcation from antagonistic ideological forces or other Christian commu-
nities as a constitutive feature, and for this reason it is capable of initiating 
a wide range of alliances in promoting justice and peace for all. Refrain-
ing from religious language in circumstances where it may alienate other 
citizens of good  will is a form of re spect, recognizing that Christian witness 
must often take the form of anonymity precisely for the sake of respecting 
the presence of Christ in our neighbor.
Th e Orthodox understanding of au then tic  human existence as the “be-
ing in communion” that Orthodox anthropology espouses is an impor tant 
contribution to the quest for building a  human community woven through 
personal relationships of freedom and love. Such theology needs to come, 
however, in terms of the all- pervading and inescapable power of sin, corrupt-
ing all who are exposed to the temptations of wealth and power. Orthodox 
anthropology, while acknowledging the pervasive presence of evil in  every 
 human being and society, at the same time affi  rms the far greater power of 
the presence of God in all  human beings through the grace of God’s Spirit 
and of Christ’s salvifi c life, death, and resurrection. Th e Christian vision 
of the  human person as sinful, redeemed, and capable of virtue should 
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inform demo cratic socie ties by helping  people in their personal and com-
munal life to develop ways to limit corruptibility and increase the range of 
opportunities for expressing the good pres ent in them. Th e Church in her 
public presence is called to acknowledge both the  human capacity for co-
operation and solidarity and the  human proneness to exclude and exploit 
 others  unless structures and sanctions are enshrined in law and in public 
institutions that promote  human solidarity, justice, and peace, bringing 
all closer to each other and more especially closer to God’s intention for 
the created world.
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Democracy and the Dynamics 
of Death
Orthodox Reflections on the Origin, 
Purpose, and Limits of Politics
Perry T. Hamalis
The phrase “shadow of Constantine,” which appears in this volume’s title, can be interpreted as encompassing at least two refl ective 
trajectories. Th e more common of the two is Constantine’s legacy as the 
fi rst emperor to self- identify as a Christian.  Here, Constantine’s “shadow” 
includes the sociopo liti cal repercussions of the coincidence of supreme 
po liti cal power and Christian faith. As other essays in this collection 
demonstrate, this trajectory raises historical questions— what  really hap-
pened and why?—as well as normative questions— how should the “Con-
stantine event” shape our beliefs and practices  today regarding Chris tian ity 
and politics? A second trajectory of refl ection pertains to the Christian 
theological- ethical tradition, which developed extensively during the 
remarkably long (1,100+- year) existence of Byzantium and continued, es-
pecially in the East, in vari ous Orthodox Christian communities. Again, 
 there are historical and interpretive questions within this trajectory— who 
developed par tic u lar theological claims, why  were they developed, and 
what did they mean?—as well as normative claims— how should Byzan-
tine theology be appropriated, applied, and communicated in pres ent- day 
contexts?
 Today’s Orthodox Christian leaders and thinkers unanimously affi  rm 
their commitment to preserving and sustaining the “second trajectory” of 
Constantine’s shadow, Orthodoxy’s theological tradition; however, their 
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attitudes  toward the “fi rst trajectory” lack consensus. Some argue enthusi-
astically for the compatibility of Orthodoxy with American- style liberal 
democracy;  others call for a neo- Byzantine symphonia model headed by an 
Orthodox king or queen; and still  others express ambivalence over  whether 
or not Orthodoxy can endorse any form of government without signifi cant 
caveats.1 For  those within or leaning  toward the pro- symphonia view, 
 whether rooted in the legacy of Byzantium, Tsarist Rus sia, or another 
Constantine- inspired regime,  there are ample historical examples and 
theological- political resources from which to draw, beginning in the early 
fourth  century with Eusebius of Caesarea (260–339 CE) and continuing 
through the early twentieth  century with vari ous pro- imperial or pro- 
monarchy voices in Rus sia and the Balkans. For  those within or leaning 
 toward the pro– liberal democracy view, however, the case is more diffi  cult to 
make, since far fewer authoritative sources exist within the Orthodox tra-
dition that explic itly defend—or even critique— democracy using theologi-
cal arguments.2 Elizabeth Prodromou refers to this as “the theory gap,” 
which, she contends, contributes both to the ad hoc quality of Orthodox 
communities’ strategies for democ ratization and to the dismissal of Ortho-
doxy’s tradition as not meriting the attention of scholars.3 Yet, as Nikolas 
Gvosdev states, “If demo cratic forms of government are to take root in 
cultures that have been  shaped by the values and practices of Orthodox 
Chris tian ity,  there must be some [historical or spiritual] foundation upon 
which such institutions can be constructed.”4 Put diff erently, Orthodox 
thinkers must work to fi ll “the theory gap” if we hope to better understand 
both the promises and the pitfalls of democracy for Orthodox Christian 
communities.
Recent contributions  toward this goal have tended to take two forms. 
Some, like Gvosdev,5 have started by identifying the defi ning characteristics 
of a democracy (popu lar sovereignty, pro cesses of deliberation/debate, open 
and  free elections,  etc.) and have then mined both trajectories of Constan-
tine’s legacy for support. Notwithstanding this approach’s contributions, 
some general criticisms of it are that it can be anachronistic and, at times, 
unconvincing in connecting ele ments of democracy with counter parts in 
the Orthodox tradition.6 Representatives of the second approach, like 
Aristotle Papanikolaou, have argued that one or more core theological- 
ethical teachings (theosis, the Holy Trinity, personhood,  etc.) are expressed 
well through demo cratic forms of government. For example, in Th e Mysti-
cal as Po liti cal, Papanikolaou constructively examines a core theological 
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theme— “divine- human communion”— with an eye  toward its relevance 
for and compatibility with con temporary liberal democracy. He describes 
his proj ect as “an attempt to draw out the implications for a po liti cal the-
ology of the Christian claim that  humans  were created for communion 
with God.”7 Papanikolaou’s strategy is to carry insights from the “second” 
refl ective trajectory of Constantine’s shadow (Eastern Christian theology) 
into the “fi rst” realm of his shadow (Christian po liti cal thought), respond-
ing to the question: On what theological basis, if any, can Orthodox Chris-
tians convincingly endorse modern democracy? Again, while such eff orts have 
yielded impor tant insights, they have also been criticized for their tendency 
to sanctify democracy as a divine form of government, to advance a ratio-
nale for democracy that is wholly unconvincing to non- Christians (if not 
to non- Orthodox), or to extrapolate theological claims to the realm of poli-
tics in ways that are somewhat naïve, if not po liti cally and theologically 
dangerous.8
In what follows, I aim to bridge and complement the two existing ap-
proaches by focusing on a theme that is basic to both: the dynamics of 
death. Th is term, “the dynamics of death,” encompasses both the predica-
ment of  human death and the ways in which the real ity and awareness of 
death shape  human life in personal and po liti cal contexts. Given the mas-
sive scope of this theme and the space limitations of this essay, what fol-
lows is a necessarily suggestive argument for the value of “the dynamics 
of death” as an interpretive lens for examining democracy within con-
temporary Christian ethics and for building a fresh rationale for democ-
racy from an Orthodox standpoint.9
Like Gvosdev, my argument takes seriously the characteristics, poten-
tial, and tendencies of real  people and real governments. I start with ob-
servable  human phenomena and historical data that po liti cal decision 
makers must address. Specifi cally, my points of departure are the drive of 
 human selfi shness, the fact of  human vio lence, and the acknowl edgment 
that governments have both prevented and infl icted death on a massive 
scale— truths pounded into our consciousness by the events of the past 
 century, but nonetheless requiring frequent recollection . . .  and prayerful 
lament. My approach, then, is characteristically modern; Machiavelli, 
Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau have taught me much, and 
they all began by “taking men as they are and laws as they might be.”10
Yet my point of departure also encompasses a set of theological- ethical 
claims that frame Orthodoxy’s normative vision: (1) Humanity’s predicament 
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is constituted primarily by the prob lem of physical and spiritual death; 
(2) the presence and awareness of this prob lem forms our lives in profound 
ways; and (3) the aim of Christian life is resurrection.11 Th us, like Papan-
ikolaou, I seek to employ a theological- ethical theme drawn from within 
the Orthodox tradition for refl ection on con temporary po liti cal thought. 
Yet, whereas Papanikolaou starts with the telos, or summum bonum, of 
“divine- human communion,” with the fulfi lled potential of  human per-
sons, or with the “way  things  ought to be,” I begin with the summum malum 
of  human death, with the depths of humanity’s brokenness, or with the 
“way  things are.” Th is diff erence carries some impor tant implications. Most 
signifi cantly, by grounding my account of democracy’s legitimacy upon the 
given  human condition instead of grounding it upon the aim of theosis, I am 
better able to avoid granting democracy an ultimate or sacred status—as 
the apotheosis of po liti cal life— and thus better able to critique some of 
democracy’s dangers. In addition, the theme of “the dynamics of death” lies 
at the foundation of modern politics, and of  human experience more broadly, 
in a way that “divine- human communion” does not. Th is shared ground 
not only bridges the two general approaches to democracy among recent 
Orthodox thinkers; it also gives Orthodox theology a po liti cal relevance, 
realism, and appeal to  those outside the tradition that is lacking in themes 
like “divine- human communion” and “communion in otherness.”
My argument in what follows is si mul ta neously interpretive and con-
structive. I both demonstrate the value of “the dynamics of death” as a lens 
for studying Christian po liti cal philosophy and defend democracy by uti-
lizing the resources of modern social contract theory, social scientifi c data, 
and selected resources of the early Christian, Byzantine, and post- Byzantine 
tradition. To start on a realistic note, I begin in Part 1 with a discussion of 
the dynamics of death theme in the writings of Th omas Hobbes (1588–
1679). While  later social contract thinkers like Locke and Montesquieu 
infl uence pres ent- day democracies more directly than Hobbes, Hobbes 
develops the “dynamics of death” theme with an unparalleled incisiveness 
and lucidity. In addition, some of Hobbes’s most “undemo cratic” and dan-
gerous claims become clear through the lens of the dynamics of death, 
providing an impor tant basis for my critique of his proposal. In Part 2, 
my focus shifts to several Orthodox sources, examining them against the 
Hobbesian backdrop. My hope is that the constructive analy sis I off er  will 
help identify lineaments of an alternative Orthodox case for democracy and 
spur additional exploration in this area of inquiry.
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Th e Dynamics of Death: Lessons from Th omas Hobbes
Th e Predicament of Death and the Origin of the State
At least one major trajectory in modern po liti cal philosophy, the social con-
tract tradition, begins in Hobbes’s work with a mythic “state of nature,” 
characterized by violent death, from which the state/commonwealth is 
born as a therapeutic response.12 “During the time men live without a 
common Power to keep them all in awe,” Hobbes writes, “they are in 
that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of  every man, 
against  every man.”13 For Hobbes, the pre- or postcivil state of nature is a 
state of total war, a bellum omnium contra omnes, which allows for no ex-
ceptions. It is a most miserable state of aff airs, a true “predicament,” which 
he famously depicts as follows:
In such condition,  there is no place for Industry;  because the fruit 
thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no 
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by 
Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and re-
moving such  things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face 
of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; 
and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent 
death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.14
At its core, the Hobbesian state of nature is an ontological predicament, 
a state of all- inclusive war and violent physical death. Life is “nasty,” “brut-
ish,” and— most importantly— “short.” Elsewhere in Leviathan Hobbes 
observes that  human beings  will risk their lives defending themselves rather 
than suff er the “greater evil” of a certain and pres ent death.15 A fortiori, 
Hobbes, in another work, identifi es violent death as “the supreme evil 
[summum malum] in nature.”16 While violent death is Hobbes’s principal 
concern, other passages suggest that Hobbes views not merely violent death 
but death per se as the fundamental  human prob lem.17 He describes death 
itself as “the greatest of all evils”18 and “that terrible  enemy of nature.”19 
For him, humanity’s predicament is constituted most fundamentally by 
the ontological prob lem of mortality and vio lence. Second, the state of na-
ture for Hobbes is a predicament not merely on the physical level, but also 
on the psychological level. It is a state of unceasing danger and “continuall 
feare.” As such, Hobbes contends, it is a condition of perpetual war: “For 
Warre, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fi ghting; but in a tract 
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of time, wherein the  Will to contend by Battell is suffi  ciently known.”20 
Th us, on top of  actual physical vio lence, the Hobbesian account of human-
ity’s state of nature encompasses knowledge that death threatens perpetu-
ally, and the continual fear of death that this knowledge fuels. Th e presence 
of this intense fear severely limits the ability of  human beings to trust 
one another, to collaborate, or to develop  toward any higher possibilities. 
Th e Hobbesian view of humanity’s prepo liti cal condition can be charac-
terized by the “dynamics of death,” wherein death, vio lence, and continu-
ous fear together comprise a state of misery from which deliverance is 
urgently needed.
In light of this realistic—if not excessively pessimistic— account of the 
“way  things are” in the state of nature, Hobbes goes on to articulate 
both the purpose of politics and the primary means through which this 
purpose is achieved. In  doing so, he inaugurates the modern social con-
tract tradition, which is subsequently developed by Locke, Rousseau, the 
American found ers, and many  others. With re spect to the purpose of poli-
tics, Hobbes unambiguously contends that government exists— fi rst and 
foremost—to protect the lives of citizens.21 Th e signifi cance of this point 
cannot be overstated. Death is what drives humanity’s po liti cal impulse; it 
is the prob lem that spurs  human beings to construct a commonwealth. 
Th e legitimacy of the sovereign authority thus stands or falls with its abil-
ity to protect the physical lives of its contracting members. “Th e offi  ce of 
the Soveraign (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly),” Hobbes writes, “con-
sisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, 
namely the procuration of the safety of the  people.”22 For Hobbes, the state 
arises as a man- made therapeutic response to the ontological dimension of 
humankind’s predicament. In light of this, the legitimacy of the state’s 
sovereign authority depends upon its eff ectiveness in delivering a life- saving 
cure. So long as a sovereign authority ensures citizens’ protection, citizens 
are obligated to recognize its legitimacy and obey its laws. Po liti cal legiti-
macy, for Hobbes, hinges not on the procedural integrity of po liti cal in-
stitutions but on the sovereign’s eff ectiveness in providing protection and 
maintaining peace.23
Protecting citizens and maintaining peace might strike us as a truncated 
po liti cal telos— shouldn’t a government do more than this? For Hobbes, a 
government should establish the conditions of peaceful coexistence where, 
within limits,  human beings can pursue their private happiness and col-
laborate on endeavors of mutual interest.24 Like other moderns, he rejects 
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the view that a universal and comprehensive account of humanity’s sum-
mum bonum can be known. Hobbes simply expects the civil sovereign to 
stop the perpetual war and terror that defi nes the state of nature. Although 
clearly not a supporter of democracy, Hobbes refuses to articulate a single, 
substantive account of  human felicity, leading some even to identify him 
as a “proto- liberal.”25
Since death lies at the core of Hobbes’s account of evil, the protection 
of life eff ectuated by a government carries tremendous normative value. 
As  others have noted and as Hobbes himself writes,26 the state assumes 
the role of an artifi cially constructed “savior” in his proposal. “Th is  great Le-
viathan, which is called a Commonwealth, or State, is a work of art; it is 
an artifi cial man made for the protection and salvation of the natu ral man, 
to whom it is superior in grandeur and power.”27 We  will return to this 
striking claim below, but fi rst we should consider how another Hobbesian 
teaching intertwines with the dynamics of death.
Th e Fears of Death and the Social Contract
In Hobbes’s teaching on the means through which a government originates, 
two ele ments, popu lar sovereignty and the mechanism of the “social con-
tract,” are vital. He writes:
Before the institution of Common- wealth,  every man had a right to 
 every  thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own 
preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order there-
unto. . . .  In the making of a Common- wealth,  every man giveth 
away the right of defending another; but not of defending himself. 
Also he obligeth himselfe, to assist him that hath the Sovereignty, in 
the Punishing of another, but of himselfe not.28
Th rough the mechanism of the social contract, each natu ral individual, 
motivated by self- preservation, becomes an author and member of the com-
monwealth by entering a covenant with the other members to transfer her 
or his natu ral right to a single sovereign authority. Th us the Hobbesian 
commonwealth, which is composed of  either a single individual or a small 
assembly, is erected by the combined power of all the covenanting citizens. 
 Here Hobbes breaks decisively from the Divine Right of Kings theory, 
which dominated po liti cal philosophy in both Western and Eastern Christian 
contexts. Not God, but the governed  people’s consent now grounds the 
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commonwealth’s sovereign authority. Yet Hobbes also rejects democracy, 
seeing it as too diff use, destabilizing, and cumbersome in attaining po liti-
cal aims.29 In his proposal, the civil sovereign receives from its  people all 
rights to judge all means and take all necessary mea sures to preserve 
citizens’ lives and maintain common peace, a teaching that has generated 
much criticism in the wake of subsequent authoritarian and totalitarian 
states.30
Entering the social contract seems to be a rational and easy choice for 
any person whose only alternative is the state of nature; yet Hobbes ac-
knowledges that  there is still a major obstacle to participation in this sav-
ing covenant: pride. Th e prob lem with pride, according to Hobbes, is that 
it prevents natu ral  human beings from seeing their need for the common-
wealth. Pride blocks individuals from discerning the fragility of their ex-
istence in the state of nature. Michael Oakeshott writes:
Th e precondition of the deliverance is the recognition of the pre-
dicament. Just as, in Christian theory, the repentance of the sinner 
is the fi rst indispensable step  towards forgiveness and salvation, so 
[in Hobbes], mankind must fi rst purge itself of the illusion called 
pride. . . .  Th e purging emotion (for it is to emotion that we go to 
fi nd the beginning of deliverance) is fear of death. Th is fear illumi-
nates prudence; man is a creature civilized by fear of death.31
Th e dynamics of death, specifi cally a sobering or humbling type of mind-
fulness of physical death’s imminence, seems to be a cornerstone of Hobbes’s 
proposal. Th e remembrance of physical death cuts through  human pride 
and intensifi es natu ral  human beings’ fear of physical death. For Hobbes, 
it is this fear that drives  people to enter the social contract and create the 
commonwealth.
A second role for the fear of death emerges once the commonwealth has 
been created. Recall Hobbes’s description of the state of nature: “During 
the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe.” A 
commonwealth achieves its purpose most basically by “over- awing” citi-
zens into civil obedience. By constructing the commonwealth, citizens ex-
press their confi dence that this governing body  will severely punish or kill 
anyone who transgresses the law— anyone who dares to attack the life, 
property, or liberty of a citizen. So long as citizens fear the commonwealth 
as the enforcer of the law, they no longer need to fear each other; and so 
long as the commonwealth has suffi  cient power to inspire awe, both  those 
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inside and  those outside its borders  will fear the consequences of acting 
against any of its contracting members. Th e dynamics of death lie at the 
foundation of the social contract’s eff ectiveness.
Fi nally, in Parts 3 and 4 of Leviathan, Hobbes’s proposal includes an 
extensive series of laws and theological teachings, enforced by the common-
wealth, that strive to minimize—if not eliminate— citizens’ fears of the 
afterlife, of divine judgment, or of eternal punishment. Such fears, he con-
tends, are susceptible to terrible abuses by religious leaders and fuel reli-
gious confl ict among citizens, since they are based on doctrines that can 
never be convincingly adjudicated.32 Most importantly, religious fears un-
dermine the ability of the commonwealth to awe  people into obedience. 
In a telling passage, Hobbes writes:
It is impossible a Common- wealth should stand, where any other 
than the Sovereign, hath a power of giving greater rewards than Life; 
and of infl icting greater punishments, than Death. Now seeing 
Eternall life is a greater reward, than life pres ent; and Eternall torment 
a greater punishment than the death of Nature; It is a  thing worthy to 
be well considered, of all men that desire (by obeying Authority) to 
avoid the calamities of Confusion, and Civill war, what is meant in 
holy Scripture, by Life Eternall, and Torment Eternall; and for what 
off ences, and against whom committed, men are to be Eternally tor-
mented; and for what actions, they are to obtain Eternall life.33
Th e commonwealth’s ability to “protect and save”  human beings— and 
hence its legitimacy— hinges on its ability to shape the actions of both in-
siders and outsiders, deterring illegal activity through a supreme fear of 
retribution. Th e social contract is strengthened and the power of the state 
is enhanced when citizens remain mindful of the real possibility of physi-
cal death/punishment (should they transgress the commonwealth’s laws) 
and forgetful of the real possibility of anything worse, like eternal suff er-
ing in the afterlife.34 Hobbes therefore makes sure that the Christian doc-
trines and practices that his civil sovereign endorses minimize fear of eternal 
death, thus buttressing the civil sovereign’s ability to command ultimate 
obedience.
Within a Hobbesian framework, then, the state originates through the 
dynamics of death: It arises as a cure to the natu ral predicament of death 
and terror; it is constructed through a social contract that is motivated and 
sustained by the desire for self- preservation; its legitimacy rests on its 
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eff ectiveness in protecting citizens’ lives; and it achieves its aim by employ-
ing the fear of violent physical death and minimizing the fear of eternal 
death in order to promote law- abidingness internally and deter outsiders 
from acting against its citizens.35
Death and the Limits of Politics
Th e lens of death’s dynamics reveals two raw truths related to the limits of 
government. Th e fi rst is the  simple but crucial acknowl edgment that, al-
though the state is born out of its contracting members’ mutual desire for 
self- preservation and its primary purpose is to protect citizens’ lives, no state 
can ultimately protect  those in its care against violent physical death. 
 Human beings are too complicated, or too corrupted; no  matter how 
massive and awesome the commonwealth’s power is,  human passions— 
anger, jealously, wrath— will, occasionally, trump the fear of retribution, 
and citizens  will be killed. Furthermore, even in a hy po thet i cal (or real) 
totalitarian regime where violent crime between citizens has been elimi-
nated, no government can protect its citizens from physical death per se. 
Mortality sets a necessary limit on politics. As Epicurus said eloquently, 
“Against all  else it is pos si ble to provide security, but as against death all of 
us mortals alike dwell in an unfortifi ed city.”36
Hobbes knew this, of course, as we all do. Yet what is striking is the 
extent to which  these uncontroversial truth claims could rock the very 
foundation of government within a social- contractarian framework. Re-
call Hobbes’s teaching on po liti cal legitimacy, which many subsequent (and 
demo cratically oriented) po liti cal theorists share: A government’s legitimacy 
rests on its ability to protect citizens’ lives. Within this framework,  every 
violent death of a citizen undermines, to some extent, the legitimacy of a gov-
ernment.  Whether it comes at the hands of a fellow citizen (a jealous lover, 
a drive-by shooter,  etc.) or at the hands of an outsider (an attacking  enemy 
soldier, a foreign terrorist,  etc.), the civil sovereign’s legitimacy erodes each 
time a citizen dies violently.37 Yet, notwithstanding this undeniable limit 
on a government’s ability to fulfi ll its purpose,  people are  eager to forfeit a 
signifi cant portion of their freedom and to enter the social contract. Some 
security, it seems, is better than no security, even if it comes at the expense 
of liberty.38 We turn easily to the state, the Leviathan, seeking a cure for 
our predicament. Yet even if Hobbes’s prescription for civil peace and sal-
vation  were to be followed completely— from the forfeiture of all rights (ex-
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cept the right to self- defense, which is inalienable), to the concentration of 
absolute power in a single ruler, to the reinterpretation of religious claims 
about the afterlife, martyrs, and the real possibility of eternal suff ering in 
hell—it would not provide salvation from what he himself calls “the great-
est of all evils”39 and “that terrible  enemy of nature,”40  human death. In 
light of this, one won ders  whether any civil sovereign within such a frame-
work can claim full and unequivocal legitimacy.
A second raw truth that emerges pertains to the horrifying capacity of 
governments themselves to engage in killing, especially when their author-
ity is absolute. While each major form of government has entered wars that 
have led to millions of violent deaths, social scientists have demonstrated 
that very rarely—if ever— does a stable demo cratic state go to war against 
another stable demo cratic state. Th e “demo cratic peace thesis,” as it is 
called, has been described by one po liti cal scientist as “the closest  thing we 
have to an empirical law in international relations.”41 While the demo-
cratic peace thesis does not contend that democracies have resisted wars in 
general (i.e., against nondemocracies) at a higher rate than other forms of 
government, the near nonexistence in the historical rec ord of wars between 
stable democracies provides strong support for cultivating democracy as a 
way to reduce violent death.
Another empirical fi nding that strongly supports demo cratic forms of 
government concerns the phenomenon of violent death being infl icted by 
a state upon its own  people. In his masterful studies, Death by Government 
and Power Kills,42 R. J. Rummel provides a detailed analy sis of “democide,” 
defi ned as “the murder of any person or  people by a government, includ-
ing genocide, politicide, or mass murder.”43 Th e data Rummel reports are 
jaw- dropping. In the twentieth  century (1900–99), an estimated 262 mil-
lion  people  were murdered by their own governments.44 Perhaps even more 
shocking is that this number is six times larger than the estimated total of 
 battle dead from all of last  century’s interstate and civil wars. Democides, 
in other words, are much more deadly than wars. Heading up Rummel’s 
list are four “decamegamurderer” regimes: China (PRC) 1949–87 (77 mil-
lion democide victims), USSR 1917–87 (62 million victims), Germany 
1933–45 (21 million victims), and China (KMT) 1928–49 (10 million vic-
tims).  Th ere is much that could be said about  these shocking statistics, and 
much that is beyond words, yet one dimension of Rummel’s analy sis should 
be repeated and underscored: Of all forms of governance, totalitarian regimes 
are most likely and democracies are least likely to engage in democide. 
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While many  factors distinguish totalitarian regimes from democracies, and 
many forms of governance dot the spectrum between  these two extremes, 
history indicates that the closer a government moves  toward absolute 
power, the more likely it is to murder  those within its borders. Embel-
lishing Lord Acton’s famous words, Rummel writes:
Power kills; absolute Power kills absolutely. . . .  Th e more power a 
government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the whims 
and desires of the elite, and the more it  will make war on  others and 
murder its foreign and domestic subjects. Th e more constrained the 
power of governments, the more power is diff used, checked, and 
balanced, the less it  will aggress on  others and commit democide. At 
the extremes of Power, totalitarian communist governments slaugh-
ter their  people by the tens of millions; in contrast, many democra-
cies can barely bring themselves to execute even serial murderers.45
While Hobbes identifi es violent death as the greatest evil and his po liti cal 
proposal aims— fi rst and foremost—at protecting citizens against violent 
death, history has taught us that the nondemo cratic form of governance 
he proposes is much more likely to exacerbate the prob lem than to solve it. 
 Th ose committed to preventing democide should  favor democracy.
Th e Dynamics of Death: Lessons from the Shadows of Constantine
Th e Predicament of Death and the Aim of Resurrection
In another work, I examine the phenomena of death, fear of death, and 
remembrance of death as a lens for assessing and comparing ethical vi-
sions.46 I also argue that many voices from the Byzantine theological- 
ethical tradition advance ethical visions that are thanatomorphic, “formed 
by death.” Th anatomorphicity, as I defi ne it, carries three distinct but in-
terrelated levels of meaning, which can be identifi ed in a wide range of 
worldviews. Th e fi rst level is ontological, the second is agential, and the 
third is noetic. According to the concept’s fi rst level of meaning, an ethi-
cal vision is thanatomorphic when it is framed by the prob lem of  human 
death.47 Th is applies to many representative voices from the “second tra-
jectory” of Constantine’s shadow  because they posit that spiritual death 
and physical death together comprise the core of humanity’s predica-
ment, our summum malum, and that salvation consists in both spiritual 
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and physical resurrection from the dead.48 For them, humanity’s broken-
ness is an ontological brokenness, a brokenness that, in turn, requires an 
ontological cure, the live- giving action of the Holy Trinity.
Some may fi nd it curious that many Eastern Orthodox theologians 
describe not only spiritual death but physical death— mortality itself—in a 
sharply negative manner. Georges Florovsky calls  human mortality “a deep 
tragedy,” a “painful metaphysical catastrophe,” and a “mysterious failure 
of  human destiny.”49 Kallistos Ware contends that physical death is “pro-
foundly abnormal” and even “monstrous,” refl ecting a world that is “dis-
torted and out of joint, crazy, écrasé.”50 And Archimandrite Sophrony 
Sakharov writes, “All of us have a single  enemy— our mortality. If man is 
[merely] mortal, if  there is no resurrection, then the  whole of world his-
tory is nothing but senseless creature suff ering.”51 In defending this view, 
Orthodox theologians sometimes appeal to the biblical accounts of Christ 
weeping for his friend Lazarus and agonizing in the Garden of Geth-
semane.52 Humanity’s predicament, from an Orthodox perspective, is 
formed by the prob lem of spiritual and physical death. Correspondingly, 
salvation entails deliverance from both spiritual and physical death; it en-
tails holistic resurrection. As Florovsky summarizes, “Th e death of our Lord 
was victory over death and mortality, not just remission of sins, nor merely 
a justifi cation of man, nor again a satisfaction of an abstract justice.”53
I emphasized above that Hobbes’s account of humanity’s predicament 
is ontological and that the summum malum in his vision is violent death. 
Within the Orthodox tradition, the core prob lem from which  human 
beings seek deliverance is, similarly, ontological; for it is constituted by 
spiritual and physical death. Th us, notwithstanding some impor tant diff er-
ences, both Hobbes and Orthodox Chris tian ity frame their ethical visions 
by starting with the conviction that the real ity and the possibility of death 
constitutes humanity’s most basic prob lem. Furthermore, both Hobbes and 
Orthodox Chris tian ity articulate normative proposals that aim to save 
 humans from the death that torments us. Given the wars, democides, and 
other death- related horrors of the past  century, one is hard- pressed to fi nd 
fault with this shared basic concern.
Th e Dynamics of Death and the Purpose of Politics
In Hobbes’s work, a description of the state of nature and the prob lem of 
death leads to his proposal for deliverance by a saving Leviathan. Does the 
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Orthodox tradition share Hobbes’s view on the purpose of politics? I be-
lieve that the debate between “pro- monarchy” and “pro- democracy” camps 
within the Orthodox community stems in part from diff er ent accounts of 
government’s purpose; in addition, diff er ent rationales for government may 
be found within each of  these two broad camps. As I noted earlier, many 
more resources within the Christian East are available that refl ect norma-
tively upon politics within an imperial or monarchical framework than 
within a demo cratic one. Yet using the “dynamics of death” lens reveals 
resources for understanding the purpose of government from an Ortho-
dox perspective that might other wise be overlooked.
Well before Constantine, St. Irenaeus of Lyons (130–202 CE) writes the 
following in his major work, Against Heresies:
For since man, by departing from God, reached such a pit of bestiality 
as even to look upon his kinsmen as his  enemy, and engaged without 
fear in  every kind of disordered conduct, murder, and avarice, God 
imposed upon mankind the fear of man, as they did not acknowl-
edge the fear of God; in order that, being subjected to the authority 
of men, and  under the custody of their laws, they might attain to 
some degree of justice, and exercise mutual forbearance through 
dread of the sword suspended full in their view [see Romans 13:4]. . . .  
Earthly rule, therefore, has been appointed by God for the benefi t of 
the nations . . .  so that  under fear of it men may not eat each other 
up like fi shes.54
Notice, fi rst, that Irenaeus begins with a reference to humanity’s Fall (“by 
departing from God”), and his description of the postlapsarian and pre-
po liti cal condition paints a dark picture of  human tendencies and capaci-
ties. Selfi shness and the fear of one’s own physical death are dominant forces 
in  human agency and root  causes of an array of “disordered conduct.” 
Irenaeus begins, in other words, with “the way  things  really are.” Second, 
government, in Irenaeus’s judgment, is a postlapsarian institution provided 
by God.  Human beings are not po liti cal in our prelapsarian condition (al-
though he believes we are social), and  will not have structures of  human 
government in our postmortem condition. Th is teaching is signifi cant for 
many reasons, not the least of which is that it reminds Christians that gov-
ernment is an accommodation, an institution of penultimate and tempo-
rary value; it is not a component of humanity’s original condition or of 
our hoped- for eternity. Th ird, while government’s necessity stems from hu-
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manity’s brokenness, Irenaeus points more directly to humanity’s lack of 
“fear of God” as being a main reason why God’s provision is required. Since 
corrupted  humans have a defi cient fear of God, the compulsion of  human 
laws and the “dread of the sword” are necessary. Th e dynamics of death 
theme thus emerges vividly in Irenaeus’s social thought: (1) Th e real ity of 
death in the fallen condition drives selfi shness and self- preservation; (2) a 
severely diminished fear of God, which is another characteristic of the fallen 
condition, is not capable of “awing”  people into peaceful coexistence; and 
(3) the government is ordained by God to provide the “awe” that is neces-
sary to prevent continuous vio lence. Th us while Irenaeus undoubtedly 
teaches that government has a divine origin, he also teaches that govern-
ment is born as a response by God to the predicament of death, vio lence, 
and the real be hav ior of fallen humanity. Fi nally, we should note that 
Irenaeus’s hope regarding government’s eff ectiveness is refreshingly mod-
est. He suggests that some degree of justice is pos si ble when  human beings 
are  under the “authority of men” and “ under the custody of their laws.” 
For him, this is not an embarrassing revelation—an exposé of the state’s 
limits; instead, it is a  simple acknowl edgment that full deliverance from 
humanity’s predicament is only pos si ble through God. Th e government 
cannot ultimately save its citizens or deliver fully on its protectionist pur-
pose. Yet, while Irenaeus  here suggests that the state can neither fully pro-
tect its citizens nor administer full justice, he also suggests that it can 
contribute  toward  these aims. Government cannot off er a cure to the pre-
dicament, but it can mitigate some of the predicament’s eff ects.
Th e subsequent Byzantine period generated a plethora of writings prais-
ing Christian emperors and articulating a more comprehensive vision of 
the purpose of government, lending support to a pro- symphonia stance. Yet 
this period also includes thinkers like St. John Chrysostom who, like Ire-
naeus, articulate a more modest rationale for po liti cal power. Consider 
Chrysostom’s homilies “On the Statues,” wherein he responds to riots 
within Antioch that had erupted in 387 CE when Emperor Th eodosius 
imposed a steep new tax. He writes:
For if, whilst  there are magistrates and soldiers living  under arms, the 
madness of a few individuals, a motley crew of adventurers, hath kind-
led such a fi re among us, in so short a moment . . .  suppose the fear 
of magistrates to be wholly taken away? To what length would they 
not have gone in their madness? Would they not have overthrown 
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the city from its foundations, turning all  things upside down and 
have taken our very lives? . . .  [S]o  were you to deprive the world of 
magistrates, and of the fear that comes of them,  houses at once, and 
cities, and nations, would fall on one another in unrestrained con-
fusion,  there being no one to repress, or repel, or persuade them to 
be peaceful, by the fear of punishment!55
Like Irenaeus before him, Chrysostom begins with fallen humanity’s pro-
clivity for lawlessness, exploitation, and mutual destruction— even before 
a total breakdown of governmental power. Chrysostom then highlights the 
role that instilling fear in citizens plays, providing a rationale for politics 
that centers on the government’s ability to protect citizens and maintain 
order. Government’s purpose, he suggests, is compatible with the Church’s 
thanatomorphic aim of fi ghting against death; but it is also a purpose that 
is focused, restrained, and limited to protecting  human life and promot-
ing peace amid a deeply broken humanity. Irenaeus and John Chrysostom 
are not “prodemocracy” thinkers, and reading them as such would be 
anachronistic; yet their affi  rmation of a limited protectionist telos for pol-
itics provides, I believe, a more modest and promising alternative ground-
ing for an Orthodox defense of democracy.
Th e above discussion of Irenaeus and John Chrysostom reaffi  rms the 
illuminative potential of the “dynamics of death” lens. In addition, consider-
ing  these teachings against the backdrop of Hobbes brings out valuable 
points of consonance and dissonance regarding the purpose of politics, the 
basis of po liti cal legitimacy, and the methods by which a government ful-
fi lls its purpose. First, both the Hobbesian tradition and selected repre-
sentatives from early Chris tian ity share a dark account of prepo liti cal 
 human nature, one that highlights the prob lem of death and the selfi sh 
and violent tendencies that our mortality fuels. For Irenaeus, Chrysostom, 
and other Eastern Christian voices, humanity’s Fall grounds this real ity, 
suggesting that humanity’s predicament is contra- natu ral and providing a 
basis from which to critique such tendencies and to hope for a restoration 
of natu ral peacefulness and community. For Hobbes, humanity’s predica-
ment is the “state of nature,” making critiques more diffi  cult to defend 
(since no pristine natu ral condition preceded it) and shifting the historical 
narrative in ways that would distort the Christian gospel.
Employing the lens of “the dynamics of death” also helps to demon-
strate that, like Hobbes, some historical Orthodox voices teach that a pri-
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mary purpose—if not the primary purpose—of government is to protect 
 human life. Th is shared claim grounds Orthodoxy in po liti cal realism and 
opens a path for understanding po liti cal legitimacy in a way that is less 
dependent upon explic itly theological claims, but also not contrary to 
Orthodox theology. In addition, whereas both Chrysostom and Irenaeus 
state that government is “ordained by God” as a response to the fallen con-
dition (see Romans 13.1), Hobbes does not. For him, government is con-
structed by and draws its authority wholly from individuals transferring 
their natu ral rights to the commonwealth via the social contract. Yet, while 
Irenaeus and Chrysostom attribute a divine origin to  human government, 
they resist the temptation to give the state or the emperor a sacred status 
that might easily go too far.56 Irenaeus and Chrysostom do not regard the 
attainment of po liti cal power as an expression of God’s  favor on a specifi c 
person or  people; nor do they regard a specifi c form of governance (mon-
archy, democracy,  etc.) as the fulfi llment of divine providence or the apo-
theosis of Orthodox theology;57 in  doing so, they provide a much- needed 
space for critiques of po liti cal leaders and po liti cal systems that have 
failed to fulfi ll their primary responsibility.
Th e dynamics of death lens also reveals that Hobbes, Irenaeus, and 
Chrysostom all emphasize the basic role that the fear of punishment 
and death play in eff ective governance. Government achieves its pur-
pose  because it is capable of deterring vio lence and disorder through the 
awe- inspiring power it wields. Chrysostom’s claim, “ Were you to deprive the 
world of magistrates, and of the fear that comes of them,  houses at once, 
and cities, and nations, would fall on one another in unrestrained confu-
sion,” could just as easily have come from Hobbes’s pen. Yet attention to the 
fear of death also reveals a core diff erence between the Orthodox thinkers 
and Hobbes. For Hobbes, the fear of God and the fear of eternal death are 
part of the prob lem; thus his proposal strives to undermine any fears that 
might trump a citizen’s fear of death by the state and systematically rein-
terprets traditional Christian teachings on death, afterlife, hell, and 
martyrdom in order to maximize the power and eff ectiveness of the civil 
sovereign. In sharp contrast, Irenaeus teaches that too  little— not too 
much— fear of God and of eternal death is the prob lem. For him, a defi -
cient fear of God fuels the  human predicament and moves God to ordain 
 human governments. Th us Irenaeus and other Eastern Christian voices 
teach that the fear of God and the fear of eternal death (rightly understood) 
are not part of the prob lem; they are part of the cure.
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Th e points of continuity and diff erence noted above, I believe, can 
contribute substantially to an alternative rationale for democracy within 
Orthodoxy. However, a crucial step must still be made in the argument, 
one that draws from the preceding discussion of Orthodox sources and 
returns to the issue of limits discussed in my analy sis of Hobbes.
Death and the Limits of Politics
I have used the lens of the “dynamics of death” to argue that representa-
tive voices from the Eastern Orthodox tradition and the Hobbesian social 
contract tradition share at least three basic convictions: (1)  Human death 
constitutes the core of humanity’s predicament; (2) government is born as 
a response to humanity’s predicament and its primary purpose is to pro-
tect the lives of  those in its care; and (3) the principal means by which 
government achieves its purpose, and thus establishes its legitimacy, is 
fear— the fear of suff ering severe punishment or physical death for break-
ing the laws that protect citizens and promote peace. Among  these three 
convictions only the second is understood in nearly identical ways by 
Hobbes and the Orthodox thinkers  here in focus. Th e fi rst conviction is 
understood diff erently  because, for Hobbes, humanity’s predicament is 
constituted by physical death alone, with violent physical death being the 
summum malum. For the Orthodox sources, humanity’s predicament is 
constituted by both physical death and spiritual death. Yet, while both 
types of death are “the  enemy,” the summum malum is eternal spiritual 
death, not physical death, a point to which the Church’s martyrs bear wit-
ness. And the third conviction, related to the po liti cal role of the fear of 
death, is understood diff erently  because, for Hobbes, minimizing—if not 
eliminating— the fear of eternal death is a cornerstone of his proposal. He 
sees traditional Christian teachings on the afterlife as a threat to the abso-
lute authority of the civil sovereign and believes that such absolute author-
ity is necessary if the civil sovereign is to fulfi ll its purpose and maintain 
its legitimacy. Th e Orthodox sources  here considered agree with Hobbes 
on the importance of the government’s use of the fear of physical death, but 
oppose him on the impact of the fear of God and eternal death, regarding 
the lack of  these fears among citizens as a root cause of the predicament, 
not a prescription for its cure. What can  these points of consonance and 
dissonance teach us about the limits of government?
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Recall that Hobbes’s teachings led to two raw truths that evoke serious 
doubts about his proposal. Th e fi rst is that even if we  were to grant Hobbes 
every thing he asks for, the Hobbesian Leviathan cannot ultimately fulfi ll 
its purpose—it cannot prevent all vio lence, and it certainly cannot pre-
vent all death. Yet, in order to attain this imperfect solution, Hobbes asks 
for nearly every thing from citizens. Th e only inalienable right is the right 
to self- preservation; all other liberty, including religious liberty, is forfeited 
to the state. It seems undeniable that the Hobbesian state demands citi-
zens’ ultimate allegiance in exchange for a cure that never fully heals. While 
Hobbes may call the Leviathan “an artifi cial man made for the protection 
and salvation of the natu ral man,” it is not capable of saving  human be-
ings from the fullness of our predicament. In the Orthodox sources  here 
considered, the state’s capability and eff ectiveness are expressed more mod-
estly. Yes, the state’s aim is principally citizens’ protection, but its limited 
ability to fulfi ll this purpose is acknowledged. Furthermore,  there is an 
impor tant thread within the Orthodox tradition that reminds the civil sov-
ereign of its inability to ultimately save  human beings from death— either 
physical death or spiritual death— the most signifi cant strand of which is 
its communal worship. Yet, in addition to the liturgical tradition,  there are 
several more explic itly po liti cal sources. From the ritual use of the akakia, 
a small silk sack of dirt held by emperors to remind them of their mortality 
and need for God’s salvation,58 to the “mirror of princes” genre exempli-
fi ed in the work of Agapetus the Deacon,59 to the striking icon of St. Si-
soes standing before of the tomb of Alexander the  Great and acknowledging 
the transience of all earthly power,60  there are several Orthodox sources 
whose purpose was to communicate a message about the limits of 
government— even within the context of Byzantium. While a full discus-
sion of  these fascinating “remembrances of death” lies beyond our pres ent 
scope, their existence alone within the shadow of Constantine is salient. 
Taken together, and regardless of the  actual impact they may have made 
on po liti cal leaders,  these resources communicate a sharp critique of 
the absolute claims and expectation of allegiance found in the Hobbesian 
state and many  others. Th ey bear witness to the limits that death places 
upon politics, and point to the need for a true Savior— lessons that are just 
as impor tant  today as they  were in Byzantium. For, as Stanley Hauerwas 
has written, “Our task [as Christians] is not to make  these nations the church, 
but rather to remind them that they are but nations. From the world’s 
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perspective, that may not seem like much, but the perspective of the 
 people formed by the story of God’s redemption shows us how impor tant 
a task it is. For the idolatry most con ve nient to us all remains the pre-
sumed primacy of the nation- state.”61 While I would not recommend 
sending our president—or each member of Congress— either an akakia 
or a copy of the icon of St. Sisoes, especially given the Leviathan’s surveil-
lance capacities,  there is a lesson vital to healthy governance that  these 
works of Christian art teach: Know and remember your limits.
Th e second raw truth pertains to the po liti cal lessons we have learned 
since the time of Hobbes. Historically, the kind of concentrated power for 
which Hobbes’s proposal calls has made pos si ble the most massive and hor-
rifi c crimes against humanity ever known. Governments wielding such 
power are much more likely to generate violent death among  those  under 
their care than a government in which power is limited and separated, as 
it is in con temporary democracies. While  there is no doubt that Byzantine 
emperors wielded near- absolute power in the civic realm, Irenaeus and John 
Chrysostom have reminded us that it is not the form of a government that 
gives it legitimacy, but rather its ability to fulfi ll its entrusted role. In other 
words,  there is no singular “Orthodox” po liti cal system; neither a monarchy, 
nor a democracy, nor a specifi c church- state relationship is, in itself, sa-
cred, pure, or always best.62 Instead  there are governments that are better 
and worse, or more compatible with and less compatible with Orthodox 
Chris tian ity’s normative vision. If my argument thus far holds, and a case 
can be made that (1) from an Orthodox perspective, the primary purpose 
of government is to protect the physical lives of citizens; (2) democracies 
are, overall, much better at protecting citizens against threats to their lives 
(especially against democides); and (3) the Orthodox tradition does not 
identify a specifi c form of government as “sacred,” then it follows that de-
mocracy can and should be supported from an Orthodox perspective. 
Winston Churchill’s famous words resonate with this conclusion:
Many forms of Government have been tried, and  will be tried in this 
world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or 
all- wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of 
government except all  those other forms that have been tried from 
time to time.63
 Th ere is, however, a major objection to democracy from an Orthodox 
perspective that we have not yet considered. If one grants the Orthodox 
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teachings that (1) the  human predicament is constituted by both physical 
death and spiritual death, and (2) while both forms of death are “the 
 enemy,” spiritual death is the summum malum, then what if democracy, 
while minimizing violent physical death si mul ta neously promotes spiritual 
death— the greater evil? What if  there is a form of government that may 
not be as eff ective as democracy is at protecting citizens’ physical lives (es-
pecially against democide), but that is signifi cantly more eff ective at pro-
tecting citizens’ spiritual lives? Should this form of government be 
preferred from an Orthodox perspective? With  these questions, I have 
arrived back to this study’s starting point— the pro- monarchy/symphonia 
Orthodox and the pro- democracy Orthodox; yet, I have arrived  here hav-
ing identifi ed an alternative grounding for each, one that has emerged by 
considering the origin, purpose, and limits of Christian politics through 
the lens of the dynamics of death. I conclude now with a summary and 
synthesis of why, in my judgment, democracy is the best option for Or-
thodox  today.
Conclusion
My aim has been to draw out lineaments of Orthodox Christian po liti-
cal philosophy by utilizing the theme of “the dynamics of death” as an 
interpretive lens and Th omas Hobbes as a conversation partner. Th e 
“dynamics of death” theme focuses our attention on the telos of poli-
tics and the telos of Christian life. It also helps us to understand the 
methods through which governments are constructed and sustained, 
for good or for ill. Fi nally, the dynamics of death theme helps us to see, 
and remember, the limits of politics. Yet I have also argued that the 
“dynamics of death” are basic to a normative Christian vision of po liti-
cal life and, therefore, hold promise for constructing an approach that 
complements and critiques existing arguments for and against democ-
racy. I return, now, to the question with which I began: On what theo-
logical basis, if any, can Orthodox Christians convincingly endorse modern 
democracy?
Th e most signifi cant fi nding that the “dynamics of death” lens has re-
vealed, I believe, is that the Orthodox tradition’s thanatomorphicity, its iden-
tifi cation of the  human predicament with the prob lem of physical and 
spiritual death and its identifi cation of the telos of  human existence 
with spiritual and physical resurrection, provides a theological basis for 
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cautiously supporting modern democracy,  unless it can be shown that 
democracy is signifi cantly more likely than its alternatives to promote spiri-
tual death among its citizens. To be sure, the Church does not need the 
state’s cooperation or support in order to fulfi ll its sacred and sanctifying 
mission. Neither an Orthodox monarchy nor democracy is a requisite condi-
tion for the possibility of living a fully Christian life. Saints have emerged out 
of  every po liti cal context. However, the Church should not hesitate to ex-
press a strong preference for a government that protects  human life over one 
that does not. Th e Byzantine symphonia model grew, in part, out of the con-
viction that it is better to have a government that is not hostile to Christians 
and to a Christian moral vision than to have a government that persecutes 
Christians and advances a moral vision that Christians regard as evil. I agree. 
But on this side of modernity  there is a third option: modern democracy.
Orthodoxy should support modern democracy  because it has proven to 
be more eff ective at protecting  human life than nondemo cratic forms of 
government. Given the extreme vio lence and terror that  people have suf-
fered at the hands of nondemo cratic regimes in countries that, historically, 
have had large Orthodox populations (Rus sia, Ukraine, Romania, Armenia, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine,  etc.), the Orthodox 
community has a strong experiential basis for critiquing authoritarian and 
absolutist regimes. Especially in light of the fact that the second most 
murderous regime in history— the Soviet Union— emerged in a region 
with the largest population of  people self- identifying as Orthodox in his-
tory, Orthodox would do well to underscore the responsibility of govern-
ment to protect  human life and to prevent vio lence against its citizens.
Orthodoxy should support democracy  because democracy, especially 
through its affi  rmation and protection of religious freedom, acknowledges 
its limits and its penultimate status. Governments cannot ultimately save 
 people from death; they cannot off er the fullness of resurrected life. Th us 
a legitimate government must give space for  people to freely pursue full 
salvation. While Orthodox Christians affi  rm  wholeheartedly that the 
Church accomplishes this desired salvation by being the body of Christ 
and the dwelling place of the Holy Spirit,  there is nothing un- Christian 
about resisting the opportunity to establish Orthodox Chris tian ity and af-
fi rming religious freedom as a civil right. Again, my reason for this stems 
from Orthodoxy’s acknowl edgment of the depths of  human corruption and 
the potential for abuse when power is concentrated. Better to have a Church 
that is separated from the government, and that can both critique po liti cal 
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power and be critiqued by citizens, than to have a Church established and 
supported by the state.
Fi nally, Orthodoxy should support demo cratic governance not  because 
democracy is the fulfi llment of an Orthodox theological- ethical vision but 
 because is it not inherently opposed to an Orthodox theological- ethical vi-
sion, so long as it stays within its limits. To elevate democracy as the apo-
theosis of Orthodoxy is neither consistent with Orthodox tradition nor 
spiritually wise. Democracy is our best available option; however, it is an 
option still wrought with spiritual dangers that must be continuously 
identifi ed and sharply critiqued in our communities and our hearts. Th e 
“dynamics of death” lens has provided lineaments of a fresh argument 
for democracy, even as it reminds us that, without Christ, “all of us mor-
tals alike dwell in an unfortifi ed city.”64
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“I Have Overcome the World”
The Church, the Liberal State, and Christ’s Two 
Natures in the Rus sian Politics of Theosis
Nathaniel Wood
In his recent book Th e Mystical as Po liti cal, Aristotle Papanikolaou has drawn attention to the thought of the Rus sian Orthodox philosopher- 
theologians Vladimir Soloviev (1853–1900) and Sergius Bulgakov (1871–
1944) as an indispensable resource for Christian theologians working out 
the po liti cal implications of the doctrine of theosis, or deifi cation, in lib-
eral demo cratic contexts.1 Th eir writings pres ent what is arguably the most 
signifi cant attempt yet to develop a “politics of theosis” in Orthodoxy, the 
tradition most closely associated with the doctrine. As Papanikolaou shows, 
examinations of theosis in connection to po liti cal theology have often tended 
to set the doctrine in opposition to the liberal demo cratic politics of the 
modern West. Papanikolaou cites John Milbank as a major example of this 
trend, while fi gures like Soloviev and Bulgakov are noteworthy exceptions 
to it. Th e latter two thinkers endorse what is essentially a Christian liber-
alism, justifi ed on the basis of a distinctively theological conception of the 
 human person as a being created for communion with God. Th ey could at 
times off er strikingly optimistic appraisals of liberal demo cratic socie ties. 
Bulgakov, for example, would go as far as to call the United States, with 
its commitment to liberal values, “the regime most favorable to the Church, 
most normal for it.”2
At the same time, such glowing remarks exist alongside much more so-
bering assessments of liberalism. In the vein of con temporary antiliberal 
po liti cal theologians such as Milbank, Soloviev and Bulgakov often treat 
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secular politics as a heresy that denies the transcendent end of the  human 
person and the  human community. Th e Church, as the locus of true com-
munity, therefore stands at odds, at least in some ways, with the liberal 
demo cratic state. It is “only the Church that possesses the princi ple of true 
social order,” Bulgakov tells us, and so the secular order must in the end 
be “overcome and dissolved in ecclesial life.”3
How, then, can  these two sides of their thought be reconciled? How can 
the Church resist the “heresy” of secular politics while also acknowl-
edging that the liberal demo cratic state is “the regime most favorable” to 
its mission?
In what follows, I argue that Soloviev and Bulgakov resolve this tension 
through the theme of “inward overcoming” that runs throughout their 
work, and that is ultimately rooted in their treatments of the  union of 
Christ’s divine and  human natures. Both thinkers understand the incar-
nation as an inward overcoming of humanity’s alienation from God: the 
kenotic immersion of God into the depths of  human consciousness in or-
der to raise it up and deify humanity from within, by its own  free activity. 
Th is approach to the incarnation stands  behind a Christological politics 
focused similarly on the Church’s inward overcoming of the secular order. 
Th e resulting po liti cal theology does not posit a strict opposition between 
the Church and the liberal demo cratic state that necessitates the Church’s 
complete withdrawal from demo cratic politics into some sort of ecclesio-
centric “ counter- politics,” nor does it defer to secular social theory as an 
adequate and complete description of supposedly immanent, “purely natu-
ral” laws of  human social relations. Th e Rus sian politics of theosis celebrates 
liberal democracy as a genuine advancement  toward a  free, creative, dig-
nifi ed humanity whose full development  will be realized only in divine- 
humanity, theosis, the collective incarnation of Christ in society; yet it also 
recognizes the innate danger of secular society to slide  toward an exclu-
sive, atheistic humanism that cuts this development short. In the politics 
of theosis, the Church, imitating Christ, immerses itself within the struc-
tures of liberal democracy in order to raise it up to a higher purpose from 
within, giving it new theological signifi cance as a  free instrument of the 
world’s deifi cation, without abandoning the liberal commitment to  human 
freedom or reverting to a theocratic privileging of the Church. What we 
are left with is a Christian politics that affi  rms some of the core insights of 
con temporary antiliberal critique, but that ultimately rejects the more 
strictly oppositional stance associated with someone like Milbank and re-
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sists the twin dangers of ecclesiastical triumphalism over the liberal state 
and ecclesiastical withdrawal from the state.
It should be made clear, fi  nally, that the following argument does not 
attempt to align the Rus sian politics of theosis straightforwardly with 
American- style liberal democracy. Despite Bulgakov’s occasional praise for 
the American system, the Rus sian liberal tradition has its own distinct 
history that is sometimes very diff er ent from the American tradition. Nev-
ertheless, the basic political- theological motifs that Soloviev and Bulga-
kov developed can be applied to the American context, and I have done 
my best in this essay to pres ent their po liti cal theology in broadly appli-
cable terms.
Th e Incarnation as a Po liti cal Task
While the twentieth  century witnessed a spectacular revival of original 
Orthodox refl ection on the doctrine of deifi cation and its implications for 
our understanding of the  human person, the specifi cally po liti cal dimensions 
of the doctrine have received far less attention from Orthodox theologians; 
when theosis has been explored in connection to po liti cal theology, it has 
tended to be set in opposition to the liberal demo cratic politics of the 
West. For the tradition of Rus sian Orthodox thought represented by So-
loviev and Bulgakov, however, the doctrine was always inescapably po liti-
cal. Po liti cal challenges drove their turn to theosis, particularly the need to 
fi nd a third way between the false dichotomy of tsarist theocracy and the 
positivism and materialism of the secular intelligent sia, both of which So-
loviev and Bulgakov believed to be incompatible with the Christian hu-
manism on which a successful po liti cal order must be based. Th us, the 
theological recovery of the par tic u lar  human person as a  bearer of “abso-
lute, divine signifi cance,”4 as one in whom the  whole created order  will re-
alize its proper communion with the transcendent God, a theme that has 
become central to con temporary Orthodox theology, is at its origin bound 
up with po liti cal theology— and not just any po liti cal theology, but one 
marked by an openness  toward at least some forms of liberal democracy.
We can fi nd evidence of that openness already in Soloviev’s early works 
of the 1870s and 1880s, a time when he still held out hope for the viability 
of an institutional Christian theocracy. Th e “ free theocracy” that Soloviev 
advocated re imagined Orthodoxy’s theocratic heritage along more liberal, 
even if not quite demo cratic, lines, affi  rming key liberal commitments like 
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the freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and the absolute dignity 
of the individual. If by the 1890s he had abandoned hope for the realiza-
tion of a genuine theocracy in history, he remained committed to a vision 
of politics rooted in the promise of theosis as divine- human communion, 
which had begun to look very much like a full- fl edged Christian liberalism 
in his most impor tant  later work, Th e Justifi cation of the Good, published 
in 1897.5 Several of Soloviev’s successors, including Bulgakov and S. L. 
Frank, would carry forward the liberal aspects of his thought, crafting 
their own “ free theocratic” systems that  were explic itly and unapologeti-
cally theological and yet remarkably receptive to the infl uence of Western 
liberal demo cratic thought. Th us Bulgakov, caught up in the spirit of the 
Revolution of 1905, could express hope in his po liti cal pamphlet An Ur-
gent Task for a “worldwide United States,” arguing that the most hospita-
ble form of government for a Christian politics is not tsarist autocracy but 
“the federative demo cratic republic, as the En glish dissidents who emigrated 
to Amer i ca understood so well in their time.” 6 It was thirty years  later, in 
a book written for Western audiences, that he would restate the same sen-
timent by identifying the American system as the one “most favorable” to 
the Church’s mission.
As I noted above, however, such statements do not indicate an uncriti-
cal endorsement of liberalism. For  these Rus sian thinkers, liberalism was 
never an end itself, but was always subordinate to an all- embracing cosmic 
vision of divine- human communion, centered on the person and work of 
Christ. While that vision could in some cases lend provisional support to 
certain features of liberal democracy as instruments of the Church’s mis-
sion, certain other aspects of the liberal tradition stand in tension with a 
politics of theosis.
Take, for example,  these thinkers’ denial of a division between nature 
and grace, or between creation and deifi cation. In same spirit as Milbank 
and other recent critics of liberalism, the Rus sians reject the notion of a 
“pure nature” that is not intrinsically oriented  toward participation in God. 
For them, then, creation reveals itself only in the light of the incarnation, 
 because creation is predestined to become God’s glorifi ed and deifi ed 
body, in which God  will be “all in all.” Th e “cosmic” incarnation of Christ, 
the historical realization of universal “God- manhood” or “divine- humanity” 
(bogochelovechestvo), is thus “the inner foundation of creation, its entelechy.”7 
Such is the promise of the Christian gospel, which imposes on its  human 
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recipients a religious task: to assist created nature in the unfolding of its 
inner ontological momentum (resisted by the forces of sin), to  labor in his-
tory to extend the incarnation into  every corner of the world, to “regard 
all  things” in light of Christ and to allow Christ to “become incarnate in 
all  things.”8
 Here one can see the basic “theocratic” character of the Rus sian politics 
of theosis. Created nature’s intrinsic orientation  toward transcendence calls 
into question any sphere of  human activity— whether economic, po liti cal, 
scientifi c, or any other— that becomes closed in on the autonomous pur-
suit of its own immanent ends. Th e promise and task of deifi cation must 
possess an “all- embracing, central signifi cance”; it must serve as the organ-
izing princi ple of all  human activity.9 “ Th ere must be nothing that is in 
princi ple ‘secular,’ ” as Bulgakov argues, nothing that is neutral or indiff er-
ent to the historical realization of divine- human communion.10 Both the 
economy and the state exist to serve a higher goal that is given to them 
from beyond themselves—by the Church, which, as Christ’s collective 
body, is also the telos of world history. Th us the Church, Soloviev argues, 
must “subordinate secular society to itself by raising it up to itself, by spiri-
tualizing it, by making the secular ele ment its instrument and means” for 
incarnating Christ in all  things.11
Certainly, if Christ’s earthly body is his Church, then to speak of in-
carnating Christ in all  things requires us to speak in a certain sense of the 
“churching” of society. In this sense, the Rus sians share Milbank’s desire 
for a po liti cal theology that is “fi rst and foremost an ecclesiology, and only 
an account of other socie ties to the extent that the Church defi nes itself, 
in its practice, in continuity or discontinuity with  these socie ties.”12 More 
so than Milbank, the Rus sians affi  rm a tremendous degree of continuity 
between the politics of the Church and the politics of liberal democracy, 
especially with re spect to liberalism’s safeguarding of the  free development 
of  human personality. Nevertheless, they are also aware of a profound dis-
continuity between the Church and the secular state,  because for them, the 
secular state is founded on a false anthropology: namely, the Feuerbachian 
heresy of “mangodhood” (chelovekobozhestvo), the immanent self- deifi cation 
of humanity, a parodic reversal of Christ’s Godmanhood. Without a theo-
logical corrective, a liberal democracy that remains strictly secular, even 
while securing a space for  free  human development, is incapable of direct-
ing that development  toward its proper divine- human end. Instead, to the 
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extent that liberalism encourages the  human  will and  human social activ-
ity to remain turned in on themselves and to fail to recognize a goal 
transcendent to themselves, the liberal demo cratic state confronts the 
Church as a rival pseudotheocracy, a competing pseudospiritual society 
rooted in mangodhood. Consider, for example, Bulgakov’s critique of the 
secular demo cratic state in his 1917 book Unfading Light.  Th ere he argues 
that with the advent of secularism, the state does not cease to be “theo-
cratic” but merely shifts its sacred foundation from the transcendent  will 
of God to the immanent  will of the  people. “For the demo cratic religion 
of deifi ed humanity, the state is the highest form of life— a pseudo- church,” 
he argues. “Even more than that: humanity, or ga nized in a state, is an 
earthly god.”13
Unsurprisingly then, like Milbank, the Rus sians sought to develop a dis-
tinctive “Christian sociology” to  counter secular accounts of society.14 So-
loviev had begun this proj ect already in his earliest works, such as Th e 
Philosophical Princi ples of Integral Knowledge (completed in 1874), in which 
he located the “princi ple of social  union” within the sacramental life of ec-
clesial society.15 Bulgakov followed Soloviev on this point, and in his 1932 
essay, “Th e Soul of Socialism,” writes that
Chris tian ity too recognises that  there is a real  human unity- in- 
plurality— the Body of Christ, which consists of distinct, individual 
living members (1 Cor. 12.12–27)— i.e. personalities; and in this 
dogma concerning the Church  there is suffi  cient basis for develop-
ing the princi ples of a Christian sociology.16
Bulgakov then immediately identifi es “this dogma” as the Slavophile doc-
trine of the Church’s sobornost, the  free, harmonious “all- togetherness” of 
Christians united by their mutual love for each other and their common 
love for the same transcendent values.17 Th e social unity of sobornost, in 
which alone  human personality can freely and fully develop in all its po-
tential, is founded on the princi ple of mutual self- renunciation. “All mem-
bers of society must set a limit to their exclusive self- assertion and must 
adopt the point of view of self- denial,” Soloviev argues. “Th ey must re-
nounce and sacrifi ce their exclusive  will.”18 Th is kenotic stance sets eccle-
sial society at odds with po liti cal liberalism, whose founding mythologies 
give ontological priority to the self- assertion of the individual  will. Th e 
Church, on the other hand, is founded on the sacraments, whose funda-
mental feature is humanity’s receptivity to a divine grace that humanity does 
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not possess of itself. In this way, Soloviev suggests, the sacraments re-
mind us that the foundations of a true social order must be “divinely- human 
and not humanly- divine,” or put diff erently, must be located in human-
ity’s kenotic openness to God’s kenotic descent rather than in the temp-
tation of  human egoism to seize absoluteness for itself from within itself.19 
For the Rus sians, this turn to transcendence is necessary if  human per-
sons are to enact a genuinely social unity, a unity based in the interpene-
tration of all by all rather than on the coercive power of an externalized 
 legal authority erected to manage the competing  wills of self- interested 
individuals.
Th e Church thus exists in a state of theopo liti cal rivalry with  every po-
liti cal order founded on the heresy of man godhood and its denial of tran-
scendence, and it is the po liti cal task of the Church to “overcome” this 
heresy. But, as I stated above, their acknowl edgment of this rivalry does 
not lead  either Soloviev or Bulgakov to the more  wholesale antiliberalism 
seen in fi gures like Milbank. As I have suggested, their ability to hold to-
gether their negative and positive appraisals of liberal politics stems from 
their Christology, where the “overcoming” motif fi nds its more fundamen-
tal theological meaning. In the hypostatic  union of Christ’s two natures, 
Christ overcame the egoistic self- assertion of humanity, by which  human 
beings had alienated themselves from God, deifying his humanity by unit-
ing it to himself. In the original incarnation event, Christ won this victory 
in the “true center of the universe, i.e., in Himself,” but history still awaits 
the communication of this victory to “the circumference of the world, i.e., 
in the collective  whole of humanity.”20 If the Church in history is Christ’s 
collective body in pro cess, then the manner in which it “overcomes” the 
secular order and incarnates Christ in  human society must correspond to 
that original overcoming accomplished in Christ’s own person.  Because the 
deifi cation of the world organically “grows out of the God- man,”21 the 
Church’s relationship to secular society must conform to the manner in 
which Christ, as God, united himself to his own humanity, raised it up to 
himself, and made it into an instrument of divine action in history. Th e 
politics of theosis must therefore be a Christological politics, a politics that 
spans the time between the incarnation in Bethlehem and the eschatologi-
cal incarnation of God in all  things.
With  these considerations in mind, I  will now off er a brief summary of 
their approaches to the divine- human unity of the incarnate Christ, fol-
lowed by a more substantial description of their Christological politics.
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Th e Divine- Human Unity of Christ
Hans Urs von Balthasar has rightly suggested that Soloviev’s Christologi-
cal outlook is most deeply informed by the Greek patristic tradition  running 
through Maximus the Confessor, who saw the Chalcedonian formula as 
“the foundation upon which the entire structure of natu ral and super natu-
ral real ity in the world is erected.”22 For patristic theologians like Maxi-
mus and John of Damascus, the unity of Christ involves more than just 
an external “adhesion” of the divine and  human natures, as if they  were 
two wholly discrete objects standing side by side and held together by the 
“glue” of the one hypostasis. Instead, the divine and the  human “interpen-
etrate” or “mutually indwell” one another in the person of Christ, giving rise 
to a new divine- human mode of personhood, a “theandric operation” that 
completely unites (albeit without confusion) the two natures’ respective 
characteristics. John’s Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith summarizes 
this position with par tic u lar clarity:
We do not say that the operations are separated and that the natures 
act separately, but we say that they act conjointly, with each nature 
 doing in communion with the other that which it has proper to it-
self. [Christ] did not perform the  human actions in a  human way, 
 because He was not a mere man, nor did He perform the divine 
actions in a divine way,  because He was not just God, but God and 
man together.23
John continues:
Th us, the theandric operation shows this: when God became man, 
that is to say, was incarnate, His  human operation was divine, that is 
to say, deifi ed. And it was not excluded from His divine operation, 
nor was his divine operation excluded from his  human operation. 
On the contrary, each is found in the other.24
John’s statements highlight the coactive character of Christ’s incarnate ac-
tivity, showing that Christ, as God, could never act apart from his hu-
manity nor bypass the limitations of his  human nature. For the incarnation 
to be fully realized, Christ’s humanity had to be brought into  free corre-
spondence with his divinity, had to be deifi ed, so that by its own properly 
 human capacities it could become the instrument of God’s self- revelation 
and redemptive activity.
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We can see clear infl uence of the Christological tradition that John sum-
marizes on Soloviev’s and Bulgakov’s own accounts of Christ’s divine- 
human unity. We see the idea of the theandric operation expressed, for 
instance, in Bulgakov’s claim that in Christ, “ there is nothing that is only 
Divine or only  human; the one in and through the other is Divine- human.”25 
Both he and Soloviev would deepen this traditional understanding of 
Christ’s divine- human perichoresis by examining the historical- ascetical 
realization of the two natures’ interpenetration within the dynamics of 
Christ’s incarnate consciousness. Th e incarnation was not accomplished 
at once in the stable at Bethlehem, but was, in Bulgakov’s words, a “cease-
lessly continuing pro cess of the attainment of the divine in the  human 
and the  human in light of the divine” across the  whole drama of Christ’s 
earthly life.26
In his treatment of the incarnation in his Lectures on Divine- Humanity, 
Soloviev argues that Christ “attains” his divine- human unity by means of 
a double kenosis, or the mutual self- limitation of the divine and  human 
natures. As God, Christ cannot deify his  human nature unilaterally, but 
only by eliciting his humanity’s  free participation in his salvifi c work. For 
this reason, Soloviev fi nds the dogma of Christ’s two  wills indispensable, 
 because in order for  there to be a real synergy between the divine and the 
 human in Christ, Christ’s humanity must possess “a  will that is distinct 
from the divine  will and that, through the rejection of any pos si ble con-
tradiction with the divine  will, freely submits to the latter and brings  human 
nature into complete inner harmony with Divinity.”27 Th e  human  will’s 
in de pen dence depends on an act of divine kenosis: becoming incarnate, 
Christ renounces his external sovereign power over humanity and sub-
merges his own divinity within the limitations of his  human consciousness 
in order to deify his humanity from within, by means of humanity’s own 
 free and conscious activity. Th e divine kenosis liberates Christ’s humanity 
to enact its own kenosis, to renounce its autonomy and subordinate itself 
freely to the divine  will. As Soloviev puts it, “Christ, as God, freely renounces 
the glory of God and thereby, as a  human being, acquires the possibility 
of attaining that glory.”28 Of course, Christ’s humanity attains this glory 
not as its own stable possession, but only by adopting the posture of ongo-
ing active receptivity to the divine, by acting out its innate  human poten-
tialities in constant coordination with the divine  will.
Bulgakov’s Christology, articulated most fully in his late masterpiece Th e 
Lamb of God, deepens Soloviev’s kenoticism. Following Soloviev, he posits 
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a mutual limitation of the two natures. In Christ  there was “no conscious-
ness of anything divine apart from the  human,”  because Christ was con-
scious of himself as God only from within the limits of his  human 
self- consciousness.29 He writes:
Th e divine- humanity consists precisely in such a correlativeness of the 
divine and the  human: the divine consciousness in Christ is com-
mensurate with the  human consciousness and does not exceed it. Th is 
relativity of the absolute, this becoming that occurs within the 
limits of the divine consciousness, is precisely kenosis.30
In the incarnation, Christ “actualizes His divinity for Himself only in in-
separable  union with the  human nature, as a function of [the  human na-
ture’s] receptivity,” that is, “only to the extent of the deifi cation of His 
humanity.”31  Because the  human nature, with its instinctual drive to assert 
itself outside God, is not immediately receptive to the divine  will, Christ 
must grow into his divine- human self- consciousness over time, through 
an “intense and unceasing strug gle” to deify his  human nature. But once 
again, as for Soloviev, this strug gle  will not be won by the sheer force of 
divine omnipotence, but by eliciting an active kenosis from the  human  will:
In the God- Man, the fallen and infi rm  human essence, subjecting 
itself to the divine essence, becomes harmonious with and obedient 
to it. But this occurs not through the coercion of the  human nature 
by the divine nature but by the spiritual overcoming of the “fl esh” 
through its  free subordination to the commands of the hypostatic 
spirit.32
Th at is to say, the divine nature “restrained its manifestation”  until the 
 human nature’s opposition to God was “inwardly  overcome.”33
Divine- Humanity and the Politics of Th eosis
Th e perichoresis of the two natures in Christ, as the “inward overcoming” 
of the distance between humanity and God, ties the Rus sians’ Christology 
to their po liti cal theology. Most fundamental  here are the implications of 
the incarnation for our understanding of divine sovereignty.  Because of 
the incarnation, “God is enthroned in a new way over the world: in man 
and through man in the God- Man,” Bulgakov argues.34 Christ’s human-
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ity has been taken up into his eternal lordship over the world, where the 
divine and  human natures “co- participate in the sitting at the right hand 
of the  Father, for God and man are seated  there in the one God- Man.”35 
If redeemed humanity, as Christ’s collective body, is seated on the heav-
enly throne, then humanity itself is the instrument through which Christ 
exercises his lordship. Christ’s rule is a divine- human rule, established on 
the  free, conscious participation of  those who are ruled. “Christ is enthroned 
not by virtue of Divine omnipotence but through the inner overcoming of 
the world, through the strug gle against  enemy powers, through victory by 
persuasion.”36 Just as Christ’s divine nature “leads” his  human nature with-
out coercing or erasing his  human  will, so also Christ leads the world as a 
 whole, his universal  human nature, to kenotically renounce its autonomy 
and egoism and to make itself receptive to the light of divine glory. Th us, 
even while the theocratic ele ment of Chris tian ity demands our uncondi-
tional submission to the  will of God, God’s  will does not confront us as 
the external authority of a transcendent sovereign. In Christ, Soloviev tells 
us, the  human  will renounced itself in  favor of the divine  will as its own 
“inner good”— the transcendent within the immanent.37 If the incarna-
tion as divine- human communion is “the law of being for natu ral human-
ity,”38 as I have suggested it is, then  there can be no contradiction between 
 human freedom and divine sovereignty,  because  human nature naturally 
reaches beyond itself to fi nd completion and rest in communion with God. 
Th e coming of God’s Kingdom is the fulfi llment of humanity’s own inner-
most potentialities and the implicit aim of all  free  human development.
With regard to the church- state relations, this approach rules out any 
sort of “po liti cal monophysitism” in which the Church would simply swal-
low up the secular state and society. Society must fi rst possess relative in-
de pen dence from the divine princi ple, must fi rst be allowed to discover its 
full humanness, before it can kenotically renounce its autonomy and be 
transformed into the  human “fl esh” of Christ’s divine- human rule. Th is 
means that the Church, in turn, cannot incarnate the divine princi ple in 
secular society unilaterally, but only by infl uencing society and eliciting its 
 free cooperation: “victory by persuasion.” Th e Church relates to the state 
and society through kenosis, by acting as the conscience of society and bear-
ing an inner witness to the divine- human ideal  toward which society should 
freely strive. Just as the  union of the two natures in Christ’s hypostasis 
depended on the active receptivity of his  human  will to divine leading, so 
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also does the Church’s eschatological overcoming of secular society de-
pend on the society’s receptivity to the Church’s witness to sobornost. In 
this way, “the Church embodies herself in the state only in as much as the 
state becomes spiritualized by Christian princi ples,” as Soloviev argues. 
“Th e Church comes down to temporal realities by the same steps up which 
the state climbs  toward the Church’s ideal.”39
Modeled on the Chalcedonian defi nition, a properly “theocratic” rela-
tionship between the Church and secular society therefore rests on a clear 
distinction between the divine and the  human, the Church and the state. 
But this is not to suggest that the Church remains indiff erent to state poli-
tics. As Soloviev reminds us, the Church’s po liti cal task is to fi ll all  things 
with the spirit of Christ and order all  human relations around the princi-
ple of sobornost:
Th e church is not only an assembly of believers, but also an assembly 
of lovers. . . .  Love is a force of limitless expansiveness, and the church, 
founded on love, must permeate the entire life of  human society, all 
its relations and activity, descending into every thing and elevating 
every thing to itself. Existing outwardly in the milieu of civil society 
and the state, the church cannot segregate itself and separate itself 
from this milieu, but must infl uence it by its spiritual strength, must 
attract state and society to itself and gradually make them like itself, 
convey its princi ple of love and harmony in all spheres of  human life.40
Th e Church carries out this task in two distinct but inseparable ways 
that S. L. Frank helpfully identifi es as the immediate “radiation of love,” 
or the direct enactment of the princi ples of ecclesial communion in personal 
encounters with our neighbors, and the “politics of love,” the systematic 
attempt to embody  those princi ples in po liti cal and  legal structures through 
po liti cal and  legal means.41
Th e radiation of love takes pre ce dence in the Church’s mission, and with 
the coming of God’s Kingdom all politics and law  will be dissolved into the 
“anarchy” of sobornost. But in the pres ent age, the politics of love assists 
the radiation of love, making use of po liti cal and  legal structures to estab-
lish the necessary external conditions that allow Christian social princi-
ples to fl ourish and maximize the potential of all  human persons to freely 
participate in humanity’s common task of incarnating Christ in all  things. 
While state politics can never eff ect the inner harmony between humanity 
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and God that deifi cation requires and therefore can never build the King-
dom of God on earth, the more modest aim of the politics of love is to use 
the power of the state to promote “the  free development of all  human 
powers which are to be the instrument of the  future perfection, apart 
from which the Kingdom of God could not be realized in humanity.”42
Frank ensures us that such a Christian politics  will often resemble 
“the wisdom of this world.”43 At the pres ent moment, it may most closely 
resemble the wisdom of liberal democracy. To the extent that the liberal 
tradition has championed the rights of individuals and secured an in de-
pen dent social space for the  free development of  human personality in all 
its distinctive humanness, Christians can recognize liberalism as a histori-
cal outgrowth of the social truth latent in the Christ- event and a provi-
dential advancement  toward the realization of Christ’s divine- human rule. 
Th is is certainly the reason that someone like Bulgakov could look to the 
United States as a beacon of hope for the  future of Christian politics. But 
to the extent that liberalism remains captive to the heresies of imma-
nentism and individualism, it still awaits eschatological “overcoming” by 
the sacramental society of the Church. Christian politics is therefore never 
reducible to liberal demo cratic politics, and the Church’s mission never re-
ducible to the interests of the liberal state. Christian politics is pos si ble 
only when the divine princi ple  toward which society strives is realized “not 
in the state, but for it in the Church.”44 Th erein lies the signifi cance of theo-
logical critiques of “Constantinianism,” or what Soloviev called the “me-
dieval worldview”45: If the Church is to spiritualize secular society, it must 
bear witness to a diff er ent Kingdom established on the basis of kenotic love 
and sacramental receptiveness to God’s self- gift (which is, at the same time, 
God’s gift to us of our own selves).
In an impor tant sense, then, liberal church- state separation is a positive 
development for Christian politics, precisely  because it allows the Church 
and the state to each develop its respective divine or  human distinctive-
ness so that the two might become partners in a divine- human activity 
without division or confusion. Christians who take seriously the “theocratic” 
character of their faith can and should work within the liberal demo-
cratic structures in which they fi nd themselves, not for the sake of 
undermining liberalism’s historical successes (for example, by exploiting 
the demo cratic pro cess to secure  legal privileges for Chris tian ity) but to 
assist liberalism in the further unfolding of its innate potential to serve as a 
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 human instrument of Christ’s rule. Th at  will mean developing the  human 
aspect of the liberal tradition to its fullest extent, not only through the use 
of the state’s coercive power to restrain all manifestations of evil that are 
“dangerous to the very existence of society,”46 but also by taking positive 
steps  toward a more just and equal society through the promotion of  human 
rights, social welfare, education and healthcare, access to both meaning-
ful  labor and leisure, and other mea sures that foster the development of 
 free  human persons who can become agents of Christ’s divine- human 
activity— all of which can be accomplished entirely through the means of 
liberal demo cratic politics. While the Church is driven  toward  these goals 
by its own theological commitments rather than by the interests of secular 
statecraft, it nevertheless can and should make use of liberal means to ac-
complish the goals in a way that involves the maximum cooperation of 
secular society itself.
At the same time, the Church  will also have to bear witness to its own 
distinctive “ counter- politics” through the living- out of its communal, sac-
ramental life, challenging the heterodoxy of the liberal tradition and call-
ing into the question the liberal state’s pseudotheocratic ultimacy. In the 
radiation of the love, the Church bears witness to a higher mode of life 
 toward which secular society must freely aspire, the divine telos of collec-
tive  human activity. But in the same way that divine nature of Christ brings 
positive fulfi llment to his  human nature and humanizes his humanity, 
the Church reveals its own social princi ples as the inner goal of liberalism, 
the fulfi llment of liberal society’s own deepest humanistic commitments. 
While the liberal tradition has been remarkably successful at securing the 
rights and freedoms of  human persons, it stands in opposition to Christ’s 
rule to the extent that it drives  human freedom  toward the pursuit of pri-
vate and collective self- interest, depriving  human freedom of any absolute 
content through the attainment of which the  human person might realize 
his or her “absolute, divine signifi cance.” In its radiation of love, on the 
other hand, the Church “discloses to man the sphere in which his freedom 
can fi nd positive realization, and his  will  actual satisfaction.”47 It is pre-
cisely the humanism of liberal democracy that demands it be receptive to 
that which is beyond the  human, that in relation to which alone humanity 
can become itself. Th e Church that “overcomes” liberal democracy is not a 
separate sovereign entity standing over against the state but the comple-
tion of the state’s own humanistic work, liberal society in self- transcendent, 
self- realizing communion with God.
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Conclusion
If we approach the politics of theosis in the way that I have described, then 
the Church’s eschatological overcoming of the secular can only be an 
inward overcoming. Th is approach affi  rms that all Christian politics must 
begin and end in the sacramental life of the Church, the divine ideal for 
secular society, but it also suggests that the Church must enter kenotically 
into liberal democracy to lead  toward that ideal from within, without 
overstepping the limits of liberalism, just as Christ’s deifi cation of his 
 human nature never overstepped the limits of his  human  will and its re-
ceptivity to the divine. In its communal life, the Church embodies  those 
social princi ples that  will someday be freely incarnated in  human society 
as a  whole, and in its po liti cal activity the Church helps prepare the mate-
rial and structural conditions that make that incarnation pos si ble. On this 
view, the Church can both appreciate the accomplishments of liberal de-
mocracy as providential advancements in salvation history while also in-
sisting that the liberal state can never be an end itself, since the very 
humanity that liberalism champions  will only be fully humanized when it 
is fully deifi ed, when it looks beyond itself to discover itself in commu-
nion with God.
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175
Emperors and Bishops of 
Constantinople (324–431)
Timothy D. Barnes
Constantine, the fi rst Christian ruler of the Roman Empire, casts a long shadow over all the subsequent history of Christian churches 
everywhere in the world up to the pres ent day. But Constantine’s relations 
with the Christian Church  were  shaped by an existing framework of atti-
tudes and beliefs formed in a pagan Roman Empire that fi rst formally 
recognized Chris tian ity as a legitimate religion in 260,  little more than a 
dozen years before the  future emperor was born.1 It was quite natu ral, there-
fore, for the supporters of Maiorinus in a disputed episcopal election in 
Carthage to appeal to Constantine in April 313 shortly  after he had an-
nounced his conversion to Chris tian ity and had exempted from curial 
duties their opponents (“ those belonging to the worldwide church [in 
Carthage], over whom Caecilianus presides”),2 just as it had been natu ral 
for bishops who had condemned and deposed Paul of Samosata, the bishop 
of Antioch, in the late 260s, to petition a pagan emperor to enforce their 
verdict of deposition.3 For from the age of the apostles onwards, Chris-
tians had believed that Roman emperors  were appointed by God to judge 
all disputes among their subjects. In the late second  century, for example, 
Th eo philus of Antioch answered the imputation of disloyalty to the em-
peror as follows: “You  will say to me, ‘Why do you not worship the emperor?’ 
 Because he was not made to be worshipped, but to be honoured with 
legitimate honour. He is not God, but a man appointed by God, not to be 
worshipped but to judge justly.”4 Constantine was proclaimed emperor in 
306 and  rose to supreme power in an ideological milieu in which emper-
ors  were regarded by all as supreme arbiters over all  matters terrestrial, 
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including the Christian Church, and it was only during the course of the 
fourth  century that it became pos si ble for Christians to argue that ecclesi-
astical aff airs lay outside the jurisdiction of a Roman emperor. In Con-
stantinople, however, the successors of Constantine exercised an eff ective 
and unchallenged control over the appointment and dismissal of bishops 
of the imperial city.
Alexander had been bishop of the ancient Greek city of Byzantium for a 
de cade or more when Constantine defeated Licinius and gained control of 
the East in 324.5 Hence, when Constantine razed Byzantium to the ground 
and built a new and wholly Christian city on its site, Alexander automati-
cally became bishop of the new city of Constantinople, whose bound-
aries Constantine marked out on 8 November 324, and that he formally 
dedicated on 11 May 330. About Constantine’s relations with Alexander 
only one  thing is known, but it is very signifi cant. In 336 a council of bish-
ops met in Constantinople, readmitted Arius to communion on the recom-
mendation and with the support of Constantine and was about to attempt 
to compel Alexander to accept Arius into communion when Arius sud-
denly collapsed and died.6 Constantine died within a year on 22 May 337, 
but Alexander outlived him by only a few weeks,  dying in the summer of 
337 at the advanced age of ninety- eight.
Paul, Eusebius, and Macedonius (337–360)
 After the death of Alexander, who had not appointed or co- opted a suc-
cessor, a contested election ensued. Th e priest Paul was supported by  those 
among the clergy and laity of Constantinople who fully accepted the creed 
drawn up at the Council of Nicaea, while  those who  were sympathetic to 
the theological views of the recently deceased Arius and his party supported 
the deacon Macedonius. Th e adherents of Paul elected and consecrated him 
bishop without waiting, as was required by the canons of the Council of 
Nicaea, for their choice to be ratifi ed by the bishops of adjacent sees. When 
Emperor Constantius arrived in the city, he convened a council of bishops 
from the surrounding area that deposed Paul and replaced him with Eu-
sebius, the bishop of nearby Nicomedia. Constantius then returned to 
Antioch.
Such is the clear and straightforward account of Paul’s election and al-
most immediate deposition given by Socrates and repeated with rhetorical 
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embellishment by Sozomen.7 Th e date can be determined almost precisely. 
Athanasius reveals not only that he was in Constantinople when Paul was 
accused prior to his deposition, but also that Macedonius was both a priest 
 under Paul and supported his bishop on that occasion.8 Now Athanasius 
had been in Constantinople twice during the lifetime of Constantine (in 
the winter of 331–32 and the autumn of 335),9 but  after the emperor died 
he set foot in the city only once. He passed through Constantinople dur-
ing his journey from Trier to Alexandria in 337, when the sons of Con-
stantine allowed all the Eastern bishops deposed  under their  father to return 
to their sees. Athanasius was still in Trier on 15 June 337, and he entered 
Alexandria on 23 November of the same year. He traveled overland through 
the Balkans, and at Viminacium he had an audience with Constantius, 
presumably shortly before 9 September 337, when the three  brothers Con-
stantinus, Constantius, and Constans  were jointly acclaimed Augusti by 
the Roman army in Pannonia. Paul was elected bishop of Constantinople 
during Constantius’s absence in the Balkans and deposed when the em-
peror returned to Constantinople, but before he departed for Antioch, 
where he spent the winter of 337–38. Although Socrates explic itly dates 
both Paul’s election and his replacement by Eusebius of Nicomedia to the 
year 340 or  later, the precise circumstantial details that he provides exclude 
any date  later than around October 337, since Constantius, who had left 
Antioch in the spring of 337 when he discovered that his  father was fatally 
ill, returned to Antioch in the autumn of 337 and did not visit Constan-
tinople again for several years.10
Eusebius died late in 341.11 On his death, his ecclesiastical supporters, 
including bishops from surrounding regions, elected Macedonius as the 
new bishop of Constantinople. However,  those who had supported Paul 
in 337 invited him to return from Pontus, where Constantius had exiled 
him, and again installed him as bishop of the city. When Constantius, who 
was in Antioch, heard the news, he ordered the general Hermogenes to ex-
pel Paul en route to taking up his new military command in Th race. 
When Hermogenes attempted to remove Paul from the church that he had 
occupied, Paul’s adherents resisted, a mob burned the  house where Her-
mogenes was lodging, dragged him out, and lynched him. Constantius 
thereupon traveled posthaste across Asia Minor, expelled Paul, punished the 
city by reducing the amount of  free bread distributed daily from 80,000 
to 40,000 modii, and returned to Syria, leaving Macedonius as bishop of 
Constantinople. Once more Socrates, who is followed and rewritten by 
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Sozomen, provides a precise and detailed narrative, and this time his con-
sular date of 342 for the murder of Hermogenes is confi rmed by other 
evidence.12
Macedonius’s tenure of the see of Constantinople was insecure, since 
the bishops of the West, who had the po liti cal support of the Western em-
peror Constans, who had been sole emperor in the West since 340, recog-
nized Paul as the legitimate bishop of the city. In 343, Paul was restored to 
his see by the Council of Serdica: that is, by a council of Western bishops 
meeting separately from their Eastern counter parts, who assembled and 
formed a  counter- council at Philippopolis. But when Paul returned to Con-
stantinople in the autumn of 344, his second attempt to reoccupy his see 
was suppressed by Constantius’s new praetorian prefect Philippus, who 
acted with guile in order to avoid meeting the same fate as Hermogenes. 
Philippus summoned Paul to a private interview in the baths of Zeuxip-
pus, where he had him arrested and then secretly bundled on board a ship, 
which took him to Th essalonica, which was in the territory of Constans 
and Paul’s native city, and forbade him to reenter the territory of Constan-
tius.13 Once in the territory of Constans, Paul betook himself to the court 
of the Western emperor and persuaded him to take up his cause. Constans 
wrote to his  brother threatening war if Constantius did not restore both 
Paul and Athanasius, who  were with him, to their sees in Constantinople 
and Alexandria.14 In 346 Constantius bowed to the po liti cal, diplomatic, 
and military pressure from his  brother and allowed the restoration of all 
the exiled Eastern bishops who had been vindicated by their Western com-
peers at the Council of Serdica. In the summer of 346, therefore, Paul 
returned to Constantinople, and Macedonius was compelled to yield his 
place as bishop.
So far Socrates was well informed about ecclesiastical events in Con-
stantinople itself, even though he sometimes set individual episodes in a 
false chronological context. I have, however, added some details to the nar-
rative of Socrates, who is followed and rewritten by Sozomen, from a very 
slippery passage in Athanasius’s highly polemical History of the Arians, writ-
ten in 357, which now needs to be analyzed in detail. Athanasius’s ac-
count of Paul of Constantinople reads as follows:
About Paul the bishop of Constantinople, I think that no- one is ig-
norant. For the more famous the city, the less hidden is what actu-
ally happened. Even against Paul a false charge/excuse [prophasis] was 
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in ven ted. For his accuser Macedonius, who is now bishop  after re-
placing Paul, remained in communion with him when he was ac-
cused and served as a priest  under the same Paul, when I myself was 
pres ent. Nevertheless, since Eusebius was watching with greedy eyes 
 because he wished to usurp the bishopric of the city [of Constanti-
nople] (he had been translated from Berytus to Nicomedia in the 
same sort of way), the false charge was retained and they did not desist 
from their plot, but continued to slander him. On the fi rst occasion, 
Paul was exiled to Pontus by Constantius [para Konstantiou]; on 
the second, he was shackled in iron chains and exiled to Constan-
tius [para Konstantion] in Singara in Mesopotamia, then trans-
ferred from  there to Emesa, and on the fourth occasion to Cucusus 
in Cappadocia next to the deserts of the Taurus [Mountains], where, 
as  those who  were with him have reported, he was throttled by them15 
and died.
 After  doing this,  those who never tell the truth showed no shame 
even  after his death when they again in ven ted the falsehood [propha-
sis] that Paul had died from illness, even though all  those who dwell 
in that region know the facts. For Philagrius, who was then vicarius 
of that area and disingenuously [hypokrinomenos] accepted what ever 
they wished, was nevertheless surprised at this, and perhaps distressed 
 because someone other than himself had performed the evil deed, 
announced to many  others known to me and in par tic u lar to the 
bishop Serapion that Paul had been shut up by them in a very small, 
dark place and left to die of starvation, but that subsequently six days 
 later, when they entered and found him still breathing, they then set 
upon the poor man and throttled him.
Th is was the end of Paul’s life on earth.16
Th e fi rst sentence of this passage fi xes the date of Paul’s fi rst deposition as 
autumn 337, since Athanasius was in Constantinople when Paul was ac-
cused and deposed for the fi rst time. What of Paul’s second, third, and 
fourth exiles? Paul was indeed expelled from Constantinople four times, 
as Athanasius acknowledges. But the details that Athanasius supplies relate 
only to Paul’s fi rst and last expulsions from the city. Athanasius supplies 
the place to which Paul was exiled in 337, which is not known from any 
other source. On both the second and third occasions, however— that is, 
in 342 and 344— Paul went to the West, an impor tant historical fact that 
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Athanasius wished to conceal. Th e places that he names as the places to 
which Paul was exiled for the second and the third time are in fact (and 
can only be) places to which Paul was sent  after his fourth and fi nal ex-
pulsion from Constantinople.
It is for this reason that the text must be emended on the basis of two 
observations, one literary, the other historical. First, the preposition para 
plus the genitive case to express agency is Athanasius’s normal usage; hypo 
is an Atticizing corruption of a common type, which replaces para with a 
stylistically superior synonym. Second, Athanasius cannot have been mis-
taken about the identity of the emperor who sent Paul to Pontus in 337. 
He was Constantius. Th e transmitted Konstantinou must accordingly be 
emended to Konstantiou.17 But to repeat para Konstantiou would be lame 
and pointless, and both Singara in Mesopotamia and Emesa in Syria, to 
which Paul was successively sent, are places in an area where Constantius 
is in de pen dently known to have been between 348 and 350.18 As for the 
council of bishops that deposed Paul for the fourth time, it can hardly be 
other than the Council of Antioch, which met and deposed Athanasius in 
349, prob ably in the autumn,19  after which Constantius sent his praeto-
rian prefect Philippus to Egypt to arrest the bishop of Alexandria.20
Eudoxius and Demophilus (360–380)
Th e Council of Constantinople, which promulgated the homoean creed in 
January 360, replaced Macedonius with Eudoxius, who occupied the see 
of Constantinople for a full de cade. Eudoxius weathered the “persecution” 
which Julian the Apostate directed against the homoeans, was left unmo-
lested by Jovian, and then enjoyed the support of Emperor Valens, who 
sustained the homoean Reichskirche in the East from his accession in 364 
 until his death on 9 August 378. When Eudoxius died in the spring of 370, 
the homoeans installed Demophilus as his successor. Th is was an obviously 
partisan choice, since Demophilus had been bishop of Beroea in Th race 
in the reign of Constantius before he and a number of other bishops  were 
condemned and deposed by the Western Council of Ariminum in 359 
 because they “refused to anathematize the Arian doctrine.’ ”21 Demophi-
lus occupied the see  until Emperor Th eodosius entered Constantinople on 
24 November 380, and immediately demanded that Demophilus accept 
the creed of Nicaea, and expelled him from the city when he demurred.22 
Although Demophilus continued to lead a conventicle of “Arians” outside 
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the gates of Constantinople  until he died in 386,23 the Nicenes took pos-
session of the main churches of the city that had been in the hands of the 
“Arians” for many years.24
Gregory of Nazianzus (379–381)
When Valens was defeated and presumed dead at the  Battle of Adrianople 
on 9 August 378, the homoean Reichskirche that he had sustained in Asia 
Minor, the Syrian region, and Egypt rapidly collapsed.25 It was prob ably 
in the autumn of 378 that Gregory, the bishop of the insignifi cant small 
town of Sasima in Cappadocia, came to Constantinople to support ortho-
doxy in the city, though not initially as bishop.26 Gregory of Nazianzus, 
as he is normally known from the name of his  later see, had been urged by 
Basil of Caesarea, who died on 1 January 379,27 and by many other bish-
ops in Asia Minor and their congregations, to defend orthodoxy in Con-
stantinople, and, against his better judgment, he acceded to their plea.  After 
some time had elapsed, Gregory was elected bishop, according to Socrates 
“by the vote of many bishops”— which implies that he was consecrated as 
bishop of Constantinople by the Council of Antioch, which met in the au-
tumn of 379.28 Within Constantinople itself, however, Gregory’s position 
only became secure  after Th eodosius expelled Demophilus on 26 Novem-
ber 380.29
Earlier in 380 an attempt had been made to supplant Gregory. A group 
of bishops sent by Peter, the bishop of Alexandria, started one night to con-
secrate an itinerant phi los o pher from Egypt, whom had Gregory initially 
welcomed to the city as a supporter, as the Nicene bishop of Constanti-
nople. (His name is stated as both Hero and Maximus, often with a sobri-
quet as Maximus the Cynic.)30 By a fortunate accident, the attempted 
consecration was interrupted before the ceremony could be completed and 
Maximus was expelled from Constantinople. From  there he traveled to 
Th essalonica, where he was rebuff ed by Th eodosius, then returned to Al-
exandria.31 From Alexandria, Maximus went to Italy, where he sought and 
gained support in the West: He convinced the Council of Aquileia in 
September 381, which was dominated by Ambrose of Milan, that he was 
still the legitimate bishop of Constantinople, with the result that  after the 
council Ambrose wrote to Th eodosius in his own name and that of “the 
rest of the bishops of Italy” demanding that Maximus be restored to 
the see of Constantinople, which had been usurped by  others, whom 
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Ambrose names as Gregory and his successor Nectarius.32 Th is Western 
démarche had no eff ect what ever in the East.
Th is Council of Constantinople, which is traditionally called “the Sec-
ond Ecumenical Council,” was a purely Eastern aff air. About one hundred 
and fi fty Eastern bishops gathered in Constantinople at the behest of Th e-
odosius in the summer of 381  under the presidency of Meletius, the bishop 
of Antioch. But Meletius died suddenly and unexpectedly with the coun-
cil’s business far from complete. Gregory took Meletius’s place, with 
unforeseen consequences. Th e Egyptian bishops, who had arrived in 
Constantinople  after the council opened, lodged an objection not merely 
to Gregory’s presidency over the council, but to the validity of his conse-
cration as bishop of Constantinople. Both the fi fteenth canon of the Coun-
cil of Nicaea in 325 and the twenty- fi rst of the canons ascribed to the 
“Dedication Council” of Antioch in 341 expressly forbade the transfer of 
a bishop from one see to another,33 and, although the rule was disregarded 
whenever it was po liti cally con ve nient to do so,34 it could always be invoked 
when ecclesiastical politics required a plausible reason for deposing a bishop, 
as it was against Gregory. Since Gregory had been consecrated bishop of 
the unimportant town or village of Sasima in 372,35 the Egyptian bishops 
argued that his consecration as bishop of Constantinople by the Council 
of Antioch in 379 was invalid.  After listening to insults and abuse directed 
at him, which fi lled him with disgust, Gregory deci ded to stand aside with-
out contesting the issue and obtained Th eodosius’s permission to resign.36 
On 30 June 381, while he was still “bishop of the catholic church in Con-
stantinople,” Gregory drew up a  will, which observed all the technical for-
malities required by Roman law and left all his property to the Church of 
Nazianzus, of which he must therefore have known that he was about to 
become bishop.37 Gregory subsequently subscribed to the canons of the 
council as bishop of Nazianzus.38
Nectarius and John Chrysostom (381–404)
Nectarius occupied the see of Constantinople for sixteen years from the 
summer of 381  until his death on 27 September 397, carefully avoiding 
controversy or, as was  later alleged, energetic action of any sort.39 His death 
produced yet another contested election. Th eo philus, the bishop of Alex-
andria, made strenuous eff orts to secure the election of Isidore, a priest of 
Alexandria  under him, whom he expected to be pliant and subservient as 
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bishop of Constantinople, but Eutropius, who was then the chief minister 
of Arcadius, persuaded the emperor to summon John, whom he had met 
in Antioch while organ izing re sis tance against a Hunnic invasion, and in-
stall him as Nectarius’s successor. Since John was already well known in 
the imperial capital as an outstanding teacher, preacher, and exegete of holy 
scripture and as a staunch supporter of Nicene orthodoxy, this was duly 
done, and a council of prominent Eastern bishops met, elected and conse-
crated John on 15 December 397, thus providing ecclesiastical and canonical 
ratifi cation of what was eff ectively an imperial appointment.40
In the pres ent context, it would be superfl uous to describe John’s tu-
multuous tenure of the see of Constantinople even in brief compass. It  will 
suffi  ce to note that, although John initially enjoyed the fi rm support of 
Emperor Arcadius and his consort Eudoxia, within six years he had alien-
ated Eudoxia, who had the ear of her husband, and in the late summer of 
403 John was condemned and deposed by the so- called Council of the Oak 
and bundled into exile, and that, though the imperial pair recalled John 
almost immediately, they played a large part in John’s permanent exile in 
June 404.
We are unusually well- informed about John’s troubled time as bishop 
of Constantinople. In addition to impor tant information preserved in  later 
texts such as the ecclesiastical histories of Socrates, Th eodoretus, and So-
zomen, and the chronicle of Marcellinus, we possess two detailed accounts 
written shortly  after John had perished from maltreatment on a forced 
march ordered by Emperor Arcadius. Th e fi rst is the funerary speech de-
livered in a city near Constantinople by one of John’s followers as soon as 
news arrived of his death in distant Comana Pontica on 14 September 407.41 
Despite its discovery in 1895, this Funerary Speech was fi rst edited criti-
cally by Martin Wallraff  in 2007, together with an Italian translation by 
his wife Cristina Ricci.42 It pres ents our earliest and fullest surviving ac-
count of John’s activities in Constantinople and of the opposition that he 
encountered or provoked with emphasis on the role played by Eudoxia.43 
Th e slightly  later Historical Dialogue of Palladius, bishop of Helenopolis, on 
the Life and Conduct of the blessed John, bishop of Constantinople, called 
Golden Mouth, which survives in a single manuscript of the eleventh  century 
(Laurentianus IX.14), has been known to scholars for centuries. Palladius 
composed this dialogue between two anonymous interlocutors styled 
“the bishop” and “the deacon” in exile at Syene in Upper Egypt in 408 and 
gave it a dramatic date earlier in the same year. Palladius’s theological 
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standpoint and his purpose and method in composing the Historical Dia-
logue can be defi ned quite precisely: Palladius was an “Origenist monk 
and bishop”; he wrote in defense of John as an advocate for the recently 
deceased bishop; he produced “a highly structured composition” in John’s 
defense using the traditional rhetorical form of a narration followed by 
arguments; and he wrote primarily for a Roman audience, though also for 
supporters of John in both Antioch and Constantinople.44 But it was not 
Palladius’s Dialogue that “fi xed John in the popu lar consciousness as both 
hero and innocent victim,” as has recently been claimed.45 For Palladius’s 
John corresponds very closely with the John whom the Funerary Speech had 
described several months earlier.
Arsacius, Atticus, and Sisinnius (404–427)
A mere fi ve days elapsed between John’s expulsion from Constantinople 
for the second time and the election of Arsacius as his successor (on 26 June 
404). Th e rapidity of this election and its po liti cal context point to impe-
rial intervention, and it is signifi cant that a few weeks  later the city prefect 
Optatus ordered John’s noble and wealthy supporter Olympias to acknowl-
edge Arsacius as the rightful bishop of Constantinople and imposed a 
heavy fi ne on her when she refused.46
Arsacius died on 11 November of the following year.  After his death an-
other contested election ensued, and Atticus, an ascetic from Sebasteia in 
Armenia, was fi  nally consecrated bishop in March 406. Th e Funerary Speech 
identifi es Atticus as one of the leading enemies of John and alleges that he 
had only allowed Arsacius to become bishop of Constantinople  after John 
 because he knew that Arsacius would soon die.47 On the other hand, 
Socrates gives Atticus a very favorable pre sen ta tion, commending him es-
pecially for his protection of the schismatic sect of the Novatians, to which 
Socrates himself belonged.48 Hence it must be suspected that when Socrates 
reports that the pious Atticus “was advanced to position of bishop”  after a 
delay of four months,49 the vague and decorous phrasing conceals impe-
rial involvement in his election.
Atticus lived on  until 23 October 425.  After his death a hotly contested 
election again ensued. According to Socrates the two main candidates  were 
the ecclesiastical historian Philippus of Side and Proculus, who was to be-
come bishop nine years  later, both of whom  were priests in charge of churches 
inside the city. Th e Christian laity of Constantinople, however, unani-
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mously favored Sisinnius, the priest of a suburban parish, who was duly 
elected on 26 February 426— which was the fortieth anniversary of the 
ordination of John Chrysostom as a priest in Antioch. It may be presumed 
that “all the  people” and “the laity” who, according to Socrates, carried the 
election of Sisinnius included the younger Th eodosius and his imperial 
 sisters.
Nestorius
Sisinnius died on 24 December 427. On the following 10 April, Nestorius 
was installed as bishop of Constantinople by the ministers of Emperor Th eo-
dosius II. Socrates describes the role of the imperial court quite explic itly:
 After the death of Sisinnius  those in power  were determined that no- 
one from within the church [of Constantinople] should be advanced 
to the position of bishop through the eff orts of lobbyists (dia tous 
kenospoudastous), although many  were urging that Philippus, many 
that Proclus be elected. Instead they wished to summon an external 
candidate from Antioch. For  there was  there someone named Nesto-
rius, a native of Germanicia who spoke fl uently and elegantly. For this 
reason they deci ded that he was very suitable as a teacher and ac-
cordingly resolved that he be summoned. So when three months 
had passed Nestorius was brought from Antioch.50
Th e role of Th eodosius in the deposition and exile of Nestorius, which was 
preceded by complicated po liti cal maneuvers, is equally clear.51 Th e so- 
called Th ird Ecumenical Council of 431 at Ephesus was in real ity no such 
 thing. Although both met in the same city,  there  were two parallel and 
opposing councils, just as  there had been in 343, when the Western and 
Eastern bishops assembled separately in Serdica and Philippopolis. On 
22 June 431, despite the protests of both many bishops from the diocese of 
Oriens and the comes Candidianus, whom Th eodosius had sent to keep or-
der at the council that he had convened, Cyril of Alexandria, assisted by 
Juvenalis of Jerusalem and Memnon of Ephesus, presided over a gathering 
of bishops that deposed Nestorius on the grounds that he had refused to 
appear before it. Another group of bishops met  under the presidency of 
John of Antioch on 29 June and deposed Cyril and Memnon. Envoys from 
both groups of bishops then scurried to the emperor in Constantinople:  After 
some delay, Maximianus was consecrated as bishop of Constantinople on 
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25 October 431 as the successor of Nestorius, who had resigned,52 and 
Th eodosius allowed the bishops who had assembled in Ephesus fi ve to six 
months earlier to return home, thus implicitly confi rming Cyril and 
Memnon in the possession of their sees and allowing the Cyrillian council 
retrospectively (and quite anachronistically) to acquire the cachet of the 
“Th ird Ecumenical Council.”
A clear picture emerges. With one pos si ble exception, it was the  will of the 
emperor that determined the election of bishops of the city of Constanti-
nople from its foundation onwards, even though he played no formal role 
in  either their election or their consecration: Elections  were made  either 
by the clergy and laity of the Church of Constantinople or by a council of 
bishops, and consecrations could only be performed by bishops of other 
cities, who sat as a church council when replacing a bishop whom they had 
just deposed. Depositions, it seems,  were a diff er ent  matter. Th eodosius un-
ceremoniously expelled Demophilus from Constantinople without wait-
ing for him to be condemned by a council of bishops, and Arcadius similarly 
sent John into exile in June 404 without waiting for a council of bishops 
to condemn him for an infraction of canon law, for which he himself was 
responsible. In Constantinople at least, therefore,  there was an unambigu-
ous answer to the question famously posed in the West in the fourth 
 century: What has the emperor to do with the church?53 In Constantino-
ple it was every thing.
Appendix One: Bishops of Constantinople, 337–431
(1) Bishops who  were formally consecrated:
PAUL
337 elected, then deposed and exiled to Pontus
342 attempts to resume possession of his see on the death of 
Eusebius, but is expelled from Constantinople, fl ees to the 
West, and goes to the court of Constans in Trier
343 reinstated as bishop of Constantinople by the Council of 
Serdica
344 attempts again to regain his see, but is deported to 
Th essalonica
346 fi  nally allowed by Constantius to resume possession of the 
see of Constantinople
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349 deposed by a council of bishops meeting in Antioch and 
taken to the court of Constantius, who exiles him to 
Cucusus
350 dies in prison at Cucusus
EUSEBIUS OF NICOMEDIA
337 replaces Paul  after the intervention of Constantius
341 dies in offi  ce
MACEDONIUS
341 succeeds Eusebius
346 replaced by Paul
360, Jan. deposed by the Council of Constantinople
EUDOXIUS
360, Jan. elected by the Council of Constantinople
370 dies in offi  ce
DEMOPHILUS
370 installed as bishop as the successor of Eudoxius
380, Nov. 26 expelled from the city by Th eodosius, but contin-




378, autumn prob ably comes to Constantinople
379 prob ably elected and consecrated by a council of bishops 
meeting in Antioch
381, June resigns and is consecrated bishop of Nazianzus
NECTARIUS
381, June- July elected and consecrated by the Council of 
Constantinople, over which he then presides
397 dies in offi  ce
JOHN CHRYSOSTOM
397, autumn summoned from Antioch by imperial order
397, Dec. 15 consecrated bishop of Constantinople
403, ca. Sept. deposed by the “Council of the Oak,” sent into 
exile, then recalled by Arcadius
404, June 20 expelled from Constantinople and exiled to 
Cucusus
407 Arcadius  orders John to be transported to Pityus on the 
northeast coast of the Black Sea
 E m p e r o r s  a n d  B i s h o p s  o f  C o n s ta n t i n o p l e  ( 3 2 4 – 4 3 1 )  187
153-66040_ch01_3P.indd   187 9/16/16   11:59 AM
407, Sept. 15 John dies at Comana Pontica during a forced 
march north through Asia Minor
ARSACIUS
404, June 26 consecrated bishop
405, Nov. 11 dies in offi  ce
ATTICUS
406, March elected and consecrated bishop
425, Oct. 10 dies
SISINNIUS
426, Feb. 28 consecrated bishop
427, Dec. 24 dies in offi  ce
NESTORIUS
428 summoned from Antioch by imperial order
428, April 10 consecrated bishop of Constantinople
431, late June condemned and deposed by the a council of 
bishops meeting in Ephesus on the initiative of Cyril of 
Alexandria,  after which he requests permission from 
Emperor Th eodosius to resign
431, August Nestorius’s deposition confi rmed by Th eodo-
sius; he retires to his monastery of St. Euprepius near 
Antioch
436 exiled to Petra, and  later (perhaps in 438 or 439) moved to 
Upper Egypt
451 recalled by Emperor Marcian in order to be rehabilitated 
at the Council of Chalcedon, but dies on the journey
451, Oct. defi nitively condemned as a heretic by the Council of 
Chalcedon
(2) Schismatic bishops:
MARCIANUS Novatianist died 395, Nov. 27 (Socrates, HE 
6.1.8)
DOROTHEUS Arian died 407, Nov. 6 (Socrates, HE 7.6.1)
CHRYSANTHUS Novatianist died 419, Aug. 26 (Socrates, 
HE 7.17.1)
BARBAS Arian died 430, June 24 (Socrates, HE 7.30.7)
(3) Rejected Names:
EVAGRIUS 370
According to Socrates, HE 4.13.3–15.3, followed by Sozomen, 
HE 6.13.3–4, when Eudoxius died in 370, the supporters of the 
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homoousion elected one Evagrius, who shared their theological 
views, and he was consecrated by Eustathius, the bishop of 
Antioch, but the emperor Valens arrested both Eustathius and 
Evagrius as soon he heard of the consecration and exiled both men: 
Eustathius to Bizye in Th race and Evagrius “to another place”54
MAXIMUS 380
Maximus was never formally consecrated bishop of Constantinople
Appendix Two: Th e Last  Will and Testament 
of Gregory of Nazianzus
Th e last  will and testament, which Gregory drew up on 30 June 381, while he 
was still bishop of Constantinople, survives complete  because it was deposited 
in the Church of Nazianzus, to which he bequeathed his entire estate. It 
conforms perfectly to the technical requirements of Roman law 55 and is in fact 
the earliest Roman  will to survive complete in its original form.56 A critical 
edition was published by Joëlle Beaucamp in 1998,57 which was unfortunately 
unknown to Brian Daley when he published an En glish translation of the 
superseded text printed by the Abbé Migne (PG 37.389–396) eight years 
 later.58 I have therefore supplied a new translation, carefully noting whenever 
I adopt a reading diff er ent from that printed by Beaucamp.
Copy of the  Will of Saint Gregory the Th eologian, transcribed from the 
original document, in which the handwritten subscriptions are preserved 
of both [Gregory] and the witnesses who subscribed.
In the consulate of Flavius Eucherius and Flavius Evagrius, viri claris-
simi, on the day before the kalends of July59
(1) I, Gregory, bishop of the catholic church in Constantinople, 
being alive and of sound mind, have, with a healthy judgment and 
unimpaired reason, drawn up this my  will, which I order and desire 
to be valid and eff ective in  every court of law and before  every [judi-
cial] authority.
(2) I have already made my intention clear and have consecrated 
all my estate to the catholic church in Nazianzus for ministering to 
the poor who are dependent on the said church. Accordingly,  because 
of this intention of mine I previously appointed three sustainers of the 
poor— the deacon and monk Marcellus, the deacon and monk Greg-
ory, who was born in my own  house hold,60 and the monk Eustathius, 
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who was also himself born in my  house hold. Now too, preserving 
the same sentiment  toward the holy church in Nazianzus, I hold to 
the same course of action.
(3) If it happens, therefore, that I reach the end of my life, let the 
sole heir of all of my property, both movable and unmovable, which 
I possess anywhere, be the aforementioned deacon and monk Greg-
ory, who was born in my  house hold and whom I freed long ago, and 
let every one  else be disinherited—on this condition, however, that 
he transfer all of my property, both movable and unmovable, to 
the holy catholic church in Nazianzus, abstracting nothing what-
ever except what I may leave in this my  will to anyone personally 
by way of legacy (legatum) or fi deicommissum, but carefully pre-
serve every thing, as I have said, for the church, having the fear of 
God before his eyes and in the knowledge that I have instructed 
all my estate to be applied to ministering to the poor of the same 
church, and that I have instituted him as heir for the precise pur-
pose that through him every thing may be preserved for the church 
without diminution.
(4) In re spect of the slaves whom I have freed,  whether on my own 
initiative or as a result of instructions from my deceased parents, I 
wish both that all of them remain  free and that the peculium of each 
of them remain fi rmly and without contestation in their possession.
(5) In addition, I desire that my heir Gregory the deacon, together 
with the monk Eustathius, who  were both born in my  house hold, 
receive the landed property in Arianzos61 which came to me from the 
estate of Reginus. And I desire that all the mules and sheep that I had 
some time ago, when I was  there, ordered to be given to them and 
had entrusted them with both their maintenance and owner ship, 
remain theirs without contestation with the  legal right of owner ship.
(6) In addition, I particularly desire that Gregory, the deacon and 
my heir, who has nobly served me, receive fi fty gold pieces with right 
of owner ship.
(7) To the most venerable virgin Rousiane, my relative, I ordered 
to be given stated sums of money each year so that she could live hon-
orably;  these sums I desire and order to be given to her promptly 
each year according to the schedule that I drew up. About her resi-
dence, I gave no instructions on that occasion, since I did not know 
where it would be most agreeable for her to live. Now, however, I de-
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sire that a  house suitable for a respectable person and appropriate for 
the virtuous way of life of a virgin be built for her in what ever place 
she may choose. Th is  house, to be clear, she  shall have for her use 
and enjoyment during her lifetime without contestation;  after this, 
however, she  shall transfer it to the church. And I desire that two girls 
of her choice be assigned to her, so that the girls remain with her for 
the duration of her lifetime; and that, if she  were to show them grat-
itude, that she have the power to honor them with freedom; but if 
she does not, that they belong to the same church.
(8) Th eo philus, the young slave who lodges with me, I have already 
freed. I now desire, therefore, that fi ve solidi be given to him as a leg-
acy (legatum).
(9) His  brother Eutaxius I desire to be  free and that he be given 
on account of a legacy (legatum) fi ve gold solidi.
(10) I also desire that my secretary Th eodosius be freed and be 
given on account of a legacy (legatum) fi ve gold solidi.
(11) As for my sweet  daughter Alypiane (for  little heed [need be 
paid] to the  others, Eugenia and Nonna, whose very [way of] life is 
reprehensible), I desire her to  pardon me for lacking the capacity to 
leave her anything,  because I have already promised every thing to 
the poor or rather have followed the promise of our blessed parents, 
whose decision I do not consider it  either holy or safe to set aside. 
However, I desire that all that is left of garments of silk, linen or wool 
or waggons62 among the eff ects of my deceased  brother Caesarius be-
long to her  children, and that neither she nor her  sisters trou ble 
 either my heir or the church in any  matter.
(12) Let Meletius, my relative by marriage, be aware that he is 
wrongly occupying the property at Apenzesus,63 which belongs to the 
estate of Euphemius. On this  matter I have often in the past written 
to Euphemius, denouncing his fecklessness for not reclaiming what 
is his; now too I call on all, both magistrates and nonmagistrates, to 
witness that Euphemius is being wronged, for the property  ought to 
be restored to Euphemius.
(13) Th e purchase of the estate of Kanotala64 I desire to be restored 
to my venerable son, the bishop Amphilochius. For it is in my papers 
and all know that the contract has been discharged, that I have re-
ceived the price and that I have long ago turned over the administra-
tion and the owner ship of the property.
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(14) To the deacon Evagrius, who has shared many of my suff er-
ings and concerns and has shown his loyalty in even more ways, I 
confess my gratitude before God and men. God  will recompense him 
with greater [rewards]; but so that even small tokens of friendship not 
be lacking on my part, I desire that he be given one double woolen 
cloak,65 one tunic, two ordinary cloaks66 and thirty gold solidi.
(15) Similarly I desire that sweet Th eodoulos, who was a deacon with 
me, be given one double woolen cloak, two tunics from  those in my 
home city and twenty gold solidi from the sum kept in my home city.
(16) To Elaphius the secretary, who is of good character and has 
nobly comforted me during the time that he has served me, I desire 
to be given one double woolen cloak, two tunics, three ordinary 
cloaks, a vestment67 that is in my home city and twenty gold solidi.
(17) Th is my  will I desire to be valid and eff ective in  every court 
of law and before  every  legal authority. But even if it  were not to have 
 legal force as a  will, I desire that it have  legal force as an expression 
of my wishes or a codicil (codicillum). Anyone who attempts to over-
turn it  will account for his actions at the Day of Judgment and  will 
[need to] justify himself in the name of the  Father, the Son and the 
Holy Ghost.
I, Gregory, bishop of the catholic church in Constantinople, have 
read my  will, satisfi ed myself with all that is written therein, have sub-
scribed with my own hand and order and desire it to have  legal eff ect.
I, Amphilochius, bishop of the catholic church in Iconium, being 
pres ent at the  will of the most venerable bishop Gregory at his invi-
tation, have subscribed with my own hand.
I, Optimus, bishop of the catholic church in Antioch,68 being pres-
ent at his invitation when the most venerable bishop Gregory made his 
 will as it is written above, have subscribed with my own hand.
I, Th eodosius, bishop of the catholic church in Hyde,69 being pres-
ent at the  will of the most venerable bishop Gregory at his invita-
tion, have subscribed with my own hand.
I, Th eodoulos, bishop of the holy catholic church in Apamea,70 
being pres ent at the  will of the most venerable bishop Gregory at his 
invitation, have subscribed with my own hand.
I, Hilary, bishop of the catholic church in Isauria, being pres ent 
at his invitation when the most venerable bishop Gregory made his 
 will as it is written above, have subscribed with my own hand.
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I, Th emistius, bishop of the holy church of God in Adrianople, 
was pres ent at the  will of the most venerable bishop Gregory at his 
invitation and have subscribed with my own hand.
I, Cledonius, priest of the catholic church in Iconium, being pres-
ent at the  will of the most venerable bishop Gregory at his invitation, 
have subscribed with my own hand.
I, Johannes, reader and notarius of the most holy church of Na-
zianzus, made the copy of the divine  will of the holy, glorious theo-
logian Gregory, which is deposited in my most holy church, and 
have published it.
Transcribed from the original document deposited in the church of 
Nazianzus.
(CPG 3033)
Appendix Th ree: Th e Date of Gregory’s  Will
Th e true historical signifi cance of Gregory’s  will has been obscured by the 
widespread adoption of an erroneous date. Th e edition reproduced by J.- P. 
Migne (PG 37.389) gives the date of 31  December 381 (πρό μιᾶς 
καλανδῶν Ἰανουαρίων) as if this date  were the sole date with manuscript 
attestation. Th is date has traditionally been rejected as impossible, for the 
obvious reason that Gregory had ceased to be bishop of Constantinople 
several months earlier, though Brian Daley has recently defended it as 
correct and deduced that even at the very end of 381 Gregory could not 
bring himself to accept that he was no longer bishop of Constantinople.71 
Hence the diurnal date of 31 December has normally been emended to 
31 May (πρό μιᾶς καλανδῶν Ἰουνίων).72 Indeed, so entrenched did the 
date of 31  May become that the only critical edition of Gregory’s  will 
printed the emendation (πρό μιᾶς καλανδῶν Ἰουνίων) in preference to 
the date of 30 June, which also has manuscript attestation.73
Gregory’s  will is transmitted in some thirty manuscripts, of which a 
slight majority are manuscripts of Gregory, while the rest are  legal manu-
scripts. In her critical edition of 1998, Joëlle Beaucamp identifi es three 
main groups of manuscripts, one comprising four manuscripts of Greg-
ory, of which three have the date of 31 December 381. One manuscript, 
however, which was copied in Constantinople in 1062, to which Beaucamp 
assigns the siglum A, and which has the date of 30  June 381 (πρό μιᾶς 
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καλανδῶν Ἰουλίων), stands apart from the rest. Beaucamp’s assessment of 
its value is that, apart from some false readings shared with other manu-
scripts, “A apparaît, par ailleurs, comme un témoin d’une grande qualité: le 
nom du mois (l.5) y est le plus proche de l’original, et les noms propres des 
souscriptions y sont exacts; les leçons propres à A ne sont pas très nombreuses 
et une seule est manifestement erronée (l.86: τῆςφιλοσοφίαςσύμβολα).”74 
According to the normal criteria of textual criticism, the reading of A de-
serves to be accepted as correct  unless  there is strong countervailing evidence. 
In fact, it entails a new interpretation of the circumstances surrounding 
Gregory’s resignation as bishop of Constantinople.
On 30 June 381 Gregory was still bishop of the imperial city, but he 
knew that he would soon be bishop of Nazianzus. Th at implies that Greg-
ory had already requested to be allowed to resign as bishop of Constanti-
nople and that his resignation had been accepted before 30 June 381. In 
turn this implies that an arrangement had already been made, with the 
approval of Emperor Th eodosius, that on his resignation as bishop of 
Constantinople, Gregory would immediately be transferred to the see of 
Nazianzus, and that by 30 June it was already known that Gregory would 
be replaced as bishop of Constantinople by Nectarius, the praetor urbanus 
in Constantinople. Nectarius had not yet been baptized when he was se-
lected as bishop of Constantinople in succession to Gregory,75 but, like 
Ambrose in Milan seven years earlier,76 he was advanced rapidly through 
the clerical ranks and presided over the fi nal sessions of the Council of 
Constantinople, which prob ably concluded on 27 July 381, although two 
diff er ent dates are also attested for its closure.77
It has normally been assumed that the bishops subscribed the canons 
of the council on 9 July 381, since that is the date stated in the heading to 
the council’s address to Emperor Th eodosius and the canons of the coun-
cil as printed by Mansi in the eigh teenth  century:
ἐν ὑπατείᾳ Φλαβίου Εὐχερίου και Φλαβίου Εὐαγρίου
τῶν ἐκλαμπροτάτων πρὸ ἑπτὰ εἰδῶν Ιουλίων78
In the more recent edition by Périclès- Pierre Joannou, however, the 
date is stated very diff erently and from a diff er ent manuscript source as
ἐν ἰνδικτιῶνι θ’ ὑπατείᾳ Εὐχερίου καὶ Εὐαγρίου,
πρὸ ς’. καλανδῶν αὐγούστων ἔτους Ἀντιοχείας υκθ’.79
Now Th eodosius, whose presence is attested close to Constantinople in 
Heraclea/Perinthus from 9 to 30 July 381,80 added his imprimatur to the 
council’s decisions at the request of the bishops on 30 July.81 Th e date of 
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27 July should surely therefore be preferred to 9 July for the closure of the 
council.82 Th e bishops who subscribed its canons included Nectarius, who 
presided as the newly elected bishop of Constantinople and hence sub-
scribed fi rst, while both Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus sub-
scribed together with another four bishops from Cappadocia.83
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Stepping Out of Constantine’s 
Shadow
Peter Iver Kaufman
Beginning in 1970 and continuing for forty years thereafter, Robert Markus informed and enlivened discussions of Constantinian Chris-
tian ity. His impressive erudition still illumines our understanding of the 
period “during which Christian Romans came slowly to identify them-
selves with traditional Roman values, culture, practices, and established 
institutions.”1 Markus identifi es the world in which that assimilation 
slowly occurred as “the secular.” Accustomed to hearing about assimila-
tion of that sort when conversations turn to Chris tian ity’s affi  rmations 
of—or accommodations to— democratic structures or, more pointedly, to 
civil religion, we may consider Markus po liti cally correct. Yet  because he 
conscripted Latin Chris tian ity’s prolifi c paladin, Augustine of Hippo, 
into the ser vice of the secular, as it  were, Markus invites us to question 
 whether he was, on that count, historically correct.2
According to Markus, Augustine subscribed neither to his faith’s repu-
diation nor to its usurpation of the po liti cal cultures around it. What re-
quired repudiation, Markus’s Augustine claims, was— and is— the profane 
or unacceptable. Th e “neutral realm of the acceptable” was “secular.” Th e 
Christians of the late fourth and early fi fth centuries— living in Constan-
tine’s shadow and especially  after Emperor Th eodosius I emphatically pro-
scribed pagan worship— found it diffi  cult to conceive of municipal or 
imperial politics as alien or, to borrow Markus’s terms, to perceive the sec-
ular as profane; the empire “had become the vehicle of their religion and 
its natu ral po liti cal expression.” Participation in po liti cal culture was hardly 
compulsory. “Christians could treat [it] as secular,” Markus allowed, “per-
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haps distancing themselves but without feeling a need to disown and 
condemn” po liti cal practice.3
What of the other options, usurpation and repudiation? Markus asso-
ciated the fi rst with the medieval papacy, making Pope Gregory I respon-
sible for the desecularization of the secular. Gregory purportedly inspired 
his successors in Rome, papal hierocratic theorists, and the canon  lawyers 
who posted pre ce dents for the theorists’ intentions to “swallow . . .  up the 
world.”4 As for re sis tance, repudiation, and repudiators, Markus could have 
nominated the usurpers’ medieval and early modern critics but cited in-
stead several twentieth- century evangelical protests against Gregorian 
Chris tian ity, particularly  those of John Howard Yoder who alleged that 
“the church desert[s] its vocation” whenever it celebrates its “Constantin-
ian status”— that is, whenever it forgets that it is a community that  ought 
to be in critical relation to “the sword”—to the po liti cal.5
We  shall start in 314, by assessing that status and cele bration shortly  after 
Constantine’s apparent conversion to Chris tian ity. We  will consider what 
Markus and his Augustine believe to be the secular spaces Constantinian 
changes opened between the sacred and profane. My aim is to raise sev-
eral questions about the Church’s mission, to ask why the Church should 
agitate in the world and  whether and how it can do so without losing its 
distinctiveness. Perhaps “agitate” is too strong a term, yet disturbances 
prob ably seemed inevitable when moral clarity, which faith ostensibly im-
parts to the faithful, was released into the secular where, according to his-
torian and ethicist Charles Mathewes— from whom I’ve borrowed the use 
of the word “agitate”— situations always are “morally ambiguous,” at best, 
and, at worst, the world is infectiously wicked, as Augustine once claimed. 
Th e bishop could be quite unfl attering when he bridled at and wrote about 
the conditions in this wretched world, in hoc saeculo maligno.6
Soon  after he was attracted to Chris tian ity, Emperor Constantine came to 
the conclusion that the African Christian clerics, who stubbornly opposed 
Bishop Caecilian of Carthage,  were malevolent (qui vis malignitatis in 
eorundum pectoribus perseverat).7 Caecilian’s critics had challenged the va-
lidity of his appointment and consecration and, in eff ect, seceded from 
other African Christian churches, whose bishops believed their accusa-
tions against Caecilian libelous. But before seceding, they had urged Procon-
sul Anulinus to deny Caecilian and his partisans the exemptions Constantine 
awarded his new faith’s clergy. Anulinus fretted, referring the  matter to 
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the emperor who, in turn, directed Miltiades, bishop of Rome, to confer 
with selected Italian prelates and to investigate the petitioners’ accusations. 
He complied, assembled eigh teen colleagues, probed the cause of the 
dissidents’ discontent— notably Caecilian’s alleged collaboration with Chris-
tian ity’s persecutors in the past— and vindicated the accused. Still, Miltia-
des hoped to avoid further recrimination and to appease the discontented 
by coupling Caecilian’s acquittal with a declaration that bishops ordained 
by his critics  were not to be denied authority. According to the proposal 
formulated in Rome, wherever opposition to Caecilian in Africa divided 
a church, seniority rather than partisanship would dictate which of the 
rival bishops remained in his see. Th e less se nior would relocate. Th e dis-
sidents thought the Roman compromise reprehensible. Th ey defi antly 
demanded that their original complaints be reevaluated. Constantine ac-
quiesced and set aside the decisions reached by Miltiades and the bishops 
he had summoned to Rome, but a second council in Arles in 314 recon-
fi rmed the Caecilianists’ position. Th ereafter, the emperor considered the 
rage against Caecilianists irrational. Th e secular had weighed in, endors-
ing the resolution of a crisis that the sacred seemed unable to contain. 
Few, if any, better examples of Constantinianism— not as the church’s 
capitulation to, but as its collaboration with, “the state”— could be found. 
Yet the endorsement failed to have the desired eff ect. Th e Arles verdict and 
imperial approval  were expected to marginalize if not to douse dissent. But 
dissidents soon capitalized on an outpouring of African sentiment against 
Roman occupation and landlords to fortify their co ali tion, consecrating 
as bishop of Carthage Donatus, a resourceful leader who masterminded 
a campaign that, within a  century, gave the secessionists’ churches— 
the pars Donati or Donatists— a commanding position in several African 
provinces.8
Donatist successes during the fourth  century— when they mattered 
most to Augustine during the 390s and thereafter— will concern us shortly, 
but fi rst we need to reemphasize the perceived appropriateness of Constan-
tine’s involvement in combatting what he took as the vis malignitatis, the 
“wickedness,” from which the African schism originated. He was said by 
his biographer to have deliberated with the bishops, if not at Rome in 313, 
then at Arles the next year. Eusebius  imagined that collaboration; gener-
ations  later, Augustine repeated the story.9 Th e evidence, however, suggests 
that Constantine did  little more than nominate a few bishops to partici-
pate in the Roman conversation, which may have been in Trier when the 
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Council of Arles met. Th e wisest course, I suspect, is to follow Brent Shaw’s 
lead and to surmise that the bishops at Rome and Arles, regardless of the 
emperor’s whereabouts, vindicated Caecilian and condemned his African 
critics at Constantine’s prompting.10
But Constantine’s prompting and the Church’s councils failed to sup-
press African dissent. Nearly eighty years  later, when Augustine resettled 
in Africa, the Donatist Christians outnumbered the Caecilianists. Th e em-
peror had promised to go to North Africa to make clear “what sort of de-
votion” pleased God, and compel the dissidents to conform to “the most 
perfect faith.” He explained that statesmen had no greater obligation than 
to eradicate religious error and encourage the faithful to defer to their le-
gitimate bishops’ authority.11 But he never went, and the immediate out-
come in situ was not what he (or what became the North African Catholic 
Church) expected. For the Donatists  were durable, intransigent, and un-
sparing in their criticism of their rivals. Th ey made the religious situation 
terribly untidy in one of the empire’s strategically impor tant regions.
Doubts about Constantine’s motives linger. He seems to have believed 
that God’s  favor was conditional, that God entrusted him with all earthly 
aff airs, terrena omnia, including Church controversies about cultic prac-
tices, and that God would continue to  favor his  family and his rule as long 
as he sensibly ordered his realm’s religious life. Th e secular and sacred  were 
one.12 Yet Peter Brown’s generalization about the eff ect of Constantine and 
his successors on religious disputes applies well to the untidiness across the 
Mediterranean in the fourth and fi fth centuries: “Far from bringing doc-
trinal controversies to an end [the emperors’ pronouncements]  were usually 
the opening shot in a campaign for the mastery of public opinion.” “Th e 
shambling Roman Empire,” Brown continues, “was far from being like a 
modern state, and the so- called Catholic Church was a loose- knit confed-
eration of local churches, which resembled in no way the papal monarchy 
of  later centuries.”13 So, once the “opening shot[s]”  were fi red, Augustine 
took it upon himself to arrange conversations with local Donatist bishops, 
circulate rec ords of what was said, and master public opinion without invit-
ing zealots who seemed  eager to upstage statesmanlike conferees and with-
out attracting the unwanted attention of secular authorities. One could 
argue that Augustine—on this count, and for a time— was trying to step 
outside Constantine’s shadow.14
From the late 390s into the next  century, he tried to reason with the 
secessionists, content to off er rules of engagement that had the prospect of 
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restoring unity to North African Chris tian ity. His subsequent reliance on 
imperial decree and on coercive mea sures to end the schism represented “a 
decisive volte- face.”15 It followed his disillusionment with attempts to ap-
pease Donatist moderates who, like Bishop Proculeianus, appeared irenic 
(in te praeeminent placidoris mentis indicia) and able to dissuade Donatists 
from stubborn re sis tance to reunion.16 Only gradually (and grudgingly, it 
seems) did Augustine realize that many Donatists remained certain of 
the truth of the charges that had failed to convince the prelates at Rome 
and Arles of Caecilian’s unsuitability for offi  ce in the early fourth  century. 
And many other dissidents  were too uninformed to argue intelligently, yet 
appeared ghoulishly to take plea sure in recycling the accusations against 
Caecilian and his long- dead colleagues to smear their current Catholic 
critics.17
In 403, Augustine collaborated with Bishop Aurelius of Carthage on a 
proposal to enlist the help of local magistrates, who might serve as referees 
and keep conversations from turning into nasty confrontations.18 Augus-
tine also favored conferring in small villages where neither faction had 
established a church. Neutral sites seemed perfect places to pore over pas-
sages in sacred texts and to reconcile rival interpretations.19 But by 406, 
Augustine had issued a veiled ultimatum, suggesting that the Donatists 
would soon be faced with a decision  either to agree to reconcile with him 
or to confront government offi  cials bent on their suppression.20
During this period and into the next de cade Augustine harped on about 
the diffi  culties that Catholic Christians in Africa  were facing from the 
Donatist thugs, called circumcellions. If we believe Augustine, they  were 
paramilitary ruffi  ans whom militant Donatist bishops used as enforcers. 
Augustine circulated reports of their atrocities and called on the emperor’s 
deputies in Africa to remove local offi  cials who tolerated the terror. Th e 
circumcellions  were “men of blood . . .  armed and active everywhere.”21 To 
assume that moderate dissidents could bridle them was unrealistic. Th e 
moderates  were in a tight spot; they could hardly appear severe when so 
many of their colleagues— and not a few of  those among them— owed their 
basilicas to circumcellions, who had frightened away Catholic congregations 
and left their rivals in possession. Augustine complained that Donatist prel-
ates  were the thugs’ driving force— agonistices— inciting circumcellions to 
“arm themselves against the law.” Hence, Catholic Christians  were justifi ed 
calling in the law, Augustine explained, in eff ect raising the stakes, over-
stating the militants’ malevolence, and overdramatizing Africa’s purported 
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plunge into anarchy.22 His recourse to force was “fundamentally defen-
sive,” Charles Mathewes says, and in no way “an exemplary case of Con-
stantinianism,” and, understandably, many of his con temporary admirers 
found it “alarming.”23
Alarmed Augustinians may fi nd  little comfort from this reconstruction 
of the perception of the crisis that led Augustine himself to subscribe to 
his colleagues’ appeals for government assistance. Th e context does not excuse 
the miscue. And I fear that what remains of this essay  will not comfort 
the alarmists who sift Augustinian sources for “an ethic of demo cratic 
citizenship,” inasmuch as I want to trawl in a few of Augustine’s texts to 
catch a modus operandi that might be construed as his alternative to 
Constantinian Chris tian ity.
He had not been looking for one earlier in his  career. His Confessions 
confi des that he had hoped for a place at court and traveled to Italy to culti-
vate infl uential friends, fl atter offi  cials, and make an advantageous marriage. 
His pro gress was professionally promising but personally unfulfi lling. He 
grew apprehensive. He came to believe that the happiness he sought was 
specious, that street  people  were better off , and that his quest for patron-
age had turned him into a bootlicking beggar.24 Years  later, composing 
his memoir, he recalled that he and several friends contemplated form-
ing a community of scholars “far removed from crowds.” Th e proj ect 
called for the appointment of a bursar or two so that  others, undistracted 
by the business end of their colloquy could devote themselves to studies 
and learned conversations. Yet several wives withheld consent, so the plan 
was abandoned.25 Its attraction for Augustine, who was unwed, seems com-
prehensible. He had been drawn to the Manichees years before, in part 
 because he valued the companionship and conversations in the sect’s cells. 
He was also intrigued by the promise that Manichaean specialists would 
explain cosmology and Christian theology. Even  after he grew disillusioned 
with their “utterly confused” explanations and found their conduct unbe-
coming (which, he scowled, they egregiously explained away by referring 
to the sinners reckoned as righ teous in several of Chris tian ity’s sacred texts), 
he was loath to leave the Manichees.26 Peter Brown suggests that Augus-
tine’s “de cades of shared religious intensity . . .  as a Manichee [and as] a 
pioneer of a philosophical commune” led him to withdraw to a country 
estate outside Milan for a few months with his  mother, his son, and some 
 others— “a community of like- minded souls,” Brown says— and then led 
him to return to North Africa, with a “party of retired bureaucrats and 
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failed would-be courtiers,” “a closed religious group” or com pany of Chris-
tian intellectuals intent on prayer, reading, and discussion.27
Apparently Augustine was satisfi ed that his small companies of Chris-
tians could encourage the self- inquiry and colloquy (interius cogitando et 
loquendo) he thought necessary as preparation to approach what he called 
“the edge of eternity.”28 Most studies of his Confessions emphasize the in-
trospection, but Gaetano Piccolo, in a lengthy discussion of interiority, con-
cedes the importance of self- analy sis, and especially memory, in the 
reception of God’s revelations. Th e inner life, if overemphasized, often dis-
orients, becoming the principal obstacle to convivenza civile.29 Augustine 
seems to have anticipated Piccolo’s counsel. When describing his party’s 
pastimes, he added loquendo as if to signal that the Christian community’s 
piety and fellowship  were due to discourse as well as to sighs, studies, and 
prayers. As he came  under the infl uence of the call for personal reform 
found in the gospels and the writings of the apostle Paul, Augustine else-
where and increasingly advised that colloquy, which he called “a surface 
activity,” was an aid to contemplation. Nonetheless, as Phillip Cary notes, 
“the privacy of the inner self is a temporary phenomenon.” Augustine 
looked forward to a time when the “inmost selves” of the faithful would “be 
open to each other’s gaze, as they  were always meant to be.”30
Memory was critical: ego sum qui memini.31 Th eir memories constituted 
Christians. Memory probed and pro cessed experiences and, in Augustine’s 
memoir, memory molded experience into what Brian Stock calls “the 
West’s fi rst fully developed narrative philosophy.”32 Th e tenth and eleventh 
books of the Confessions are its display cases. Signifi cantly, the latter starts 
speaking “plurally and communally,” Charles Mathewes notes; for nine 
books, readers watch Augustine, alone, mea sur ing time, but  after that “we 
are in the church,” a church that remembered Constantine’s conversion, 
but not necessarily as a watershed: that is, as a po liti cal turning point 
that accommodated Chris tian ity—or assimilated the Church—to the 
po liti cal structures of the empire.33
Faithful Christians in the Church  were on pilgrimage in time, Augus-
tine explained  later, when he realized that politicized Chris tian ity was un-
sturdy in theory and practice.  After he wrote his memoirs— but before his 
day seemed so disjointed, following rebellion and riots in Africa and the 
sack of Rome in 410—he associated pilgrimage with tears. Weeping, he 
claimed, was the appropriate response to the faithful’s estrangement from 
the celestial city.34 Despite the consolations on off er in time (rationality, 
208 P e t e r  I v e r  K a u f m a n
153-66040_ch01_3P.indd   208 9/16/16   11:59 AM
vitality, and the Church with its sacraments), pilgrims needed to be re-
minded that their true home was elsewhere, and that their purpose on 
earth, in large part, was to yearn for it. Th e Church was also the repository 
for memories and for their authoritative interpretation. Both the memories 
and their interpretation reinforced the pilgrims’ sense of mission to pro-
claim their citizenship in the celestial city together with their longing for 
it. Augustine learned as much in the 380s. In the Confessions he recalled 
being told a story by Simplicianus, who succeeded Ambrose as bishop of 
Milan. Simplicianus reported coaxing a widely respected rhetorician, 
Victorinus, into the Church. Victorinus eventually admitted that he 
found truth and comfort in Chris tian ity, but he resisted public disclosure. 
He declined Simplicianus’s invitation to come to church (arguing that 
it was preposterous to suppose that walls made the faithful any more 
faithful)  until God unexpectedly moved him to make a con spic u ous 
and celebrated confession of his  adopted religion and to join “God’s gentle 
fl ock.”35
Th e Church was custodian of memories and stories such as that of Sim-
plicianus. Retelling the stories of conversions instructed prospective con-
verts. Conceivably, Augustine was thinking of that possibility when he 
drafted his memoirs and added his odyssey to the Church memory bank. 
Possibly he had this prospect in mind when he strategically deployed the 
Church’s recollections in his City of God. Rehearsing martyrs’ ordeals, he 
suggested to Christian pilgrims what they could expect from authorities, 
even  after the Constantinian settlement, since many pagans continued to 
blame Chris tian ity for their empire’s unnerving setbacks in 387, when Em-
peror Valens died defending the frontier, and in 410, when Alaric chased 
Emperor Honorius from Rome. Th e Christians  were blamed for abandon-
ing Rome’s old gods who protected cities in return for worship rendered 
by leading citizens. Pilgrims learned from martyrs that they lived precari-
ously and as captives on earth and that they should stand ready to embrace 
the promise of redemption rather than cultivate civic pride and accumu-
late possessions associated with an unwholesome secular life.36 Pagans cre-
ated and preserved memories for related reasons, using them to encourage 
civic solidarity. In a recent study, Patrice Cambronne infers that Augus-
tine adapted their approach to the Church’s purposes. Alleging that the 
pagans’ storytellers  were charlatans, he relayed his memories of martyrs to 
bind pilgrims to their Church over their cities, and to the Christian prom-
ise of redemption.37
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Binding pilgrims to each other as well as to a repository of their faith’s 
stories and memories, Augustine steps outside our frame of reference, 
which, as Martin Claussen says, takes pilgrimage “as a somewhat solitary 
exercise.” For Augustine this was not the case, and pilgrimage was rather 
“something the  whole community . . .  does together.”38 Entering the com-
munity, catechumens  were given history lessons. Th ey began with the Old 
Testament’s saga of creation, fall, and fl ood. Th ey recalled the apostles’ or-
deals and concluded with a short tribute to the martyrs, who attested the 
truth of their faith  until “the neck” of their persecutors’ pride had been 
snapped. Th e Church, as Joost van Neer says, makes its memories come 
alive “to build up the faith.”39
On Augustine’s watch, memories  were crafted and conveyed to make 
the Church’s story and prospects so much more appealing than  those 
of the secular world. His City of God sets out the history (and pre- history) 
of the Church  after commenting somewhat favorably on old Rome’s 
achievements. Contestable interpretations of  those comments and of sev-
eral passages elsewhere suggest that Augustine  imagined that secular re-
gimes could be more or less just; readings of the City’s fourth book, for 
example, justify Rome’s territorial expansion by referring to the unruly 
conduct of the neighbors it absorbed. But the lust for domination, which 
Augustine deplored, is the proper explanation— his explanation, accord-
ing to which such lust made po liti cal equilibrium impossible. Th at the City 
defi nes a republic without reference to justice and that it endorses the 
complaints of one of Cicero’s characters in De re publica, who maintained 
that po liti cal practice requires unjust be hav ior, appear to be irrelevant to 
scholars devoted to discovering Augustine’s optimism or sources for po liti-
cal optimism in his City that would enable them to come to comfortable 
terms with liberal democracy.40
Th omas Martin’s essay on the politics of monasticism seems to me a 
more sensible application of Augustine’s refl ections on solidarity and civic 
piety. Martin relates Augustine’s take on fairness and meaningful recipro-
city to “the republic of grace” in convents. Monasticism was peregrinans 
and “far from perfect,” yet it represented humanity’s best eff orts— and best 
bet— in hoc saeculo maligno to get just results. “Th e monastic community 
does witness to the art of the pos si ble,” Martin says, to “what can be done 
while still on pilgrimage.”41 As for Christian magistrates and soldiers, who 
cannot responsibly retire from the secular world and who must reconcile 
themselves to their secular duties, which amount to damage control, Au-
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gustine told them to pray for their deliverance, fret about the inconsistency 
between their po liti cal practice and their piety, and to repent. Ideally, they 
can fi nd scope for an uncompromising exercise of virtue in their churches.42
Th e world is to be used but not improved by Christian pilgrims and their 
Church, which is the context in which operative and cooperative grace im-
proves relations among the faithful and the relations between them and 
their creator and redeemer. Pilgrims are taught to expect celestial rewards, 
properly to weigh the value of temporal rewards, and to pay forward 
God’s love in their love for neighbors. But pilgrims are not to propose a 
new religious foundation for municipal moral order. Augustine did not 
politicize piety. For him, piety’s proper arena was, according to John 
Rist, “unpolitical”— not apo liti cal, but unpolitical— and what Francesco 
D’Agostino identifi es as Augustine’s antigiuridismo demonstrates just that. 
It surfaces in several skirmishes with Pelagians who depicted law as grace, 
when, insisting that a Christian’s freedom to obey the law was implicit in 
the very existence of law, they supposed the laws of God  were refl ected in 
the laws of civil society. To Augustine, their supposition was preposterous.43
So it would be foolish to look for any signifi cant slab of the optimism 
resembling Eusebius of Caesarea’s euphoria in Augustine’s remarks on po-
liti cal leadership or jurisprudence. Perhaps we should we refer to Augus-
tine, in the words of Christoph Horn, as “a po liti cal functionalist,” one 
who acknowledges the normativity of institutions and laws, while accept-
ing that prevalent po liti cal practices serve useful yet occasionally immoral 
purposes?  After all, Augustine would have conceded that institutions, laws, 
and practices in the terrestrial city, in hoc saeculo maligno,  were normative 
to a point. But “normativity” meant relatively  little in the long run for Au-
gustine or, to put his likely perception in more precise terms, calling the 
prevailing patterns of po liti cal be hav ior normal or normative did  little to 
relieve the distress that “everywhere fi lled” what he knew of  human expe-
rience in this wicked world (ubique impleverunt); temptations and suspi-
cions affl  icted what passed as ordinary lives. For Augustine, the secular was 
sinful; what ever  there was of his functionalism was trumped by his “mor-
alism.”44 In Augustine’s City of God po liti cal be hav ior and, more impor-
tantly, po liti cal institutions invariably succumb to “the universal sway of 
antagonism.” Th at phrase, “universal sway of antagonism,” is John Mil-
bank’s and is quite controversial, but, as James Wetzel admits, Milbank 
has “an exegetical basis in the City of God for conjoining sin, secularity, 
and paganism.”45
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Th e Church supplied some refuge and relief from the wreckage of cre-
ation that we have been calling “the secular.” Th e Church had a distinctive 
calling, which distinguished it from— and called for unremitting criticism 
of— political settlements. Th at criticism neither required nor commended 
active participation in po liti cal deliberations. In Augustine’s judgment, 
the compassion of Christians was better spent in their churches than in 
senates, better spent paying forward God’s love for the pilgrims’ celestial 
city in their love for neighbors. Opera misericordiae, expressions of tender-
ness,  were sacrifi ces that as suredly pleased God, Augustine warranted, and 
might even snatch up (rapere) neighbors whose be hav ior had been objec-
tionable and change them into eff ective executors of God’s love.46 To change 
or reform  others, of course, required that one be reformed, which, for 
Augustine, meant losing the form of secular desire ( formam concupiscentiae 
saecularis amittat), having it consumed by the fi re of God’s love. Th at fi re 
was kindled by submission to God. Pilgrims’ passions for the celestial city 
began with self- inquiry, which Luigi Alici dubs “spiritual reconnaissance,” 
developed with their submission, and contributed to constituting churches 
as pride- free zones in which aversion to contention eventually, and ideally, 
douses the self- love and lusts that infl ame contentious spirits.47
“Zoning” the Church in this fashion returns us to Augustine’s opposi-
tion to the Donatists. To his mind, the Donatists’ claims to superior 
righteousness— their purported libels against their fi rst critics, the Caeci-
lianists, and their re sis tance to reconciliation— exhibited an all- too- human 
lack of compassion and an addiction to contention. Augustine believed the 
Pelagians  were similarly disposed. He chided them as well for conceit, in-
asmuch as their claims to please God without special divine assistance 
drove them, he said, from the certainties of faith to idolatry.48 Pride played 
itself out in assertions of “moral self- suffi  ciency, religious superiority, and 
po liti cal domination,” according to J. Patout Burns— “pride was the prin-
cipal obstacle to overcome.” One function of the law was “to dissolve a 
person’s sense of self- reliance,” Patout Burns goes on, but it was also the 
Church’s function to challenge members’ self- satisfaction. Th e churches 
consequently contributed to a pro cess by which the celestial city was “con-
stantly being formed by the reform (mutatione) of the wicked.”49 Augus-
tine acknowledged that  there would be heavy lifting ahead. Professed 
Christians in the Church could be indecisive, and “many live[d] lives un-
worthy of the baptisms they received.” Th ey crowded into the circus rather 
than into the basilica. Th ey set up shops on holy days and grew irritable if 
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trade on  those days was restricted.50 Augustine urged that the faithful help 
coreligionists whose determination was unequal to the challenges that 
Christian standards posed for them. Th e most motivated pilgrims should 
help the least to “cross the Red Sea,” he said, and get wet enough to wash 
away the residue of their sinful lives—to accept God’s promises, and put 
the temptations of this wicked world into perspective.51 In the same ser-
mon, preached sometime during the fi rst de cade of the fi fth  century or 
shortly  after Rome’s humiliation in 410, Augustine concluded that Chris-
tians might also assist  those “dregs” (amurca) who tempted pilgrims into 
the saeculum and have them participate as incurious and uncomplaining 
citizens of this wicked world; maybe the faithful should bring that “slag” 
to church along with  those susceptible to their tempters’ touting civic pride, 
Augustine suggested, trusting that tempters and tempted alike might be 
inspired by the memories of martyrs and the stories of converts as well as 
by self- reconnaissance, and colleagues’ compassion— inspired to step out 
of Constantine’s shadow.52
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“You Cannot Have a Church 
Without an Empire”
Po liti cal Orthodoxy in Byzantium
James C. Skedros
A t the end of the  fourteenth  century, the Byzantine Empire had been reduced to a handful of possessions consisting of the depop-
ulated city of Constantinople, a few port towns in nearby Th race, the in-
de pen dent empire of Trebizond on the southern coast of the Black Sea, 
some northern Aegean islands, and parts of the Greek Peloponnesus. Th e 
grandeur, military might, and economic dominance that once had made 
Byzantium the envy of the medieval world was gone. By 1371, Emperor 
John V Palaiologos had begun to pay an annual tribute to the more 
power ful Ottomans. It is rather remarkable that Byzantium would sur-
vive for another three generations. Yet, even within such a bleak po liti cal 
and military existence, the rhe toric of empire continued. In 1393, Anthony, 
patriarch of Constantinople, penned a letter to Basil I,  grand prince of 
Moscow. Anthony had learned that the Muscovite prince was not off ering 
the liturgical commemoration of the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II 
Palaiologos (1391–1425).1 In this oft- quoted letter, Patriarch Anthony ex-
presses his dismay at such an oversight and expresses the conventional 
imperial ideology of Byzantium:
My son, it is not pos si ble for Christians to have a Church and not 
have an empire. Church and empire have a  great unity and commu-
nity. It is not pos si ble for them to be separated from one another. For 
the holy emperor is not as other rulers and the governors of other 
regions are; and this is  because the emperors, from the beginning, 
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established and confi rmed true religion (eusebia) in all the inhabited 
world (oikoumene). Th ey convoked ecumenical councils . . .  and 
[they] strug gled hard against heresies.
Th ough not part of the imperial orbit of the dwindling eastern Roman Em-
pire, Moscow was, at the very least, a member of the larger Christian Or-
thodox world, the Orthodox oikoumene that had already begun to replace 
the soon- to-be-defunct po liti cal entity on the Bosporus, and as such, 
Moscow, in Patriarch Anthony’s view,  ought to remember and pray for 
the emperor. In a clear reference to the fi rst Christian emperor, Anthony 
argued that emperors had always been involved in defi ning orthodox doc-
trine over against misguided teachings. Th ough written within the context 
of ecclesiastical relations between Constantinople and the metropolitanate 
of Rus sia, Anthony’s letter off ers a succinct exposition of the imperial re-
sponsibility as defender of Orthodoxy.
Byzantine emperors had a long tradition as defenders and protectors of 
the faith dating back to the enshrined deeds of the fi rst Christian emperor, 
Constantine. Imperial proclamations in support of the early Ecumenical 
Councils make this role abundantly clear. Emperors  were generally required 
to profess their doctrinal orthodoxy at their coronation, the fi rst attes-
tation of such a profession being that of Anastasios I (491–518).2 Th e Byz-
antine emperors had the authority and right to call ecumenical councils 
and to enforce synodal and canonical decisions made by the Church. 
Further, emperors, most famously Justinian I (527–65) and Leo VI (886–
912), promulgated legislation that was directly related to the aff airs of the 
Church. Regarding issues of dogma, emperors  were expected to defend 
the Church against the encroachment of heresy. Th ough key concepts 
in the self- defi nition of the Christian Church, the constructs of heresy 
and orthodoxy  were not exclusive domains of the Byzantine Church but 
 were at work in creating and sustaining imperial ideology as well. In this 
paper, I suggest that the concept of “orthodoxy” was as much, if not more, 
impor tant to the po liti cal and cultural identity of Byzantium as to the 
defense of the proper teachings of the Christian faith. Th is “po liti cal or-
thodoxy,” especially from the eleventh  century onwards, became critical 
to Byzantine po liti cal identity in ways that it had not been in the earlier 
period.3
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Byzantine Po liti cal Th eory
Before defi ning what is meant by “po liti cal orthodoxy,” three relatively 
undisputed and rather prosaic observations about church and state in Byz-
antium are in order. First, Byzantium lacked detailed or systematic po liti cal 
treatises defi ning the theoretical foundations of its po liti cal legitimacy.4 
 Th ere was no constitution per se, nor did any  great thinker produce the 
equivalent of a City of God as Augustine had done in the West. Rather, in 
the East it was politics as usual. Th at is, the imperial offi  ce (and its holder) 
was the justifi cation for and the  legal basis of the Byzantine po liti cal ma-
chinery. Even the dynastic princi ple, though at times operative during the 
history of Byzantium, was unnecessary to validate authority. Imperial le-
gitimacy rested primarily on the imperial offi  ce itself, and whoever held 
the offi  ce of emperor held absolute authority.
Second, the Byzantine emperor played a signifi cant role in the life of 
the Byzantine Church. Th e emperor possessed longstanding privileges: 
He presided at Church councils and gave them the weight of civic (impe-
rial) law; he could formulate rules for the proper governing of the eccle-
siastical hierarchy; and he had the right to be involved in the election of 
bishops to vacant sees as well as to initiate episcopal transfers, most signi-
fi cantly that of the see of Constantinople. His right to appoint and re-
move the patriarch of Constantinople was never seriously challenged. In 
addition, he held lesser (perhaps merely symbolic) liturgical rights: He 
could cense the altar in Hagia Sophia as well as the tombs in the Church 
of the Holy Apostles; he could preach on certain occasions; he could com-
mune himself (at the very least, on the day of his consecration); and as 
affi  rmed in the well- known Canon 69 of the Council in Trullo (690–91), 
he was the only layman who was offi  cially allowed in the bema of a church 
(thysiasterion).5
Th ird, the bound aries between church and state  were blurred. Although 
employing  these two institutional identities (i.e., church and state) already 
prejudices the discussion, divisions between or harmony among the spiri-
tual and the temporal, the hierosyne and basileia, and the kingdom of heaven 
and the po liti cal oikoumene, continuously informed the history of Byzan-
tium. It is wrong to assume that Byzantine society did not recognize dif-
ferences between church and state; the two often came into confl ict. Yet 
to set up the two in opposition to each other already introduces into the 
discussion preconceived ideas of the “theory of the two powers” that was 
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prevalent in the West from Pope Gelasius onwards but failed to make solid 
inroads in the East.6
Th is is not the place to address the question of Byzantine caesaropapism. 
How one views Byzantium and the role of its emperor in the life of the 
Church is often related to the observer’s own po liti cal and ecclesial 
views.  Whether Byzantium was or was not caesaropapist is of no import 
for the pres ent discussion.  Whether we view Byzantine society as the best 
pos si ble combination of the two powers— the symphonia or harmony of the 
priestly and imperial powers in the language of Justinian’s sixth novella—
or as the Church surrendering to worldly authority,  there can be no doubt 
that civic and religious life in Byzantium  were intertwined.
Th e Byzantine Church absorbed the legacy of Constantine in a variety 
of ways. Th roughout its millennial existence within the po liti cal orbit 
of the Roman Empire, the Church dealt often in a realpolitik approach to 
the challenges that imperial authority posed. At times, concessions or af-
fi liations granted to the imperium raised the ire of many a Church leader 
and observer. At other times, the Church of Constantinople was more than 
willing to pursue a policy of accommodation  toward imperial authority as 
long as it furthered the goals of the Church. In one area, however— that 
of po liti cal orthodoxy— imperial and ecclesial authorities joined forces in 
both policy and rhe toric. Defi ning the message and the language appro-
priate for the expression of the Christian gospel was as old as the evangeli-
cal message itself. What was new from Constantine onwards was the 
involvement of the state in this pro cess. Constantine set the pre ce dent and 
it continued down to the end of the empire. Within this relationship 
between the state and the Church that tran spired over centuries and as 
Byzantine ecclesial identity and doctrinal content  were being defi ned, 
 there emerged not only the defi nition of orthodoxy but the utilization of this 
construct for po liti cal purposes. Po liti cal orthodoxy describes the adoption 
and defense of orthodox dogma as well as the cultural and po liti cal iden-
tity that helped to defi ne it. As a construct, po liti cal orthodoxy diff ers from 
“po liti cal theology” or “po liti cal Chris tian ity”— the former referring in gen-
eral to the adoption of Chris tian ity for po liti cal purposes (á la Constan-
tine) and the latter constructing a theological view to support po liti cal 
authority (á la Eusebius).7 Po liti cal orthodoxy moves beyond  these, though 
informed by both. Adhering to orthodox doctrine and practice, po liti cal 
orthodoxy expresses  these in terms of cultural and institutional identity. It 
places orthodoxy in the ser vice of defi ning oneself against someone  else. 
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Certainly the categories of heresy and orthodoxy had been  doing this kind 
of work for centuries. Po liti cal orthodoxy encompasses the defi nition of 
religious orthodoxy and places it in the ser vice of the larger emerging ethno- 
political identities of the Eastern Roman Empire. To defend orthodoxy is 
thus to defend  these identities as well.
Defender of Orthodoxy
In the fi rst half of the fi fteenth  century, Symeon, archbishop of Th essa-
loniki (1416–29), noted that the emperor held an ecclesiastical rank equiv-
alent to that of depotatos (deputatus) as well as the title of defender (defensor) 
of the Church.8 Both titles and the several privileges given to the emperor 
 were, according to Symeon, derived from the fact that the emperor at his 
coronation was anointed by the patriarch with chrism— that is, the same 
myron used in baptism. Physical anointing of the Byzantine emperor was 
a late innovation, and can be attested with certainty only with the corona-
tion of John III Vatatzes in 1221, who was crowned Byzantine emperor at 
Nicaea.9 Th e Western infl uence of such anointing cannot be doubted. Yet 
the po liti cal real ity of the loss of the city of Constantinople a few years 
earlier to the Fourth Crusade, along with the breakup of the empire into 
three competing centers of authority (Trebizond, Epirus, and Nicaea), led 
to the diminishing of the po liti cal legitimacy of the imperial offi  ce. Th e 
use of chrism refl ects the increased authority of the Church, as does the 
addition, during the Palaiologan period, of a profession of faith and proc-
lamation by the emperor to defend the Church.10
As protector and defender of the Church, the function of the emperor 
was well defi ned and had a long history. Justinian placed the following edict 
at the beginning of his codifi cation of law:
It is our  will that all  peoples who are ruled by the administration of 
Our Clemency  shall practice that religion which the divine Peter the 
apostle transmitted to the Romans. . . .  We command that  those 
persons who follow this law  shall embrace the name of Catholic 
Christians. Th e rest, however, whom we judge demented and in-
sane,  shall sustain the infamy attached to heretical dogmas.11
Th is imperial responsibility is repeated again and again in our sources, per-
haps most famously by Photios in the second title of the Epanagoge, a law 
book published in 886 that served as an introduction to the late ninth- century 
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comprehensive collection of laws known as the Basilika. Photios writes, 
“Th e emperor is presumed to enforce and maintain, fi rst and foremost, all 
that is set out in the divine scriptures; then the doctrines laid down by the 
seven holy Councils.”12 Th e role of defender of the faith is refl ected more 
dramatically by the actions of Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081–118). In 
the second year of his reign, in March 1082, Alexios timed the condemna-
tion of John Italos, head of the school of philosophy in the imperial capi-
tal, to coincide with the Feast of Orthodoxy, which was celebrated each 
year on the fi rst Sunday of Lent.13 Th e Feast of Orthodoxy celebrated the 
fi nal victory of Orthodoxy over Iconoclasm that had occurred in 843. Each 
year on this feast day the Synodikon of Orthodoxy was read out. Th e Syno-
dikon, a quasiliturgical/canonical text that affi  rmed the reinstatement and 
veneration of images, had remained substantially unaltered. Alexios 
changed all this, and added to the Synodikon anathemas against Italos for 
his apparent philosophical musings that did not sit well with ecclesiastical 
authorities. Th e condemnation of Italos and the reading of the anathemas 
against him on the Feast of Orthodoxy transformed the traditional role of 
the Synodikon. From Alexios’s time onwards, additions to the Synodikon 
would continue to be made. Th e Synodikon no longer remained identifi ed 
with the victory over Iconoclasm but was now seen as “an authoritative 
statement of orthodoxy.”14 Alexios’s expanded role as defender of ortho-
doxy would be repeated throughout the remainder of the empire.15
Th e imperial defense of doctrinal orthodoxy did not necessarily trans-
late into recognition of a par tic u lar emperor’s sanctity. It is true that all 
the emperors of Constantinople who convened an ecumenical council are 
commemorated in the tenth- century Synaxarion of Constantinople. Th is 
does not mean, as Hippolytus Delehaye noted over a  century ago, that in-
clusion in the Synaxarion, an offi  cial collection of brief notices of saints 
commemorated in the liturgical calendar in Constantinople, was equiva-
lent to recognition of sanctity.16 Interestingly, the majority of the imperial 
recognitions made in the Synaxarion do not use the adjective hagios or ha-
gia, but rather rely on formula that make reference to an individual’s piety 
(most often using the word eusebia [εὐσέβια]). Several augusta show up as 
well (Flacilla Eudokia; Pulcheria; Ariadne, the wife of Zeno (and  later An-
astasios); Th eodora, the wife of Justinian). With the exception of the 
saintly Th eophano, the fi rst wife of Leo VI, and Constantine and his 
 mother Helena, the Synaxarion of Constantinople is cautious in acknowl-
edging the sanctity of imperial offi  ce holders. Th is may have more to do 
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with a broader view of what it means to “remember” the pious monastic, 
the steadfast martyr, the  great theologian, or the eff ective emperor. Th e 
“memory” (mnēmē) is what is called upon; and remembrance does not 
necessarily equate with sanctity. Yet, it is signifi cant that the Synaxarion 
remembers only  those emperors who  were defenders or supporters of 
orthodoxy; conspicuously, and not surprisingly, absent are the seventh- 
century emperors associated with monotheletism and  those of the Icono-
clastic period.
Po liti cal Orthodoxy
Th e task of defi ning and defending religious orthodoxy continued to oc-
cupy a variety of constituencies in Byzantine society. Yet it was in the wake 
of a series of po liti cal, ecclesiastical, and military crises that the understand-
ing in Byzantium of the role of orthodoxy shifted. With the exception of 
the Palamite controversy of the mid- fourteenth  century, the fundamental 
doctrinal content of orthodoxy had not changed since the conclusive re-
buttal of Iconoclasm. Yet, we can point to three major catastrophes that 
required responses: schism with Rome in the eleventh  century; the arrival 
and settlement of Turks in Asia Minor (the Seljuks at the end of the elev-
enth  century, followed by the Ottomans at the beginning of the  fourteenth); 
and the eastward extension of Western feudal power, culminating in the 
sack of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade. All of this provided 
the context for a reevaluation of the function of “orthodoxy.” Most dramati-
cally the Fourth Crusade fragmented the empire into several competing 
centers of authority: Th e Empire of Nicaea, the Despotate of Epiros, and 
the Empire of Trebizond each tried to fi ll the po liti cal void created in the 
aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. Although the Empire of Nicaea regained 
the imperial capital in 1261, the po liti cal fragmentation of Byzantium 
proved irreversible.
It was the period from 1261  until the fall of Constantinople to the 
Ottoman Turks in 1453, known as the Palaiologan period, that witnessed 
a subtle but signifi cant shift in the self- consciousness of the Byzantines. 
Th is fi nal period of Byzantine history is characterized by an odd combina-
tion of territorial and po liti cal disintegration in parallel with a cultural re-
vival in art and lit er a ture. Th e imperial offi  ce survived and continued its 
ideological claims to the Roman imperium. For many of the Palaiologan 
emperors, the only pos si ble chance for survival was better diplomatic, 
 P o  l i t i  c a l  O rt h o d ox y  i n  B y z a n t i u m  225
153-66040_ch01_3P.indd   225 9/16/16   11:59 AM
commercial, and ecclesiastical relations with Western powers, which were 
realized in three ways: increased economic advantages given to Italian com-
mercial fl eets; ecclesiastical reunion with the papacy (the reunion councils 
of Lyons in 1274 and Florence in 1438–39 are the most tangible expres-
sions of this policy); and military assistance from Western armies. One of 
the results of this westward- looking policy was an intense debate among 
intellectuals, churchmen, and  others about what constituted their own po-
liti cal, cultural, and religious identity. It is during this time that the no-
tion of po liti cal orthodoxy emerges defi nitively in opposition to the West 
and the irreversible Ottoman expansion.
Coinciding with this new understanding of “orthodoxy,” and  under its 
infl uence, was the fl ourishing of Hellenic paideia that occurred during the 
Palaiologan period. Th e fl owering of cultural Hellenism at this time par-
alleled a new understanding of what it meant to be a Hellene. Th e term 
“Hellene” was now being used in varying frequency to refer to the eastern 
Roman population. Th e threat posed by the Latins and the Turks was 
not simply territorial but cultural. By this time, the Byzantines had suffi  cient 
experience living  under both Turks and Latins, and although both might 
allow for the continuation of Byzantine culture,  there was intense pressure 
(economic and personal) to adopt the culture of the overlords. It is in this 
context that the Byzantines reasserted their identity in terms of the ancient 
Greeks and an expanded understanding of orthodoxy. Although the con-
cept of orthodoxy had been around since the earliest days of the empire, 
it was now being used as a cultural and national marker of identity.17
At the twilight of the Byzantine Empire, po liti cal orthodoxy, once the 
sole purview of imperial leadership, had found a home among opponents 
of ecclesiastical reunion with the Latin Church. Both the pro- and anti- 
unionist camps had accepted it as well, though it does seem that the anti- 
unionists  were more inclined to adopt it. Th e ardent fi fteenth- century 
pro- unionist John Argyropoulos referred to his con temporary Constantine 
XI, who, unknown to Argyropoulos at the time, would be the last emperor 
of Byzantium, as the God- appointed “emperor of the Hellenes” and con-
sidered him the defender of “the freedom of the Hellenes.”18 Yet, unsur-
prisingly, the pro- unionist Argyropoulos never makes use of the adjective 
“orthodox” nor of its derivative noun “orthodoxy.” For pro- unionist Byz-
antines it was the ancient Hellenes and not Byzantium’s Orthodox Chris-
tian roots that provided for a new self- defi nition.
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It was the opponents of reunion with the Roman Church who elevated 
the construct of orthodoxy to the level of a self- conscious marker of iden-
tity in contrast to the heretical West. One of the earliest examples of this 
comes from the pen of Germanos II, patriarch of Constantinople in exile 
at Nicaea (1223–40) and a strict anti- unionist. In several of his letters to 
Latin ecclesiastical leaders, Germanos identifi es his Orthodox fl ock with 
 those Graikoi (Γραικοί) living both within and outside of the Nicaean Em-
pire.19 Joseph Byrennios, a monk and fervent anti- unionist, while address-
ing a synod in Constantinople in the year 1412, stated that Orthodoxy 
“is our riches, it is our past glory, it is our nation.”20 For Byrennios, the 
Byzantines  were an “Orthodox race (τὸ ὀρθόδοξον γένοι).”21 Orthodoxy 
had now become a marker of national or po liti cal identity.
Orthodoxy was not only defi ned in relation to the Latin West. Isidore 
Glabas, twice metropolitan of Th essaloniki during the last two de cades of 
the  fourteenth  century, witnessed fi rsthand the challenges Orthodox Chris-
tians faced living  under Ottoman rule. In 1387 he traveled to Asia Minor to 
negotiate a po liti cal treaty with the Turks on behalf of the empire. He 
encouraged the Christians he met with the following words: “Let us be 
sure above all, my  brothers, that with all our energy and power we keep 
Orthodoxy unstained, even if it be necessary to this end that our worldly 
wealth be dissipated, our country enslaved, our limbs mutilated, our bod-
ies tortured, our lives violently extinguished. Let us endure all this with 
joy if it means that our fl awless religion be not betrayed.”22
Doukas, who composed a history of the Empire covering the period 
from 1341 to 1462, reports how George Scholarios, the onetime pro- unionist 
turned staunch anti- unionist, responded to the Council of Florence. In his 
description of the reception of the Greek del e ga tion upon its return to 
Constantinople from Florence, Doukas describes how the anti- unionists 
visited the cell of George Scholarios, who had now become the monk 
Gennadios. Th e group asked Gennadios how they should react to the  union 
proclaimed at Florence. Gennadios penned his response and placed it on 
the door of his cell. According to Doukas, the note read: “Wretched Ro-
mans, how you have gone astray! You have rejected the hope of God and 
trusted in the strength of the Franks; you have lost your piety, along with 
your city which is about to be destroyed.” Doukas continues his narrative: 
“Th en all the nuns, who believed themselves to be pure and dedicated ser-
vants of God in Orthodoxy, in accordance with their own sentiments and 
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that of their teacher Gennadios, cried out the anathema, and along with 
them the abbots and confessors and the remaining priests and laymen.”23
An odd shift has taken place. It is generally agreed by historians of Byz-
antium that the authority and prestige of the patriarch of Constantinople 
reached its zenith during the Palaiologan period— that is, from the recap-
ture of Constantinople from the Latins in 1261 to the fall of the city in 
1453. As the po liti cal stature of the Byzantine Empire and its emperor 
diminished, the importance and authority of the patriarch expanded. 
Demographically, more Orthodox Christians  were  under the ecclesial ju-
risdiction of Constantinople than  were  under the po liti cal control of the 
Byzantine emperor. It was no longer enough for the emperor simply to be 
a defender of orthodox doctrine; his prestige needed a boost, so he was now 
to be seen as the defender of po liti cal orthodoxy. Th e Roman imperium, 
by all mea sures except rhe toric, was dead. It was in need of a redefi nition. 
Th e imperium was the protector of Orthodoxy: a concept that signifi ed not 
only a theological body of doctrine, but a cultural expression of Chris tian-
ity that was neither Latin nor barbaric. It was neither Western nor  Middle 
Eastern. It was not Roman Catholic, nor was it Islamic. It was Orthodoxy. 
Po liti cal orthodoxy was born within the cultural revival and theological 
fl owering that occurred within the context of the Palaiologan dynasty and 
amid the po liti cal upheaval that would signify the end of the empire.
Conclusion
For Byzantine society prior to 1204, “orthodoxy” primarily referred to ad-
herence to a set of dogmatic beliefs and religious practices. During the 
period between the end of Iconoclasm and the Fourth Crusade, this “reli-
gious orthodoxy” began to expand as a concept to include cultural iden-
tity in addition. Th e Komnenian dynasty, especially  under Alexios I, helped 
direct this development as it continued its employment of “orthodoxy” 
in aid of the state. Th e shift from “religious orthodoxy” to “po liti cal or-
thodoxy” is most dramatic during the fi nal two centuries of Byzantium. 
Yet the move was never fully complete. For some, “orthodoxy” remained 
a referent to the pristine expression of the person of Christ, his message of 
salvation, and the manner in which one should worship him. For  others, 
“orthodoxy” was a po liti cal orientation as well. Patriarch Anthony’s claim 
that one cannot have a Church without an emperor has less to do with tra-
ditional religious orthodoxy than it does with a new self- defi nition of 
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Christian Byzantine (Roman) identity. Th e fall of Byzantium was one of 
many moments in the complicated history of Byzantine “orthodoxy” which 
served as a catalyst for the further development of po liti cal orthodoxy. In 
fact, the transition from pristine Christian orthodoxy to po liti cal ortho-
doxy continued  after 1453, and found a permanent home among the 
Orthodox faithful  under Ottoman rule.
Po liti cal orthodoxy, therefore, was a marker of identity that developed 
at a time when the very po liti cal and cultural foundations of Byzantium 
 were threatened by forces that  were not Orthodox. Orthodoxy, as a con-
struct vis- à- vis heterodoxy, was as old as Chris tian ity itself; and Byzantine 
Chris tian ity was never able to divorce itself from this real ity. For the 
Byzantines and their identity, po liti cal orthodoxy comes into focus in 
the de cades following the end of Iconoclasm, not as some scholars have 
argued in response to the internal Orthodox debate over Iconoclasm, but 
in response to the Latin West. It gained fuel in the eleventh- century dis-
tancing of the two churches; it was defended by the faithful Komnenian 
emperors; it became more prominent following the catastrophe of the 
Fourth Crusade; and it became entrenched in the anti- unionist responses 
to the pro- Latin ecclesiastical policies of the Palaiologans. It was the po liti-
cal failure of the Byzantines to reassert their once- great imperial authority 
and prestige among their neighbors that caused a reassessment of their 
own identity. Orthodoxy provided the Byzantines with an identity that, 
although extending beyond the shrinking po liti cal bound aries of Roma-
nia, was in need of the cultural and po liti cal legacy that Byzantium had 
imparted to the Church. Po liti cal orthodoxy is the culmination of a long 
pro cess of self- identity set in motion by the actions of and reactions to the 
fi rst Christian emperor.
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Roman Catholicism and Democracy: 
The Postconciliar Era
J. Bryan Hehir
The goal of this essay is to provide a synthetic statement of the understanding of democracy in the Roman Catholic Church  after 
Vatican II. Th is  will be achieved in two stages: fi rst, some background 
information to elucidate the state of the question before the Council; sec-
ond, an examination of (1) the Conciliar era, (2) the pontifi cate of John 
Paul II (1978–2005), and (3) the pontifi cate of Benedict XVI (2005–13).1
A Clash of Cultures: Catholicism and Democracy
If one takes the quite diff er ent examples of the American and French Rev-
olutions as a baseline for the establishment of modern democracy, then the 
relevant religious background for this essay stretches from the responses 
of Pope Gregory XVI (1831–46) and Pius IX (1846–78) to that of Pius XII 
(1939–58). Th e story has been told often, well, and in  great detail by his-
torians and theologians. Th e purpose  here is simply to harvest from their 
work, and sketch a complex narrative.2
Th e journey from Gregory XVI’s description of the modern liberties, 
upon which democracy is based, as “utter madness,” to Pius XII’s careful 
but clear endorsement of democracy in 1944 is not easily summarized. One 
persuasive account by Paolo G. Carozza and Daniel Philpottl argues for a 
long, slow pro cess of convergence, which always (even  today) produces sub-
stantial, but limited, agreement about the po liti cal order.3 A second ac-
count, which has achieved among scholars the status of a classic, is the more 
detailed analy sis of John Courtney Murray, SJ, who provides a lucid sense 
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of how confl icted the pro cess of convergence was within the Church and 
in the po liti cal world.4 Th e two accounts need not be counterpointed; the 
fi rst is a broad-brush, but careful narrative; the second, a close reading of 
texts reaching  until the decisive moment of Vatican II. Murray’s interpretive 
essays used a multidimensional analy sis of Church teaching to explain that 
what Gregory XVI condemned is not what Vatican II endorsed even though 
both  were addressing what they understood demo cratic freedoms to mean. 
In the nineteenth  century, the papacy encountered a two- dimensional 
threat. First, a philosophical position (Liberalism in its Eu ro pean model) 
and second, a po liti cal movement designed to force the Catholic Church 
(along with the Ancien Régime) out of the po liti cal pro cess. Neither 
Gregory XVI nor Pius IX saw any room for convergence or compromise 
with  either of  these threats, and they reacted by launching a frontal assault 
on both, and then withdrawing the Church  behind the fortress of the 
Vatican.
Th e last pope of the nineteenth  century, Leo XIII (1878–1903), shared 
some of the premises of his pre de ces sors, but he did not push them to the 
same conclusions. In Murray’s account Leo is the transitional fi gure in the 
narrative; he did not achieve convergence, but he did open the door to de-
velopments that he neither  imagined nor achieved. Indeed, it is arguable 
that Murray saw openings in Leo’s extensive corpus of po liti cal writings that 
Leo himself did not see.5 Leo XIII recognized that, by the late nineteenth 
 century, the Church had been backed into a corner with no exit and rapidly 
declining infl uence in its primary area of concern— the Eu ro pean state 
system. Th e imprisonment was partially coerced and partially chosen. Leo 
had more confi dence in the intellectual resources of Catholicism than 
his immediate pre de ces sors;6 he was committed also to playing a vigorous 
diplomatic role, even with limited possibilities of success. Murray depicts 
Leo as engaging his surroundings at the philosophical level and the po liti-
cal level si mul ta neously. Leo XIII died  after a long pontifi cate, but with a 
very unfi nished agenda. He created space for the Church to assert itself in 
a changing po liti cal context, but his successors  were not prepared to carry 
the pro cess of development forward. Th e term of the pro cess Leo began 
arrived only with the pontifi cate of Pius XII.
Like Leo XIII, Pius XII was a conservative intellectual diplomat, deter-
mined to provide the Church with a voice and status in the world of states. 
For both of them, it is necessary to distinguish their view of Liberalism as 
a philosophical position and democracy as a po liti cal regime. Convergence 
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with Liberalism has always been a limited enterprise for Catholicism; con-
vergence with democracy, at least the Anglo- American version of it, was 
simpler and more promising. Th e disagreements with Liberalism— even 
recognizing that this philosophy has a pluralism of expressions— have 
been deep and substantial. Th ey include a conception of the  human per-
son (less autonomous and more social in the Catholic view) in the under-
standing of society (less contractual, more organic), in jurisprudence (rooted 
in Natu ral Law), and in a more expansive, normative role for the state and 
civil law.7
In spite of continuing tension with advocates of Liberalism during the 
pontifi cate of Pius XII and his successors, Catholic teaching on democ-
racy,  after World War II, exhibited a search for common ground and ex-
pressions of moral support. Th is shift from the nineteenth  century was the 
result not only of changing ideas, but also current events. A Church that 
had often been not uncomfortable with authoritarian regimes found itself 
faced, in the 1930s, with totalitarian regimes, in whose view the Church 
was as much an adversary as the Liberals. Th is experience was a principal 
ele ment in determining the Church’s postwar diplomatic position and 
eventually its reexamination of democracy. Pius XII, whose entire priest-
hood was spent in the Vatican diplomatic ser vice, and whose teaching built 
upon Leo XIII’s opening and went beyond it, is a unique case study in the 
evolution of the Holy See’s theology and diplomacy. In his diplomatic ser-
vice as nuncio to Germany and then secretary of state for Pope Pius XI, 
then- Cardinal Pacelli was a brilliant, but not innovative, representative of 
Vatican diplomacy.8 Neither Liberalism nor democracy  were aspects of his 
statecraft. Elected to the papacy on the threshold of World War II, Pacelli— 
now Pope Pius XII— moved Catholic social teaching, during the war and 
during the Cold War, decisively in the direction of support for  human 
rights and recognition of the merits of democracy and the rule of law. Th e 
clearest example of the changing dynamic in Catholic social teaching was 
his 1944 Christmas Address. During the period from 1939–45, the pope 
used his traditional Christmas Address— a teaching document, not a li-
turgical homily—to outline the Holy See’s position on the postwar inter-
national order.  After a  century of the Church treating democracy as at least 
suspect, Pius XII dedicated this address to an examination of the require-
ments of demo cratic governance and an affi  rmation of its value. Th e ad-
dress focused primarily on the role citizens should play in infl uencing the 
shape of civil society. It also acknowledged the Church’s standard position 
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that multiple forms of government can exist. But then he turned the ad-
dress from the citizenry to the structure of the state:
If then, we consider the extent and nature of the sacrifi ces demanded 
of all citizens especially in our day when the activity of the state is so 
vast and decisive, the demo cratic form of government appears to 
many as a postulate of nature imposed by reason itself.9
Th e fi nal phrase is the decisive statement in the address: “A postulate of 
nature imposed by reason” is the archaic, but recognizable language of 
Natu ral Law, the Holy See’s substantive discourse in its  century- long de-
bate with Liberalism, the “modern liberties,” and, to some degree, forms 
of democracy. Natu ral Law discourse used rational refl ection on  human 
nature and  human experience to derive moral norms for  human be hav ior 
and  human institutions like the state, society, and the economy. As is its 
typical style, when the Holy See is about to alter its public stance on a topic, 
the appeal  here is to say that democracy “appears to many” as a demand of 
reason. Th is is beyond Leo XIII’s teaching, but a less forceful endorsement 
than we  will fi nd in John XXIII, Vatican II, and the postconciliar teach-
ing of John Paul II and Benedict XVI, but it is the basic turning point for 
Catholicism and democracy.
Th e Conciliar Era
Th e Second Vatican Council ran from October 1962 to December 1965. 
In this section, while focusing on two documents of the council, Dignitatis 
Humanae (Th e Declaration on Religious Freedom) of 1965 and Gaudium et 
Spes (Th e Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World) of 
1965, I also include the 1963 papal encyclical Pacem in Terris. Collectively, 
 these documents provide an understanding of the relationship of Catholi-
cism to the idea and institutions of democracy in the 1960s and 1970s.
John XXIII convoked Vatican II and promulgated Pacem in Terris. 
While he did not live to see the two major documents of the council about 
the Church’s public role, his encyclical and his basic posture of promoting 
a dialogue with the modern world  were foundational for the council’s work. 
Th e encyclical Pacem in Terris was a deeply personal initiative of John XXIII 
in the last months of his life. Working with his close collaborator, Msgr. 
Pietro Pavan of the Lateran University, the pope wrote this text about peace 
in the nuclear age as a response to the Cuban Missile Crisis, which had 
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occurred just as Vatican II opened in Rome. While the encyclical was a 
clarion call for diplomacy rather than war, the pope’s basic theme was that 
peace could be achieved and guaranteed only if the rights and duties of 
persons and states  were respected and promoted. His opening sentence set 
the theme for the encyclical: “Peace on earth, which all men of  every era 
have most eagerly yearned for, can be fi rmly established only if the order 
laid down by God be dutifully observed.”10 Th at order, the letter asserted, 
can be understood principally in terms of a fabric of rights and duties that 
structure and shape the national and international common good.
Pacem in Terris was both thoroughly traditional in substance and fully 
con temporary in tone. Th e language of the letter was drawn directly from 
the Natu ral Law tradition. Th e theme of order, however, allowed the clas-
sical ideas to be understood in a relational, personalistic, and historically 
con temporary fashion. Without ever articulating this goal explic itly, John 
XXIII’s interpretation of Natu ral Law was designed in part to narrow the 
gap between the centuries- old argument of Natu ral Law and Natu ral 
Rights phi los o phers. Rather than rehearse that real and signifi cant divide, 
the encyclical focused on analyzing a modern conception of  human rights 
that owed its heritage to both traditions of discourse. Th e papal letter en-
dorsed the spectrum of rights found in the United Nations Declaration 
on  Human Rights (1948) and the subsequent implementing documents. 
Th e entire tone of the letter sought to build bridges (between the Church 
and the world, and between East and West) rather than walls, in the con-
text of the still- tense and dangerous atmosphere of the Cold War.
A bridge of some intellectual understanding with Liberalism was pos si-
ble in terms of  human rights, but even with this strip of common ground 
as a mediating discourse,  there remained substantial diff erences between 
Catholic teaching and Liberalism. Regarding democracy, the possibility ex-
isted for more substantial convergence between Catholic social thought 
and demo cratic polity. In his extensive and detailed essay, “Catholicism and 
Liberal Democracy,” Prince ton University Professor Paul Sigmund identifi ed 
Pacem in Terris as a unique text in paving the way for Vatican II’s endorse-
ment of the right to religious freedom and, beyond this, to democracy. 
Sigmund points to the encyclical’s assertion that, “the dignity of the  human 
person involved the right to take an active part in public aff airs and to con-
tribute one’s part to the other common good of the citizens.”11 Like other 
statements in Pacem in Terris, this support for democracy is expressed in 
general terms rather than a clear endorsement, but the encyclical’s princi-
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ples became the foundation for the council’s endorsement of both the right 
to religious freedom and demo cratic polity.
Vatican II produced sixteen major documents, covering both the inter-
nal life of the Church and its relationships to other religious traditions and 
to the secular world. Th e two texts that are pertinent to this chapter are 
Dignitatis Humanae and Gaudium et Spes. Th ey share some secular themes, 
but diff er in style and character. Dignitatis Humanae has a single, impor-
tant purpose and stands as a culminating moment in the long debate in 
Catholicism about the meaning of religious freedom. Th e precise objec-
tive of the declaration is stated in its second paragraph: “Th is Vatican Synod 
declares that the  human person has a right to religious freedom . . .  [and] 
that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of 
the  human person, as this dignity is known through the revealed Word of 
God and by reason itself.”12 Th is  simple, direct affi  rmation of a basic  human 
right took centuries of argument to fi nd its place in the social teaching of 
Catholicism. Some serious opposition to it was sustained throughout the 
fi rst three years of Vatican II. To affi  rm this right, however, was to pre-
sume that it should be honored in any specifi c form of government or pol-
ity. So the question for this chapter remains: What is the relationship of 
the conciliar declaration to demo cratic polity?
In answer to this question, Fr. Murray, the principal drafter of the dec-
laration, is uniquely helpful. In commentaries  after the council, Murray 
argued that the affi  rmation of a right to religious freedom was in part 
the Church’s response to two broad themes of modern life: the  human 
person’s rising sense of po liti cal consciousness, and the desire of citizens to 
live  under a government limited by law and re spect for  human rights.13 
While  these characteristics of civil society (also noted in Pacem in Terris) 
are themes rather than specifi c arguments, Murray also pointed to the sub-
stantive fact that Pius XII and John XXIII had endorsed the concept of 
the “constitutional state,” in a more limited understanding of the power 
and rights of the state than had characterized Catholic teaching through 
the pontifi cate of Leo XIII.14
 Th ere are diff er ent ways to defi ne democracy, but an essential compo-
nent is a  legal system that defi nes the state’s powers and sets precise limits. 
Within this structure,  human rights are central concepts: “Th e protection 
and promotion of the inviolable rights of man ranks among the essential 
duties of government; therefore, government is to assume the safeguard of 
the religious freedom of all its citizens in an eff ective manner by just laws 
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and by other appropriate means.”15 In clarifying the Catholic Church’s po-
sition on democracy, the conciliar declaration relies in its argument for 
religious freedom on characteristics of government that are central aspects 
of democracy.
Th e companion text from Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes, is a lengthy re-
fl ection on a broader question than religious freedom. It is the theme, as 
ancient as Augustine, of the relationship of the Church to the world. Th e 
“world”  here can mean its po liti cal, intellectual,  legal, scientifi c, or economic 
dimensions. Gaudium et Spes has a distinctive place in Catholic social 
thought: It builds on the tradition, but it is more explic itly theological; it 
also reframes questions (such as war and peace) in new ways. Sigmund 
rightly argues that in its treatment of democracy, it builds on Pacem in Ter-
ris, but is even more explicit in its endorsement of this polity. Again, Sig-
mund identifi es a section of Gaudium et Spes that he calls a “formal 
commitment of Catholicism to democracy”:
It is in full accord with  human nature that judicial- political struc-
tures should, with even better success and without any discrimina-
tion, aff ord all the citizens the chance to participate freely and actively 
in establishing the constitutional bases of a po liti cal community, 
governing the state, determining the scope and purpose of vari ous 
institutions, and choosing leaders.16
In interpreting  these conciliar texts elsewhere, I have argued that it is not 
only the conceptual support for democracy and  human rights that is the 
mea sure of Catholic commitment to both, but also the public engagement 
of the Church, from the papacy to the parish, national episcopal confer-
ences, religious  orders, and lay Catholics, within countries and in interna-
tional forums, that illustrates the contrast between the nineteenth  century 
and our own time.17 John Paul II’s ministry was a unique testimony to the 
bond linking the Church to democracy.
John Paul II
In his pontifi cate of twenty- seven years, John Paul II enhanced Catholic 
social teaching and the Church’s public role in a far- reaching fashion. His 
impact involved both words and deeds: What he did and what he refused 
to do, what he said and how he said it, made a  great diff erence. In all of 
his social teaching, he was at pains to stress continuity with the words of 
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his pre de ces sors. But John Paul II also moved Catholic social thought to 
new frontiers, by word and deed. Th e reasons for his impact  were multi-
dimensional: First, he was a professional phi los o pher who always extended 
his refl ections to a philosophical- theological contribution; second, the fact 
that he was a citizen, a priest, and a bishop in a communist state, with a 
command economy and few po liti cal freedoms, gave his teaching a unique 
perspective and power; third, he played an acclaimed role in the collapse 
of communism; fourth, he never confi ned his social critique only to Eu rope, 
communism, and Western democracies; rather, he focused substantially 
also on the fate and  future of the Global South.18 To illustrate his contri-
bution to  human rights and democracy, I  will refer to three texts: his two 
addresses to the United Nation (of 1979 and 1995) and his encyclical Cen-
tesimus Annus (1991).
Pope John Paul II was twice invited to address the General Assembly of 
the United Nations and did so with a profound sense that he was before 
what the Yale historian Paul Kennedy has called “Th e Parliament of Man.”19 
His two addresses spanned the collapse of the Cold War. Neither address 
was specifi cally focused on democracy, but both  were relevant to the theme. 
Th e 1979 address was dedicated to a refl ection on the United Nations, the 
UN Declaration of  Human Rights, and the Holy See’s collaboration with 
the United Nations. Th e address served to set the direction of John Paul’s 
pontifi cate in making the defense of  human rights a programmatic theme 
of his ministry. Th e pope did not directly address the topic of democracy. 
His comment on po liti cal systems was pitched at a higher level: “It is a question 
of the highest importance that in internal social life, as well as in interna-
tional life, all  human beings in  every nation and country should be able to 
enjoy eff ectively  these full rights  under any po liti cal regime or system.”20 
In this address, and in other forms of teaching, John Paul made his case 
that the right to religious freedom should have a unique signifi cance and 
protection  because it served as a foundation for other rights.
Th e relationship of democracy and  human rights is a topic that extends 
beyond the bounds of religious discourse;  human rights as moral claims, 
based on  human dignity and having, therefore, universal validity, are a test 
for any po liti cal regime.  Th ere are certainly arguments made on a norma-
tive and empirical basis that democracy provides the most secure po liti cal 
context for the protection and promotion of  human rights. John Paul did 
not make this case. In this early address to the question, he stressed the uni-
versality of  human rights, argued that they needed a solid philosophical 
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foundation, and then provided an original exposition about how the “two 
kinds” of rights found in the UN Declaration and in its implementing 
covenants should be understood.
Th is latter question sounds very theoretical, but in fact was a dividing 
line at the United Nations throughout the Cold War. Some Western voices 
argued that only political- civil rights are truly rights, whereas socio- 
economic rights are  human needs, but should not be given the status of 
rights. Voices from the Communist states, and also Western voices, argued 
for equality in the status of rights. John Paul entered this po liti cal thicket 
by redefi ning the rights debate by speaking of spiritual and material goods. 
He clearly held to the position that both claims to rights  were valid, but 
he moved beyond that debate to argue that spiritual goods and the rights 
to them should be given priority.21 His argument was that spiritual goods 
are not limited and do not lead to confl ict about how many  people seek 
to possess them. Material goods by defi nition are limited in supply; they 
are surely necessary, but pursuit of them is more likely to lead to confl ict 
in society. It is impor tant to stress that the pope’s overarching argument is 
that both kinds of rights are necessary in  every society. Th e 1979 address 
was highly regarded as a clarion call to protect  human dignity and to com-
mit the members of the United Nations to implementation of the Decla-
ration of 1948.
When John Paul II returned to the UN General Assembly in 1995 for 
the observance of the fi ftieth anniversary of the United Nations Charter, 
he consciously developed his speech as a complement to the 1979 address. 
Th en he spoke of the urgency to protect and promote the rights of the 
person in society. In 1995 he focused on the rights of nations, arguing that 
too  little attention has been devoted to this theme. In a sense, the second 
address was a plea for a balanced view of nationalism. As a citizen of Po-
land, his voice carried special resonance in this argument. Th e pope was 
careful to acknowledge that nationalism has been an explosive idea in world 
politics, and he precisely noted that he was not arguing on a normative 
basis that  every national claim necessarily deserved the status of sover-
eignty.22 Neither UN address took up the idea of democracy directly, but 
both dealt with issues that can be argued to be prior to democracy. As noted 
above,  human rights provide the moral claims that can be used to give pref-
erence to democracy as a mode of governance. Th e rights of nations is a 
topic that cuts across the internal life of states and the relationship of states 
in the international order.
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Pope John Paul II did address democracy directly in the encyclical 
Centesimus Annus (1991), a text that surveyed a  century of papal social teach-
ing in light of the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War. By 
1991 John Paul II was a universally recognized leader of global signifi cance. 
Th is recognition was uniquely tied to his acknowledged role (in tandem 
with  others, to be sure) in bringing down the Communist order in Cen-
tral and Eastern Eu rope. So  there was widespread attention to the encycli-
cal of 1991, expected not only to celebrate a  century of social teaching, but 
also to off er refl ections on the collapse of communism. Other theories 
 were abroad in the world, tied principally to po liti cal, military, or eco-
nomic  factors. John Paul wove together distinct themes to account for the 
peaceful transition that ended the Cold War. He attributed the Commu-
nist failure, fi rst, to its distorted view of the  human person and the  human 
rights violations that followed; second, to its inability to meet  human 
economic needs; third, to the nonviolent opposition it faced from citizens; 
and fourth, to its atheistic orientation.23
Th e encyclical moved from a critique of communism to a narrative 
commentary about the Catholic vision of state, society, and culture. In 
this context, John Paul turned his attention to democracy. Strikingly, the 
title of the chapter was “State and Culture,” not State and Society, the 
more likely linkage used in a Western context. It quickly became evident, 
however, why the pope linked state and culture: It fi t his pervasive interest 
in analyzing the role of state.
Th e encyclical began its consideration of the state with the strongest ex-
plicit endorsement of democracy yet recorded in offi  cial Catholic teaching:
Th e Church values the demo cratic system inasmuch as it ensures the 
participation of citizens in making po liti cal choices, guarantees to the 
governed the possibility both of electing and holding accountable 
 those who govern them and of replacing them through peaceful 
means when appropriate.24
From Pius XII’s acknowl edgment that many believe democracy is a demand 
of nature, through Pacem in Terris’s thematic discussion of the ele ments of 
democracy, to the conciliar texts,  there was a clear direction to Catholic 
teaching: coming to terms with a form of governance that Catholicism had 
approached skeptically in the past. But the explicit endorsement of demo-
cracy by a pope from the East was a new marker in the Church’s social 
tradition. Quickly  after the statement just quoted, the encyclical began to 
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probe its meaning: “Au then tic democracy,” it said, is based on the rule of 
law and a correct conception of  human nature. Th en the step to culture 
was taken. In other places, I have written that the pope’s belief in the po-
liti cal ele ments of democracy is clear cut and certain. But equally clear  were 
his doubts about the cultural context often associated in the West with 
demo cracy. Th e critique was direct: “ Th ere is a tendency to claim that 
agnosticism and skeptical relativism are the philosophy and basic atti-
tude which correspond to demo cratic forms of po liti cal life.”25 Th e Pope 
expresses his awareness that in Western socie ties,  shaped by a secular con-
ception of the state and pluralistic fabric of society, much public discus-
sion and po liti cal commentary is premised on the idea of a “thin” theory 
of values a society should pursue. Th is idea may not be rooted in agnosti-
cism or atheism, but in a belief that deeply rooted convictions about 
what constitutes “the good society” make consensus about law and policy 
very diffi  cult. A “thin” theory of the good places much greater emphasis on 
tolerance, procedural rules, and individual freedom. An example, perti-
nent to this chapter, is debates about  human rights. Th e debate goes back 
to the moment John Paul celebrated in his 1979 UN Address— the Decla-
ration on  Human Rights. Even in the  human rights community of advo-
cacy, debates about what counts as a right, the content of rights, and the 
relationship among rights, are relatively simpler than fi nding consensus 
on the foundation of rights, where they are rooted, and why. When Cen-
tesimus Annus speaks of “au then tic democracy,” the foundation of it is an 
understanding of  human rights grounded in the dignity of the person. 
While the UN Declaration does cite  human dignity as the basis of rights, 
John Paul has a much “thicker” conception of this idea than prevails in 
 human rights discourse  today.
John Paul did not remain, however, at the purely philosophical level 
when addressing the theme of democracy. Credited in part with the col-
lapse of communism in Poland, and then in other states of the Commu-
nist system, in Centesimus Annus he turned to a critique of established 
democracies in the West. With his idea of “au then tic democracy” in the 
background, he warned advanced democracies that failure to attend to 
foundational issues ran a huge risk, for, “as history demonstrates, demo-
cracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarian-
ism.”26 At a more operational level, he criticized demo cratic socie ties that 
failed to create an eff ective consensus to take needed critical decisions.
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In retrospect,  there is no question that John Paul II tightened the bond 
between Catholicism and democracy. At the same time, some of his basic 
concerns remain debated to some degree inside the Church and more so 
in the wider civil society and international society. Yet, through his teaching 
and his pastoral ministry in countries throughout the world, John Paul II 
did strengthen the ties between Catholicism and democracy. From Po-
land to the Philippines, and from South  Korea to Central Amer i ca, John 
Paul II entered complex and confl icted po liti cal settings as a voice for 
 human rights and democracy.  Human rights advocates in the religious and 
secular communities came to see John Paul as a unique voice. Th is did not 
always mean they found his theoretical and/or theological arguments con-
vincing. Willing to support the right to religious freedom with him, they 
did not necessarily see it as the anchor for  human rights.  After the collapse 
of communism  there was broader agreement to support the full spectrum 
of rights found in the UN Declaration and Covenants; this was not neces-
sarily based on the pope’s 1979 Address about the unity and priority of 
rights. Fi nally, many remained unconvinced that a unifi ed foundational 
view of rights could be achieved.
Benedict XVI
Benedict XVI strongly supported his pre de ces sor’s position that both 
 human rights and demo cratic polity require a fi rm grounding in values and 
princi ples of the moral order.27 In his 2008 Address to the United National 
General Assembly, Benedict noted positively that “ human rights are in-
creasingly being presented as the common language and the ethical sub-
stratum of international relations.”28 He then went on to stress in his own 
way the message of John Paul II about the necessary grounding of  human 
rights:
Th ey are based on the natu ral law inscribed on  human hearts and 
pres ent in diff er ent cultures and civilizations. Removing  human 
rights from this context would mean restricting their range and yield-
ing to a relativistic conception, according to which the meaning and 
interpretation of rights could vary and their universality would be 
denied in the name of diff er ent cultural, po liti cal, social and religious 
outlooks.29
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Benedict brought to the papacy his own distinctive characteristics, in some 
ways complementary to the positions of John Paul II, and in other ways 
 shaped and expressed diff erently. He was a theologian with a distinguished 
publication rec ord reaching back before Vatican II. He had less experience 
and engagement in the public arena than his pre de ces sor and seemed less 
suited to that dimension of the papal offi  ce. He was clearly more a teacher 
than a diplomat or a prophetic voice on public issues. Looking back  after 
his historic resignation from the papal offi  ce, it is reasonable to assume 
that Catholics  will read his theological writings long  after his papacy has 
receded from public attention.
Pope Benedict XVI brought to the papal offi  ce two deeply held convic-
tions, which remained prominent and per sis tent in his public role and re-
lated directly to his assessment of democracy. Th e fi rst was a con temporary 
conception of the traditional Catholic conviction that the world of faith 
and the world of reason are complementary understandings of truth. Th ey 
are not adversarial or inimical positions. Th e second conviction may have 
been Benedict’s primary pastoral objective: to address the secularization 
of public life and public policy that he saw in the postindustrial democra-
cies of the West. Neither of  these positions was missing in the pontifi cate 
of John Paul II, but Benedict made them singularly impor tant. Key texts 
surveyed below highlight  these themes.
Reason and faith  were at the heart of one of Benedict’s most publicized 
addresses, his 2006 lecture at Regensburg University. Benedict had taught 
in the theology faculty and his address was a homecoming in multiple ways. 
It must be stated clearly that the pope’s intention in giving the address 
and its consequences  were very diff er ent. Th e subject of the address, faith 
and reason, initially became lost in a major controversy sparked by a quote 
used by Benedict from a  fourteenth- century Byzantine emperor that dispar-
aged Islam. Th e quote actually was not essential to the pope’s intent or 
primary audience. He addressed the gathering at Regensburg as represen-
tatives of the Western university world, and his message was a critique of 
a narrow positivistic conception of reason, rooted in the physical sciences, 
which excluded the classical conceptions of philosophy and theology. Th e 
outcome of this postenlightenment defi nition of reason reduced the role 
of religion and ethics to private status.30 Th eology and ethics in this con-
ception  were marginal disciplines in the university world and excluded 
from infl uence in the world of public policy. His defense of a public role 
for religion, for a fruitful collaboration of reason and faith, was stated 
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precisely: “We  will succeed in  doing so only if reason and faith come to-
gether in a new way, if we overcome the self- imposed limitation of reason 
to the empirically falsifi able, and if we once more disclose its vast horizons.”31 
Th e missed opportunity of this address was that it not only pointed to in-
stances in secular Western democracies where religion can be marginalized. 
Beyond the pope’s message, that secularity without religion can distort 
what he called “the genuine dialogue of culture and religions so urgently 
needed  today,”32 lay the other issue that religion without the disciplining 
role of reason can easily become dangerous. A mischosen quote sacrifi ced 
an opportunity to address the role of religion in Western democracies and 
the role of religion in world politics.
Benedict XVI returned often and more eff ectively to questions of rea-
son and faith, and did so in part  because of his second major concern, the 
secularization of society in the postindustrial democracies. Th e topic had 
both pastoral and public dimensions to it. It also arose from the division 
of faith and reason, particularly in Western Eu rope. Pastorally, Benedict 
and many  others believed the secularization of society led to the post– World 
War II decline of participation in countries with historically strong Cath-
olic cultures and populations. Th e consequences of the secularization of 
the public arena marginalized the voice of religion, as just noted above. 
Pope Benedict chose another German setting in 2011— that of the German 
parliament—to address the consequences of secularization in the public 
arena. In a tightly designed academic lecture, he traced the relationship of 
biblical, philosophical, and  legal sources as foundations of what he de-
scribed as “a  free state of law.” To some degree, the address was about dif-
ferences between a Natu ral Law conception of law and a  legal positivistic 
view represented (he noted) by Hans Kelsen. Beyond this theoretical de-
bate, he argued that the complexity of public issues in Western democra-
cies  today is magnifi ed by the power residing in  human hands. “Man can 
destroy the world. He can manipulate himself. He can, so to speak, make 
 human beings and he can deny them their humanity.”33 In the face of  these 
 human stakes, “the decisions of a demo cratic politician, the question of 
what now correspond to the law of truth, what is actually right and may 
be enacted as law, is less obvious.”34
Benedict’s response was twofold. First, a call to recognize the secular 
value of a Natu ral Law ethic for public policy, a language and criteria that 
can be used across lines of cultures, diff er ent religions, and even between 
the world’s belief and unbelief. Second, while recognizing the essential 
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value of a public ethic rooted in “nature and reason as the true sources of 
law,” Benedict also made a further point.35 In a culture that marginalizes 
religion from its public discourse,  there is a loss of both historical memory 
of religious insight and a voice that can complement nature and reason.
At this point Eu rope’s cultural heritage  ought to come to our as-
sistance. The conviction that  there is a Creator God is what gave 
rise to the idea of  human rights, the idea of the equality of all 
 people before the law, the recognition of the inviolability of  human 
dignity in  every single person and the awareness of  people’s respon-
sibility for their actions. Our cultural memory is  shaped by  these 
rational insights.36
Benedict’s deep convictions, about faith and reason and about the danger 
of secularization for society, share two characteristics: Th ey are faithful to 
a long Catholic tradition, and they are diffi  cult to share with demo cratic 
socie ties on both sides of the Atlantic, and beyond,  today. As noted, both 
convictions bear directly on one’s conception of democracy. Benedict XVI 
off ered his specifi c views of this theme in a historic setting: Westminster 
Hall in the United Kingdom. Th e background and the topic for the lec-
ture  were both signifi cant. Benedict began by paying tribute to the role of 
the British Parliament and to the “common law tradition” which has in-
fl uenced  legal systems for centuries and throughout the world. His subject 
was “the proper place of religious belief within the po liti cal pro cess.” Th e 
address resonated with the two themes just discussed in this essay. In re-
sponse to his own question of where can one fi nd the ethical foundation for 
po liti cal choice, Benedict invoked the Catholic tradition, which “main-
tains that the objective norms governing right action are accessible to rea-
son, prescinding from the content of revelation.”37
He asked and answered his own question in a tone respectful of the gap 
that likely separated most of his audience from “the Catholic tradition.” 
But then he moved beyond his initial answers, seeking to fi nd common 
ground on the question of the proper place of religion in politics. Return-
ing to the theme of reason and faith, he argued for a dialectical relation-
ship of “purifying” discourse, with religion playing a purifying role in 
reason’s development of moral norms, and then reason playing a purifying 
role within religious traditions. In Benedict’s perspective, the world of re-
ligious belief and secular rationality need each other.38  Th ere is a religious 
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potential for “corrective” action in the po liti cal arena, and a need for ra-
tional “corrective” critique within the religious traditions.
From Pacem in Terris (1963) through the retirement of Benedict XVI 
(2013),  there has been a double dynamic at work around the theme of 
Roman Catholicism and democracy. Th e dominant note has been an in-
creasing ac cep tance by the Church of the  human rights and demo cratic 
traditions— indeed, beyond ac cep tance, a move  toward identifying why the 
Catholic social tradition should fi nd in  these secular traditions reasons for 
support and complementarity. Th is dynamic has been the subject of this 
essay. But the narrative should not close without noting a counterpoint, 
voiced by both John Paul II and Benedict XVI, which is that the way in 
which specifi c topics in modern democracies are interpreted, deci ded in 
courts, and expressed in legislation in the twenty- fi rst  century (particularly 
a range of issues in bioethics, the understanding of marriage and  family, 
and sexuality itself), has created quite specifi c confl icts for Catholicism, in 
spite of the more long- term reconciliation that has occurred between the 
Church and demo cratic regimes.
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253
How (Not) to Be a Po liti cal 
Theologian
Stanley Hauerwas
Trying to Understand Where I Belong Po liti cally
I have recently discovered I am numbered among  those identifi ed as “po-liti cal theologians.” I must be a po liti cal theologian  because  there is an 
article, a very good article by Rusty Reno, on my work in Th e Blackwell 
Companion to Po liti cal Th eology.1 Reno even begins his article with the as-
tounding claim that “in the fi nal de cades of the twentieth  century, Stan-
ley Hauerwas articulated the most coherent and infl uential po liti cal 
theology in and for the North American context.”2 Rusty Reno is a theo-
logian of rare intellectual judgment, so I assume he must know what he is 
talking about, but I confess for me the idea that I am a po liti cal theolo-
gian  will take some getting used to.
I want to use this essay to explore why my identifi cation as a po liti cal 
theologian takes, at least for me, some getting used to. To do so  will re-
quire that I revisit some of the early developments in Christian ethics that 
 shaped how I think about the fundamental po liti cal character of Chris-
tian theology. In short, I have always assumed that any theology refl ects a 
politics  whether that politics is acknowledged or not. Of course the cru-
cial question is: What kind of politics is theologically assumed? In the tra-
dition in which I was educated it was assumed that demo cratic politics 
was normative for Christians.  Because I do not share that presumption, 
some think I have no politics.
In truth I have no stake one way or the other in being counted among 
 those  doing po liti cal theology. I have always resisted modifying theology 
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with descriptors that suggest theology is the possession of certain groups 
or perspectives. For me nothing is more impor tant than the fundamental 
task of theology to be of ser vice to the Church; it belongs to the Church. 
I am well aware that time and place do and should make a diff erence for 
how theology is done. But too often I fear that, when theology is made 
subservient to this or that qualifi er, it has inadequate means with which to 
resist becoming an ideology.
It is true, however, that  there is no “method” that can protect theolo-
gians from engaging in ideological modes of thought, even when they claim 
to be  doing theology qua theology. Th eology stands  under the permanent 
temptation to “choose sides,” which means theology can become ideologi-
cal long before anyone notices. I have no objection to calling theology 
“Christian,” but that description does not ensure that theology that bears 
the name  will be  free of ideological perversion. “Christian” is no guaran-
tee that theology can be safeguarded against being put at the ser vice of 
po liti cal loyalties and practices that betray the Gospel.
I resist using the phrase “po liti cal theology” for many of the same rea-
sons I try to avoid the phrase “social ethics.” Ask yourself what kind of 
ethic would not be social? In a similar fashion I assume  every theology, 
even theology done in a speculative mode, has been produced and repro-
duces a politics. If theology is done faithful to the Gospel it  will not only 
be po liti cal but it  will be so in a par tic u lar way. Th us, John Howard Yod-
er’s observation in Th e Politics of Jesus that appeals to Jesus as “po liti cal” 
too often are only slogans that fail to indicate the kind of politics Jesus 
incarnated.3
 Whether or not I am a po liti cal theologian depends on how “po liti cal 
theology” is understood. It is impor tant to remember that the nomencla-
ture, “po liti cal theology,” has only recently been reintroduced into discus-
sions in theology and po liti cal theory.4 Indeed, as Elizabeth Phillips rightly 
reminds us, po liti cal theology did not originally come from Christian the-
ology, but rather originated in Athens in which politics was understood as 
the art of seeking the common good of the polis.5 Phillips observes that 
task was  later taken up by Christian thinkers such as Augustine who com-
pared and contrasted Chris tian ity to what had been done in the name of 
po liti cal theology. Th e phrase, “po liti cal theology,” however, has only re-
cently been reintroduced into po liti cal and  legal theory through the work 
of Carl Schmitt.
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Schmitt maintained that all signifi cant concepts that constitute the le-
gitimating discourses of modern state formations are in fact secularized 
theological concepts.6 Phillips observes that this claim has given new life 
to diverse approaches to “the political”— not the least being the discussions 
and ongoing debates around Schmitt’s strong claim about the totalizing 
character of modern politics. Accordingly, po liti cal theology has become 
an attempt to identify how ideas concerning salvation and devotion to God 
migrated from Christian theology to the nation state. Schmitt’s work is 
quite controversial not only  because of his association with the Nazi party 
but  because of his Hobbes- like contention that the sovereign is known as 
the one who decides on the exception.
Paul Kahn argues that Schmitt’s understanding of sovereignty has struc-
tured an inquiry into the po liti cal that is a kind of mirror image of the 
po liti cal theory of liberalism. For Schmitt not the law but the exception, 
not the judge but the sovereign, not reason but decision determines the 
character of the po liti cal. Kahn argues that Schmitt’s inversion of liberal 
presuppositions about politics is so extreme one “might think of po liti cal 
theology as the dialectical negation of liberal po liti cal theory.”7 Given my 
identifi cation as a critic of liberal po liti cal theory, some might, with some 
justifi cation, think I am rightly described as a po liti cal theologian.
I doubt, however, I deserve such a description. I confess it is tempting 
to claim that identity as a way to  counter the oft- made criticism that I am 
a “sectarian, fi deistic tribalist” who is trying to get Christians to abandon 
the task of securing justice through participation in politics.8 It is true, 
moreover, that I fi nd much of the work being done in po liti cal theology to 
be quite congenial to the way I think about the po liti cal challenges facing 
Christians in contexts such as Amer i ca. But the path I have taken for how 
I understand the po liti cal stance Christians should assume in the world in 
which we fi nd ourselves is quite diff er ent than  those who now identify 
themselves with “po liti cal theology.”
In order to explain that “path,” as well as how I now think about the 
politics of Christian existence, I need to provide an account of how Chris-
tians in Amer i ca became convinced they had a moral obligation to be po-
liti cal actors in what they took to be demo cratic politics. Th e expression 
“the politics of Christian existence” that I use to describe my position in-
dicates my distance from the story I have to tell about how Christians came 
to ask themselves what po liti cal responsibilities they had as Christians. Th at 
153-66040_ch01_3P.indd   255 9/16/16   12:00 PM
question would often produce investigations into the relation of Chris tian-
ity and politics. From my perspective that way of putting the  matter— that 
is, “What is the relation between Chris tian ity and politics?”—is to have 
failed to account for the po liti cal real ity of the Church.
My point is not unlike John Howard Yoder’s argument concerning the 
inadequacy of H. Richard Niebuhr’s “method” in Christ and Culture. Yo-
der argued that the very way Niebuhr posed the prob lem of the relation of 
Christ to culture failed to be properly Christological just to the extent 
that the Christ who is Lord is separated from Jesus of Nazareth. Yoder 
argued that Niebuhr’s account of Christ as the exemplifi cation of radical 
mono the ism failed to give adequate expression to the full and genuine 
 human existence of the man Jesus of Nazareth. Th at Christological  mistake 
from Yoder’s point of view  shaped the problematic character of Niebuhr’s 
typology  because recognition of Jesus’s full humanity is necessary to rec-
ognize that Jesus himself is a “cultural real ity.” As a result, the Christ of 
Christ and Culture was assumed to be alien to culture qua culture, thus 
creating the problematic that shapes Niebuhr’s book.9
What I must now try to do is to tell the story of the “and” that created 
the question of the relation of Chris tian ity and politics. I hope to show 
that, just as Yoder suggests the “and” between Christ and culture reproduced 
a Christ that was less than fully  human, so the “and” between Chris tian ity 
and politics assumed a Church that was fundamentally apo liti cal.  Because 
I have been so infl uenced by Yoder I am often accused of tempting Chris-
tians to withdraw from participation in politics. Yet neither Yoder nor 
myself have assumed it pos si ble to “withdraw” from the world, or even if 
withdrawal  were pos si ble, that it would be a “good  thing.” Admittedly, as 
I  will suggest in due course, Yoder changes how we as Christians are to 
understand “the po liti cal,” but he does so  because of how he under-
stands “the politics of Jesus.”10 But to show the diff erence Yoder makes, 
I need to provide a brief account of how Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr 
understood democracy as the politics that is defi nitive for Christians.
How Christians Became “Po liti cal” in Amer i ca
Th e story I have to tell is not unlike the story I planned to tell by writing 
a book on the development of Christian ethics in Amer i ca. In a chapter in 
A Better Hope entitled, “Christian Ethics in Amer i ca (and the Journal of 
Religious Ethics): A Report on a Book I  Will Not Write,” I explain why I 
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did not write the book.11 I did not write the book  because I did not want 
to write about a tradition I thought had come to an end.12 Th at the tradi-
tion had come to an end had every thing to do with what I took to be the 
storyline of the book. Th e storyline is that the subject of Christian ethics 
in Amer i ca was fi rst and foremost Amer i ca. Th at such was and still remains 
the case means: Just to the extent Christians got the politics they had iden-
tifi ed as Christian— that is, demo cratic politics— they seemed no longer to 
have anything po liti cally in ter est ing to say as Christians.
Put diff erently, I suggested that the book I did not write would ask the 
dramatic question of how a tradition that began with a book by Walter 
Rauschenbusch entitled Christianizing the Social Order would end with a 
book by James Gustafson entitled, Can Ethics Be Christian? Th e story I 
sought to tell was meant to explore how that result came to be by concen-
trating on  people such as Reinhold Niebuhr, H. Richard Niebuhr, Paul 
Ramsey, Jim Gustafson, and John Howard Yoder. Yoder, of course, did not 
stand in the same tradition as  those from Rauschenbusch to Gustafson, 
but that was just the point: Namely, that only an outsider could off er the 
fresh perspective the mainstream theological tradition so desperately 
needed.
It is not quite true that I did not write the book I had planned. I did 
write a number of essays on Rauschenbusch, Reinhold and H. Richard 
Niebuhr, Paul Ramsey, and Jim Gustafson that developed some themes 
that the proposed book was to be about.13 What I failed to do, and the 
failure was intentional, was to bring  these essays and chapters together in 
one book. I do not regret that decision, but that I did not write the book 
means I can use this opportunity to make explicit how the development 
of Christian thinking about politics resulted in the loss of the politics of 
the Church.
A strange claim to be sure. Th e social gospel was,  after all, largely a move-
ment of churchmen to convince their fellow Christians that they had a 
calling to engage in the work of social reconstruction. Of course the cen-
tral real ity for the social gospel was not the Church but the Kingdom of 
God. Yet Rauschenbusch claimed that the Church is the social  factor in 
salvation. Th e Church is so  because it “brings social forces to bear on evil. 
It off ers Christ not only many  human bodies and minds to serve as min-
isters of his salvation, but its own composite personality, with a collective 
memory storied with  great hymns and Bible moral feelings, and with a col-
lective  will set on righ teousness.”14
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Rauschenbusch appealed to Schleiermacher and Royce to emphasize 
that the Church is the social organism that makes it pos si ble for us to share 
in the consciousness of Christ. According to Rauschenbusch, the individ-
ual is saved by membership in the Church  because the Church is neces-
sary to make Christ’s consciousness the consciousness of  every member of 
the Church. It is not the institutional character of the Church, nor its con-
tinuity, its ministry, nor doctrine that saves, but rather the Church pro-
vides salvation by making the Kingdom of God pres ent.15
According to Rauschenbusch the Kingdom of God is the heart of the 
revolutionary force of Chris tian ity. It was the loss of the Kingdom ideals 
that put the Church on her path to abandon her social and po liti cal com-
mitments. As a result, the movements for democracy and social justice  were 
left without religious backing. In the pro cess many Christians lost any sense 
that social justice might have something to do with salvation. Christians 
thus failed to emphasize the three commitments that the Kingdom entails: 
(1) to work for a social order that guarantees to all personalities their freest 
and highest development; (2) to secure the progressive reign of love in 
 human aff airs so that the use of force and  legal coercion become super-
seded; and (3) the  free surrender of property rights, which means the refusal 
to support monopolistic industries.16
All of which can be summed up by Rauschenbusch’s claim that the 
social gospel is the religious response to the historic advent of democracy. 
For Rauschenbusch the social gospel sought to put the demo cratic spirit, 
which the Church inherited from Jesus and the prophets, once more in 
control of the institution of the Church.17 Another word for salvation, 
Rauschenbusch asserts, is democracy,  because Jesus’s highest redemptive 
act was to take God by the hand and call him “our  Father.” By  doing so 
Jesus demo cratized the conception of God and in the pro cess not only saved 
humanity but “he saved God.”18
Th e Christian’s task is to work to extend this demo cratic ideal. Rauschen-
busch thinks the ideal that has been largely achieved in the po liti cal 
sphere, but now the same demo cratic ideals must be applied to the eco-
nomic realm. Th at means Christians must work to see that the brother-
hood of man is expressed in the common possession of the economic resources 
of society. Th ey must also seek to secure the spiritual good of humanity by 
insuring such a good is set high above the private profi t interests of all ma-
terialistic groups.19 Rauschenbusch was convinced, moreover, that  these 
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 were not unrealizable ideals, but pos si ble achievements Christians could 
bring to fruition if the gospel was recognized to be a social gospel.
It is tempting to dismiss Rauschenbusch as hopelessly naïve, but that 
would be a  mistake. His rhe toric invites the judgment that he is far too 
“optimistic,” but it should not be forgotten that  after Rauschenbusch it was 
assumed by most  people in mainstream Protestant denominations in Amer-
i ca that Christians had a responsibility to be po liti cally active in order to 
extend demo cratic practices. Reinhold Niebuhr  will criticize Rauschen-
busch for failing to account for the necessity of confl ict and coercion for 
the establishment of justice, but Niebuhr never called into question 
Rauschenbusch’s fundamental insight that Christians have to make use of 
politics to achieve justice. As critical of the social gospel as he may have 
been, Niebuhr simply assumed that Christians must be po liti cally respon-
sible. Niebuhr’s chastened realism, to be sure, was a critical response to 
Rauschenbusch’s far- too- optimistic presumption that justice was achiev-
able, but in many ways Niebuhr’s criticism of the social gospel was made 
pos si ble by the achievement of that movement.
Of course it was sin that determined Niebuhr’s fundamental perspec-
tive on the necessity of politics.  Because we are sinners, justice can be 
achieved only by degrees of coercion, as well as re sis tance to coercion. Th us 
his oft- made claim that “the po liti cal life of man must constantly steer be-
tween the Scylla of anarchy and the Charybdis of tyranny.”20 Th at alter-
native, anarchy or tyranny, was the kind of dualism Niebuhr often 
confi dently declared  were our only choices if we did not strive to sustain 
demo cratic life and institutions. Th us his contention that democracy is the 
worst form of all governments, except all other forms of government, 
 because democracy provides an alternative to totalitarianism or anarchy.
For Niebuhr, Christians have a stake in demo cratic socie ties  because, 
given the realism that the Christian understanding of sin requires, Chris-
tians know “that a healthy society must seek to achieve the greatest pos si ble 
equilibrium of power, the greatest pos si ble centers of power, the greatest 
pos si ble social checks of the administration of power, and the greatest pos si-
ble inner moral check on  human ambition, as well as the most eff ective 
use of forms of power in which consent and coercion are compounded.”21 
Democracies at their best are, therefore, able to achieve unity of purpose 
within the conditions of freedom and to maintain freedom within the 
framework of order.
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It is particularly impor tant to note that for Niebuhr democracy is a sys-
tem of government that does not require the governed to be virtuous. 
Rather it is a form of social organ ization that limits self- interested men from 
pursuing their interests in a manner that destroys community. Of course 
a too- consistent pessimism concerning our ability to transcend our inter-
ests can lead to absolutist po liti cal theories. So Niebuhr is not suggesting 
that democracies can survive without some sense of justice. Rather he is 
reminding us that, as he puts it in what is prob ably his most famous epi-
gram, “man’s capacity for justice makes democracy pos si ble; but man’s in-
clination to injustice makes democracy necessary.”22
Th e task of social Chris tian ity for Niebuhr is not to advocate par tic u lar 
solutions for economic or social ills, but to produce  people of modesty and 
humility about what can be accomplished given our sinful condition.23 It 
is equally impor tant that some modesty be applied to the Church, which 
is no less  under the power of sin. In fact, from Niebuhr’s point of view the 
sins of the Church may be even more destructive given the temptation to 
identify religious politics with the politics of God. For Niebuhr the task of 
the Church is “to bear witness against  every form of pride and vainglory, 
 whether in the secular or in the Christian culture, and be particularly in-
tent upon our own sins lest we make Christ the judge of the other but not 
of ourselves.”24
Th e contrasts between Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr are clear, though 
they share more than is immediately apparent. In par tic u lar, democracy 
plays a very similar role in their respective positions. Th e question of the 
relation of Chris tian ity and politics is fundamentally resolved for Rauschen-
busch and Niebuhr if the politics the Christian is to presume as norma-
tive is a demo cratic politics. Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr are vague about 
what makes a democracy demo cratic, but I hope enough has been said to 
show how the language of democracy became their way to assure Chris-
tians in Amer i ca that they must “be po liti cal.”
Th e Diff erence Yoder Makes
I simply assumed, as I suspect did almost anyone who worked in Chris-
tian ethics in the second half of the twentieth  century, that Rauschen-
busch’s and Niebuhr’s diff er ent understandings and justifi cations of 
democracy  were a given. Yet even before I had read Yoder I was beginning 
to explore issues in demo cratic theory that would make me worry about the 
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assumption that democracy is normative for Christians. For example, in the 
earliest article I wrote on Chris tian ity and politics, “Politics, Vision, and 
the Common Good,” I began to worry about issues intrinsic to demo cratic 
practice and theory.25 Th e civil rights movement, the protest against the 
war in Vietnam, and questions of economic in equality made me question 
pluralist justifi cations of demo cratic pro cesses. Drawing on the work of 
Robert Paul Wolff , Ted Lowi, and Sheldon Wolin, I began to explore what 
alternatives  there might be to Niebuhr’s “realism.”
Th e article on politics and the common good was paired with another 
chapter in Vision and Virtue entitled “Th eology and the New American 
Culture.”26 “Th eology and the New American Culture” is prob ably best 
described as an attempt at theological journalism. Reinhold Niebuhr was 
the master of this genre, as he ably helped us see that what seemed to be 
quite theoretical issues in po liti cal theory had concrete manifestations. In 
“Th eology and the New American Culture,” I was trying to suggest that 
the cultural despair that was so evident among many in the sixties was not 
accidentally related to some of the fundamental presumptions of liberal 
demo cratic theory and practice. Drawing on Philip Slater’s Th e Pursuit of 
Loneliness, I tried to show  there was a connection between our isolation 
from one another and our inability to discover goods in common through 
the po liti cal pro cess.
Somehow, and it may have come from reading the Social Encyclicals, I 
began to think  there was a deep tension between liberal po liti cal theory 
and accounts of politics that appealed to the common good. Niebuhr’s po-
liti cal realism expressed in terms of interest group liberalism at best can 
give you an account of common interests. For Niebuhr, as well as more 
secular accounts of liberal demo cratic theory,  there are no goods in com-
mon that can be discovered as well as serve demo cratic politics. Th e demo-
cratic state, as Ernst- Wolfgang Bockenforde has argued, is an order of 
freedom and of peace rather than an order of truth and virtue necessary 
for the recognition of common goods.27 Accordingly, defenders of liberal 
democracies seek to establish institutions that make pos si ble the achieve-
ment of relative justice without  people themselves being just.28
I observed above that I was beginning to explore critical questions es-
sential to issues in demo cratic theory. Th at way of putting the  matter is, I 
think, impor tant  because it indicates I was not calling into question the 
presumption that some account of democracy is impor tant for Christians 
if we  were to be po liti cally responsible. A Community of Character:  Toward 
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a Constructive Christian Social Ethic, a book published in 1981, included a 
chapter entitled “Th e Church and Liberal Democracy.” In that essay I 
began to try to distinguish demo cratic practice from liberal po liti cal 
theory.29 Drawing on the work of C. B. Macpherson, I tried to show 
how liberalism, particularly in its economic modes, subverted the demo-
cratic commitment to sustaining a common life necessary to make pos si-
ble lives of virtue.30 Accordingly, I argued, just to the extent the Church is 
or can be a school for virtue, Christians can be crucial for the sustaining of 
demo cratic social and po liti cal life.
By the time I wrote A Community of Character I had read and begun to 
absorb the work of John Howard Yoder. What I learned from Yoder meant 
I was to be labeled a sectarian, fi deistic tribalist  because I was allegedly 
tempting Christians to withdraw from po liti cal engagement. Nothing 
could have been further from the truth. In fact the attempt to distinguish 
demo cratic practice from liberal po liti cal theory refl ected my conviction 
that Christians could not and should not withdraw from serving their 
neighbor through po liti cal engagement. Some suggested the book I wrote 
with Rom Coles, Chris tian ity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary: 
Conversations between a Radical Demo crat and a Christian, represented a 
more positive approach to the po liti cal than my previous work.31 Th at 
may be true of the tone of the book, but I understood the conversation 
between Coles and myself to be the continuation of my attempt to fi nd a 
way to talk about forms of demo cratic life that  were not  shaped by liberal 
presuppositions.
Th at is not to say, however, that Yoder did not make a diff erence in how 
I thought about Christian po liti cal engagement. Prior to reading Yoder I 
had the sense that my emphasis on the virtues meant that the Church was 
crucial to politics for the formation of lives of virtue. Th e Church became 
the polis that Aristotle knew had to exist but, in his case, did not. Accord-
ingly Yoder’s ecclesiology supplied the politics I needed to make intelligi-
ble the stress on the virtues. Th at meant, as Dan Bell argues, that I had to 
resist any politics that portrays the Church as apo liti cal in a manner that 
leaves the formation of the body to the state. I refused any reduction of 
politics to statecraft in order to emphasize the po liti cal character of the 
Church as a po liti cal space in its own right.32
From such a perspective the moral emptiness at the heart of liberalism 
could be construed as an advantage for Christians if the Church was cap-
able of producing lives that are not empty. Liberalism as a practice for 
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organ izing cooperative arrangements between moral strangers could be 
good for Christians, though I think it bad for liberals. Indeed I thought 
my critiques of liberalism  were charitable  because my criticisms  were an 
attempt to suggest to liberals that  there are alternatives to a liberal way of 
life. Of course one of the diffi  culties with that way of conceiving the po-
liti cal mission of the Church is that too often Christians had policed their 
Chris tian ity to make it compatible with liberal tolerance. Th e other diffi  -
culty being that the alleged indiff erence of liberal states concerning for-
mation of “citizens” was anything but “neutral.” In fact, the liberal state is 
quite good at the formation of  people with virtues to sustain war.
I do not mean to suggest that Yoder’s infl uence on me made  little dif-
ference. In fact it made all the diff erence. Th us his claim:
To ask, “What is the best form of government?” is itself a Constan-
tinian question. It is representative of an already “established” social 
posture. It assumes that the paradigmatic person, the model ethical 
agent, is in a position of such power that it falls to him to evaluate 
alternative worlds and to prefer the one in which he himself (for the 
model ethical agent assumes himself to be part of ‘the  people’) shares 
the rule.33
Yoder’s challenge, interestingly enough, made me won der— given my in-
terest in exploring issues in demo cratic theory— whether, in fact, rather 
than being a “sectarian,” I did not continue to be a Constantinian.
Of course, if Alex Sider is right, and I certainly think he is, it is very 
hard to avoid being Constantinian. Th at it is hard to avoid being Constan-
tinian is clear  because, as Sider argues, even Yoder was unable to avoid 
that fate. According to Sider, Constantinianism is not so much a “prob-
lem” as it is a totalizing discourse. Th at means that the resources one has 
to map a way out of Constantinianism  will themselves likely be implicated 
in Constantinianism.34 In short, Constantinianism conditions the possi-
bility for its own investigation just to the extent it determines what is to 
count as history.35 Th at is why Sider argues that more fundamental than 
the distinction between transcendental and empirical uses of the description, 
“Constantinianism” is the distinction between historicist and eschatologi-
cal discourse. Th at means for Yoder “the true meaning of history is in the 
church. And this history is, at least in part, one of disavowal and apostasy.”36 
But the very narration of Constantinianism as apostasy reproduces a 
Constantinian view of history.
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Sider’s account of the unavoidability of Constantinianism makes clear 
how, in spite of what I have learned from Yoder, I have in many ways re-
mained a Constantinian. Yet I have never pretended that every thing as-
sociated with Constantinianism is to be rejected.37 Certainly Yoder did not 
think such a rejection warranted or required  because he often saw much 
good in some developments associated with Christendom arrangements. 
It is, moreover, impor tant to note that Yoder’s observation about the ques-
tion of what is the best form of government is one made in the context of 
his chapter, “Th e Christian Case for Democracy.” With his usual analyti-
cal power Yoder explores in that essay the limits and possibilities of ap-
peals to the rule of the  people, observing that it is by no means clear why 
rule by the  people is a good; and how would we know it to be good if the 
 people did rule?38
Yoder worries that the glorifi cation of democracy as the rule of “the 
 people,” as well as the presumption that democracy represents a form of 
government that does not suff er from the disabilities of other forms of gov-
ernment, results in uncritical support for wars fought in the name of de-
mocracy. So his strategy in his chapter on democracy can almost be 
described as Niebuhrian, just to the extent he seeks to  humble the rhe toric 
surrounding the uncritical cele bration of democracy by Christians. Yet he 
argues that if Christians accepted our minority status in socie ties, like  those 
in North Amer i ca, we would be  free to hold rulers to account by asking 
them to rule consistent with the rhe toric they use to legitimate their power. 
What we dare not forget, however, is that the assumption that “we” the 
 people are governing ourselves is actually not the case. We are governed 
by elites. Democracies are no less oligarchic than other forms of govern-
ment, but it is true, according to Yoder, that demo cratic oligarchies tend 
to be the least oppressive.39
For Yoder the task is not to justify “democracy.” Rather he simply ac-
cepts the fact that we are told we live in a democracy. He is not convinced 
we know what that entails. But drawing on A. D. Lindsay’s argument in 
his Th e Modern Demo cratic State, that the origins of democracy  were in 
Puritan and Quaker congregations where the dignity of the adversary made 
dialogue not only necessary but pos si ble, Yoder argues the Church can serve 
demo cratic  orders in a similar fashion by being a community that contin-
ues to re spect the adversary both within and outside of the Church. From 
Yoder’s perspective the Church best serves the social  orders that claim to 
be demo cratic by taking seriously the internal calling of the Church rather 
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than “becoming tributary to what ever secular consensus seems strong 
at the time.”40
Th at is the strategy I have tried to adopt in my work. It is a strategy 
that makes any identifi cation as a “po liti cal theologian” doubtful.  Th ere is 
much to learn from work in po liti cal theology, but the way I think about 
Christian po liti cal engagement is less  grand than most of what is identi-
fi ed as work in po liti cal theology. For example, I think calling attention to 
the work of Jean Vanier has a po liti cal purpose. For it must surely be the 
case that the existence and support of the work of Vanier to secure homes 
for the mentally disabled indicates the kind of moral commitment neces-
sary to sustain a politics capable of recognizing the dignity of each  human 
being.41 But to hold up the work of Vanier as po liti cally signifi cant I am 
sure seems to many simply a way to avoid the primary po liti cal challenges 
before socie ties like the United States of Amer i ca. Th at may be the case, 
but that is the way I have learned to think theologically about politics.
In Th e First Th ousand Years: A Global History of Chris tian ity, Robert 
Wilken observes that Chris tian ity is a culture- forming religion. Conse-
quently the growth of Christian communities led to the transformation of 
the cultures of the ancient world, which meant the creation of several new 
civilizations. At the heart of that pro cess was language  because, as Wilken 
suggests, “culture has to do with the pattern of inherited meanings and 
sensibilities embedded in rituals, institutions, laws, practices, images, and 
the stories of  people.”42 Wilken’s description of the conceptual revolution 
brought about by Chris tian ity rightly directs attention to the signifi cance 
of language as the heart of politics. Th at is why I resist any attempt to sug-
gest that the Church is one  thing and politics something  else.
Luke Bretherton puts this well when he suggests that “ doing church” 
and “ doing politics” are both about the formation of shared speech and 
action that forms a common world. Th erefore, according to Bretherton, 
politics and ecclesiology name two mutually constitutive locations where 
a sensus communis can be forged.43 I take it to be that one of the character-
istics of the culture currently described as demo cratic is the loss of elegant 
speech. It is not simply the loss of elegance that I lament, but the language 
used in politics is intended to obscure rather than illumine. If, as Brether-
ton suggests, ecclesiology is politics by another name, then the Church can 
serve the world in which we fi nd ourselves by attending to our speech. Well- 
formed sermons may turn out to be the most impor tant contribution 
Christians can make to a politics that has some ambition to be truthful. 
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To conceive Christian witness in this manner may seem insignifi cant 
and to require patience we do not have, but that is why Jean Vanier is so 
impor tant. He is the culture Chris tian ity produces.
Th e Church as Foot- Dragging
I am aware that  these last suggestions may seem far too abstract, so let me 
try to suggest the kind of concrete politics I think they entail, at least for 
Christians in advanced cap i tal ist socie ties, by calling attention to James 
C. Scott’s recent book, Two Cheers for Anarchism: Six Easy Pieces on Au-
tonomy, Dignity, and Meaningful Work and Play.44 I am well aware that 
to identify with Scott’s account of anarchism  will only confi rm for many 
I am a “sectarian, fi deistic, tribalist,” but I have long given up on any at-
tempt to  counter that charge. Th at I am directing attention to Scott’s 
book is not meant to suggest that he provides the only way to think about 
the po liti cal character of the Church—in fact, I am quite sympathetic to 
Luke Bretherton’s more robust account of what a Christian politics might 
look like.45
One of the attractions of Scott’s account of anarchy is his reticence about 
any account of anarchy that tries to be comprehensive. Accordingly he de-
scribes his “method” as an “anarchist squint” that is intended to help us 
see what we might other wise miss.46 Scott does not deny that Prou dhon’s 
description of anarchism as “mutuality or cooperation without hierarchy 
or state rule” certainly captures some of what may pass as anarchy, but that 
description may not adequately suggest the anarchist tolerance for confu-
sion and improvisation that accompanies social learning.47 Scott has no 
reason to try to nail down a defi nition of anarchism, being content to use 
anarchism to describe a defense of politics, confl ict, and debate, along with 
the perpetual uncertainty and learning they entail. Th at means that, un-
like many anarchists, Scott does not believe the state is always the  enemy 
of freedom.
Scott’s proj ect might be called an exercise in small politics. For example, 
he writes about his stay in Germany when he was trying to learn German 
by forcing himself to interact with fellow pedestrians in the small town of 
Neubrandenburg. He tells the story of crossing the street to get to the 
train station in obedience to lights that indicated when it was  legal to cross 
the street. He reports that fi fty or sixty  people would often wait at the cor-
ner for the light to change even though they could see no traffi  c was com-
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ing. He reports  after fi ve hours of observation he saw no more than two 
 people cross against the light.  Th ose two who would cross against the lights 
had to be willing to receive from  those that waited gestures of disapproval. 
Scott reports he had to screw up his courage to cross the street against their 
disapproval. He did so, justifying his law- breaking per for mance by remem-
bering that his grandparents could have used more of the spirit of break-
ing the law in the name of justice. But  because they had lost the practice 
of breaking small laws, they no longer knew when it  really  matters to break 
the law. Scott calls such practice of law breaking “anarchist calisthenics,” 
implying that Germans could use the practice.48
Scott observes that,  under authoritarian regimes, subjects who are 
denied public means of protest have no recourse but to resort to “foot- 
dragging, sabotage, poaching, theft, and, ultimately, revolt.” Modern forms 
of democracy allegedly make such forms of dissent obsolete. But Scott 
argues that the assumed promise of democracy that makes “foot- dragging” 
no longer necessary is seldom realized in practice. He argues that what 
needs to be noticed is that most of the po liti cal reforms that have made 
some diff erence for demo cratic change have been the result of disruption 
of the public order. Accordingly, Scott argues that anarchism at least is a 
reminder that the cultivation of insubordination and law breaking is cru-
cial for the po liti cal developments we call democracy.49
Yet Scott observes that proponents of liberal demo cratic theory seldom 
attend to the role of crisis and institutional failure that lead to po liti cal re-
form. Th at liberal democracies in the West are generally run for the top 
20  percent of  those that possess wealth no doubt is one of the reasons for 
the occlusion of crisis to account for demo cratic developments. Indeed, 
Scott observes the greatest failure of liberal democracies is the lack of 
protection they give to the economic and security interests of their least- 
advantaged citizens. As a result, Scott argues, the contradiction between 
the renewal of democracy by major episodes of extra- institutional disorder 
and the promise of democracy as the institutionalization of peaceful change 
is seldom noticed.50
Scott’s book is an account of episodes of foot- dragging and disruption. 
In par tic u lar he directs attention to  matters not often considered “po liti cal” 
to illumine our po liti cal landscape in advanced industrial socie ties. For 
example, he pokes fun at the use of quantitative mea sures of productivity 
in the acad emy in order to show how democracies like the United States 
have embraced meritocratic criteria for the elite se lection and distribution 
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of public funds to create “a vast and deceptive ‘antipolitics machine’ de-
signed to turn legitimate po liti cal questions into neutral objective ad-
ministrative exercises governed by experts.”51 Th is strategy to depoliticize 
protest masks a lack of faith in the possibilities anarchists and demo-
crats have in the mutuality and education that can result from common 
action.
Scott’s defense of anarchy, therefore, turns out to be a defense of poli-
tics. He observes that “if  there is one conviction that anarchist thinkers 
and nondemagogic populists share, it is faith in the capacity of demo cratic 
citizenry to learn and grow through engagement in the public sphere.”52 
Yet he argues that the formation of bodies wrought through populist poli-
tics is often defeated by something as  simple as the SAT exam. For that 
exam serves as a way to convince  middle- class whites that affi  rmative ac-
tion is a choice between objective merit and favoritism. As a result, the SAT 
robs us of the public dialogue we need to have about how educational op-
portunity  ought to be allocated in a demo cratic and plural society. Cost- 
benefi t analy sis often functions in a similar way to make the confl ict needed 
seem petty.53
Scott ends his book by directing our attention to the role of history in 
modern politics. Th e purpose of enunciating histories is to summarize ma-
jor historical events, making them understandable as a single narrative. As 
a result, the “radical contingency” of history is domesticated in an eff ort 
to underwrite the assumption that the way  things turned out is the only 
way they could be. Such condensations of history, which fulfi ll the need 
of elites to proj ect an image of control, create a blindness to the fact that 
“gains for  human freedom have not been the result of orderly, institutional 
procedures but of disorderly, unpredictable, spontaneous action cracking 
open the social order from below.”54
I confess that it is with some hesitancy that I use Scott’s account of an-
archy to exemplify what a Christian politics might look like. I worry that 
“anarchy” may suggest that I have no use for institutions that inevitably 
involve hierarchies of authority. I assume it is never a question of  whether 
hierarchies of authority should or should not exist, but rather how author-
ity should be understood as an aid for the discovery of the common good 
of a community. Indeed I am in deep agreement with Victor Lee Austin’s 
argument in Up with Authority that,  because the common good of com-
munities is not one isolated goal, “authority is needed  because it is desirable 
that par tic u lar goods should be taken care of by par tic u lar agencies.”55 Th e 
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irony is that such an account of authority stands as a challenge, a challenge 
that may appear to threaten anarchy, in a liberal social order in which 
common goods by design are reduced to common interest.
Th e Church is rightly a hierarchical institution. It is so  because the 
Church is a community that believes the truth  matters. Accordingly, the 
saints and martyrs stand as authorities necessary to test the changes 
that the Church  will undergo if it is to remain faithful to the gospel.  Th ose 
singled out for offi  ce in the Church (to insure that the Church attends to 
the saints) must recognize that the exercise of their authority can never be 
an end in itself. But it is “po liti cal” in the most basic sense of what it 
means to be po liti cal and accordingly can serve as an example for the ex-
ercise of authority beyond the Church. If that is a Constantinian strategy, 
then I am a Constantinian.
Above I referred to Sider’s suggestion that Yoder’s anti- Constantinianism 
is best expressed in terms of the Church being the true meaning of his-
tory. Th at is an extraordinary claim, requiring a  people to exist who know 
how to drag their feet when confronted by  those who think they know 
where history is headed— which, I hope, is one way to say that the Church 
does not have a politics, but rather the Church is God’s politics for the 
world. If Christians are well- formed by that politics, they hopefully  will 
serve the world well by developing an “ecclesial squint.” By  doing so they 
might just be able to serve their neighbor by helping us see that “it did not 
have to be.” Th at, moreover, is the most radical politics imaginable.
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